Essays in Media Economics by Kerkhof, Anna-Kristina
Essays in Media Economics
Inauguraldissertation
zur
Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der
Wirtschas- und Sozialwissenschalichen Fakultät
der
Universität zu Köln
2020
vorgelegt von
M.Sc. Anna-Kristina Kerkhof
aus Kleve
Referent: Prof. Dr. Johannes Münster
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Felix Bierbrauer
Tag der Promotion: 19.05.2020
I
Acknowledgments
I am deeply indebted to my main advisor Johannes Münster for his support and guidance
since my early undergraduate studies. Without you, I would not be where I am. You always
took me seriously and I could always trust you. Thank you so much.
Many thanks also to my second advisor Felix Bierbrauer, who helped me see the bigger
pictures.
I would also like to thank Jonas Loebbing and Sebastian Mertesacker for countless scientic
and non-scientic discussions over lunch and dinner. You do not know how much I learned
from you.
Annika Bohnhorst, Julian Freitag, Marina Happ, Sebastian Mertesacker, Sarah Recht, Leja
Riedl, Marius Vogel, and Youpeng Zhang provided excellent research assistance. Thanks for
your help!
I also thank Maja Adena, Pauline Aeldt, Ruediger Bachmann, Kai Barron, Davide Cantoni,
Joerg Claussen, Gregory Crawford, Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Milena Djourelova, Ruben
Durante, Marc Egger, Matthew Ellman, Florian Englmaier, Ruben Enikolopov, Thomas
Fackler, Oliver Falck, Razi Farukh, Tobias Föll, Marcel Garz, Fabrizio Germano, Paul Gorny,
Anna Gumpert, Oliver Gürtler, Emanuel Hansen, Julian Harke, Paul Heidhues, Matthias
Heinz, Marit Hinnosaar, Erik Hornung, Steen Huck, David Jaeger, Andre Kaiser, Ulrich
Kaiser, Reinhold Kesler, Tobias Kretschmer, Ulrich Laitenberger, Johannes Loh, Leonardo
Madio, Gregory Martin, Simon Martin, Frank May, Felix Mindl, Florian Morath, Axel Ock-
enfels, Martin Peitz, Christian Peukert, Pia Pinger, Susanne Prantl, Andrea Prat, Sven-Oliver
Proksch, Riccardo Puglisi, Martin Quinn, Alexander Rasch, Markus Reisinger, Maximilian
Schaefer, Paul Schempp, Olga Slivko, Robert Somogyi, David Strömberg, Daniel Sturm,
Frederic Thenee, Kevin Tran, Marius Vogel, Van Anh Vuong, Fabian Waldinger, Alexander
Westkamp, Christoph Wigger, Ilya Zarubin, and Dainis Zegners for helpful comments and
suggestions.
Finally, I would like to thank my entire family for their support and their patience during
dicult times, when I was moody, stressed out, and lost sight for what is really important
in life. You always believe in me. Thank you so much.
II

Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Overview of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contribution to the co-authored chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Advertising and Content Dierentiation: Evidence from YouTube 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 YouTube: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Platform, audience, and contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Monetization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3 The ten minutes trick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Identication: Stylized example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.1 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 Denition of mainstream content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3 Final dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.4 Illustrative evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.1 Baseline regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.2 IV regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6.1 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6.2 Validity checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6.3 Eect heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6.4 Dierentiation along the tail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.7 Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.7.1 Denition of competitive content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7.2 IV regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7.4 Commentator uctuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
III
Contents
2.8 Dierentiation in the aggregate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.8.1 The tail becomes longer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.8.2 The tail does not become fatter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.9 Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.9.1 Likes and dislikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.9.2 Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Incumbency Dominance in Leers to the Editor: Field Experimental Evidence 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Design and hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Implementation and data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.1 Nonparametric tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.2 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.3 Additional ndings: Do newspapers prefer letters that oppose their politi-
cal position? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4 Coverage Bias on Wikipedia? Evidence from Biographies of German Members
of Parliament 81
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4 Empirical strategy and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.1 Basic estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.2 Dierence-in-dierences estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Further dimensions of coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.6 Partisan contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.6.1 Authorship patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.6.2 Talk pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.7 Negative coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5 Selective Sharing of News Items and the Political Position of News Outlets 101
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
IV
Contents
5.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5.1 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5.2 Comparison to existing measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.5.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6 antity Restrictions on Advertising, Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare 115
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.4 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4.1 Economic agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4.2 Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.4.3 Microfoundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.5.1 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.5.2 Eects of a cap on advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.5.3 The optimal cap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.5.4 Endogenous number of broadcasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.5.5 The eects of an advertising tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.6 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.6.1 Pay TV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.6.2 Ad avoidance technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7 Conclusion 147
A Appendix to Chapter 2 149
A.1 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.1.1 Alternative observation period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.1.2 Alternative selections of YouTubers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.1.3 Alternative classications of the treatment group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
A.1.4 Alternative denitions of the instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
V
Contents
A.1.5 Alternative denitions of mainstream content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
A.1.6 Placebo regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
A.1.7 Robustness checks: mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
A.1.8 Validity checks: Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
A.2 Further discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
A.2.1 Misclassication of advertising and non-advertising YouTubers . . . . . . 163
A.2.2 Platform events during the observation period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
A.2.3 YouTuber learning eect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
B Appendix to Chapter 3 171
C Appendix to Chapter 4 173
C.1 Classroom survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
C.3 Party aliation and English biography length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
D Appendix to Chapter 5 179
D.1 Tweet examples (translated from German into English) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
D.1.1 Examples of non-criticizing tweets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
D.1.2 Examples of criticizing tweets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
E Appendix to Chapter 6 181
E.1 Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
E.2 Proof of Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
E.3 Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
E.4 Proof of Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
E.5 Proof of Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
E.6 Proof of Proposition 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
E.7 Proof of Proposition 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
E.8 Proof of Proposition 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
F Online-Appendix to Chapter 6 189
F.1 Additional background material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
F.2 Microfoundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
F.3 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
F.3.1 Deceptive Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
F.3.2 Sector Specic Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
VI
Contents
F.4 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
F.4.1 Television viewing behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
F.4.2 Advertising demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
F.4.3 Technical Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
F.5 Omitted Steps of Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Bibliography 215
VII

List of Tables
2.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 McCrary test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Mainstream content – Evidence from the video level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Video duration and mainstream content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Main results non-advertising YouTubers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7 Main regression, subscribers ≥ 1, 000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.8 Main regression, subscribers < 1, 000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.9 Heterogeneity along video categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.10 Dierentiation along the tail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.11 Mechanism: Competitive content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.12 Competitive content – Evidence from the video level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.13 Video duration and competitive content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.14 Commentator analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.15 Commentator analysis – Non-advertising YouTubers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.16 Quality - Likes / (Likes + Dislikes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.17 Quality - log(Views) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1 Overview of the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3 Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4 Additional results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Basic results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3 Dierence-in-dierence results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Further results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.5 Negative coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.1 Absolute number of Twitter referrals by party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
IX
List of Tables
5.2 Relative number of Twitter referrals by party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3 Overview of the ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.5 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.1 Alternative observation period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
A.2 Alternative selection of YouTubers – median video duration < 7.5 . . . . . . . . . 151
A.3 Alternative selection of YouTubers – 90th percentile < 10 min . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.4 Alternative classications of the treatment group – cutos . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A.5 Alternative classications of the treatment group – all videos ≥ 10 minutes . . . . 154
A.6 Alternative denitions of the instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
A.7 Correlation measures mainstream content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
A.8 Alternative denitions of mainstream content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
A.9 Correlation measures competitive content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
A.10 Alternative denitions of competitive content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
A.11 Alternative cutos for the commentator analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
A.12 YouTube platform events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
A.13 Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
C.1 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
C.2 Robustness checks I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
C.3 Robustness checks II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
F.1 Evidence on advertisers’ inuence on media content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
F.2 Dierent assumptions on television viewing behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
X
List of Figures
2.1 Old ad break tool (before Oct 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 New ad break tool (after Oct 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Stylized example of the identication strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Log-log plot of the number of views a keyword attracts and its associated rank in
the category “Science & Technology” in March 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Trends in advertising vs. non-advertising YouTubers’ share of videos between ten
and fourteen minutes. The vertical line depicts Oct 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Trends in advertising YouTubers’ share of videos between ten and fourteen min-
utes. The vertical line depicts Oct 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 Histogram of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 Histogram of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration after Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.9 Histogram of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.10 Histogram of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration after Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.11 McCrary test of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.12 McCrary test of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
XI
List of Figures
2.13 McCrary test of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.14 McCrary test of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers
from the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The
vertical line depicts the ten minutes threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.15 Plot of all values of closei on the associated average probability to be treated,
Pr(Di = 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.16 Event study mainstream content (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots
and the solid line represent the estimates γˆt from equation (2.5). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.17 Event study mainstream content (non-advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots
and the solid line represent the estimates γˆt from equation (2.5). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.18 Log-log plot of the number of usages of a keyword and their associated rank in
the category “Science & Technology” in March 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.19 Event study competitive content (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots
and the solid line represent the estimates γˆ′t from equation (2.9). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.20 Event study competitive content (non-advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots
and the solid line represent the estimates γˆ′t from equation (2.9). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 German biography length across parties in characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 English biography length across parties in characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1 Main results: The Spearman rank correlation coecient for each news outlet
under consideration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2 Comparison of the Spearman rank order coecient to the weighted PCI by Dewen-
ter et al. (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.3 Comparison of the Spearman rank order coecient to the score by Garz et al. (2019). 110
6.1 Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2 Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
XII
List of Figures
6.3 Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4 Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A.1 Event study likes/(likes+dislikes) (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots and
the solid line represent the estimates γˆ′′t from equation (A.3). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
A.2 Event study log(views) (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots and the solid
line represent the estimates γˆ′′′t from equation (A.4). The dashed line depicts a
95%-condence interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
F.1 Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
XIII

1 Introduction
1.1 Overview of the thesis
Media markets play an essential role for modern societies. A free, unbiased, and diverse media
landscape sustains democracy, freedom, and the public discourse, as the media inform, set the
agenda, and inuence both voters and politicians (Downs, 1957; Coase, 1974; Gentzkow et al.,
2016; Puglisi and Snyder, 2016). Indeed, state-of-the-art research demonstrates that media content
has a causal eect on the economic and political choices of individuals (DellaVigna and La Ferrara,
2015). It is therefore crucial to understand what drives the individual content choices of media
outlets and how potential biases in a media market can be assessed and mitigated.
This thesis contributes to the understanding of media markets by studying the determinants
of media outlets’ content choice, by developing novel techniques to assess media bias, and by
analyzing the welfare eects of potential regulations. To this end, the thesis is organized around
the following research questions:
1. How can we achieve a diverse media landscape?
2. How can we measure media bias?
3. How can we mitigate media bias?
Chapter 2, “Advertising and Content Dierentiation: Evidence from YouTube”, ad-
dresses the rst research question and demonstrates that advertising has a causal positive eect
on content dierentiation on YouTube. In particular, I show that an exogenous increase in the
technically feasible advertising quantity – in other words, the lift of an advertising cap – reduces
the YouTubers’ probability to duplicate mainstream content. A likely driver of this result is that
consumers perceive advertising as a nuisance and thereby similar to a price they have to pay.
Moreover, mainstream content – i.e., content in high demand by the consumers – is provided by
many competing YouTubers. Hence, if a YouTuber who provides mainstream content increased
her advertising quantity, her consumers could easily switch to a competitor. Losing consumers is
less likely, however, if the YouTuber dierentiates her content from her competitors and thereby
makes her videos less substitutable.
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My results make an important contribution to the existing literature; to the best of my knowledge,
“Advertising and Content Dierentiation: Evidence from YouTube” is the rst paper that provides
evidence of a causal positive eect of advertising on content dierentiation. The paper thereby
adds to the persistent and unresolved debate about the consequences of advertising on content
dierentiation in media markets (e.g., Herman and McChesney, 1997; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney,
2004; Gabszewicz et al., 2001; Huang et al., 2018; Anderson and Jullien, 2016) and contributes
to recent discussions about the eect of digitization on content dierentiation and diversity in
media markets (Anderson, 2006; Brynjolfsson et al., 2003, 2011; Waldfogel, 2017, 2018; Goldfarb
and Tucker, 2019).
The media are repeatedly accused of being biased towards the political left or right (Puglisi
and Snyder, 2016). Thus, to address my second research question, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 develop
novel techniques and applications to measure political media bias. Chapter 3, “Incumbency
Dominance in Letters to the Editor: Field Experimental Evidence”, presents the results of
a randomized eld experiment three weeks before the 2017 federal elections in Germany. We
wrote four dierent versions of a letter to the editor that diered in the subject the letter was
about (Chancellor Merkel versus her main challenger Schulz) and in the evaluation of this subject
(positive versus negative). We sent one randomly drawn version to each of over 200 German
daily newspapers and observed whether the letter was published or not. The experimental design
allows us to test three hypotheses on the (systematic) selection of media content on behalf of news
outlets: political bias, negativity bias, and incumbency dominance. We nd no political bias in
the selection of letters to the editor and no statistically signicant negativity bias. We do observe
incumbency dominance, though: letters about the Chancellor were 40% more likely to be printed.
In Chapter 4, “Coverage Bias on Wikipedia? Evidence from Biographies of German
Members of Parliament”, we study if the individual contributions of Wikipedia users lead to
the unbalanced coverage of otherwise comparable MPs from dierent political parties. The central
challenge of this analysis is to disentangle the eect of party aliation on Wikipedia coverage from
the eect of an MP’s characteristics. We address this issue in two steps. First, we study a sample of
relatively homogeneous observations. We consider the 18th German Bundestag (2013 to 2017) and
focus on MPs from Germany’s two biggest political parties, the center-right CDU/CSU and the
center-left SPD, who jointly comprised more than three quarters of all MPs and formed a coalition
government. Second, we compare the length of German and English Wikipedia biographies in a
dierence-in-dierences framework. Partisan contributors are less likely to amplify the English
biographies, since German voters are unlikely to read them. Assuming that unobserved MP
characteristics aect the German and the English biography length equivalently, a dierence-
in-dierences estimation using language as a rst, and party aliation as a second dierence,
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yields unconfounded estimates of the eects of party aliation on biography length. Our analysis
reveals a small to medium size coverage bias against MPs from the SPD. The analysis of authorship
patterns and talk pages shows that partisan contributions to Wikipedia are a plausible explanation
for our results.
Chapter 5, “Selective Sharing of News Items and the Political Position of News Outlets”,
presents a novel approach to measure the political position of online news outlets that is based on
the selective sharing of news items by politicians on social media. Our central argument is that
politicians predominantly share news items that are in line with their own political position, i.e.,
left-wing politicians prefer to share news items from left-wing news outlets, while right-wing
politicians prefer to share news items from right-wing news outlets. Consequently, we can utilize
the politicians’ revealed preferences over news items to infer the political position of the news
outlets. We apply our measure to twelve major German media outlets by analyzing tweets of
German Members of Parliament on Twitter. For each news outlet under consideration, we compute
the correlation between the political position of the seven parties in the 19th German Bundestag
and their MPs’ relative number of Twitter referrals to that outlet. We nd that three outlets are
positioned on the left, and two of them are positioned on the right.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 make two major contributions to the literature on political media bias. First,
measuring media bias is a dicult task, since researchers must nd ways to overcome problems
of subjectivity and the absence of suitable baselines against which to assess bias (e.g., Groeling,
2013). The chapters present three original approaches to measure political media bias that are
applicable beyond German newspapers, German Members of Parliament, and German online
news outlets. Second, knowledge on political media bias in online media outlets is scarce. Chapter
4 contributes to closing this gap by documenting coverage bias on Wikipedia, the world’s largest
online encyclopedia; relatedly, Chapter 5 exploits politicians’ selective sharing of online news
items via Twitter to determine the political position of online news outlets.
The neutrality of media outlets can also be compromised by the interference of advertisers on
whom they nancially depend (e.g., Ellman and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2013). For
instance, advertisers prefer genres that put consumers in a more ad receptive mood (Wilbur, 2008)
and may prefer the media not to report critically about their products (Blasco and Sobbrio, 2012).
Indeed, commercial media bias is an increasingly important issue: given their severe nancial
situation, media outlets may become more and more susceptible to advertisers’ pressures (FCC,
2011). Yet, not much is known about the determinants of commercial media bias and the mechanics
of media markets in the presence of it.
To contribute to the understanding of this topic, Chapter 6, “Quantity Restrictions on Ad-
vertising, Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare”, studies commercial media bias that arises
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out of a conict of interest between consumers and advertisers over media content. We analyze
the welfare eect of a quantity restriction on advertising in a free-to-air television market in the
presence of commercial media bias and thereby address research questions one and three. In
our model, broadcasters face a trade-o between increasing the number of viewers by producing
content that is highly valued by viewers, and increasing the price of advertising by choosing
advertiser friendly content. A cap on advertising drives the per-viewer price of ads up; thus,
content improves for viewers. Therefore, the cap can be welfare enhancing, even when viewers
are not ad averse. Competition among broadcasters makes it more likely that a cap on advertising
improves welfare. Thus, there is a complementarity between regulation and competition in this
market.
Beyond contributing to the three broad research questions from above, the individual chapters
of the thesis are linked through and contribute to three recurrent themes from the literature on
media economics.
First, media markets are two-sided markets, which means that they nance their operations all
or in part by advertising revenue instead of charging their consumers a monetary price (Anderson
and Jullien, 2016). Yet, the eect of advertising on the individual media outlets’ content choice is not
well understood and provokes persistent debates about the consequences of advertising on content
dierentiation in media markets. In addition to that, the media’s dependency on advertising
revenue raises concerns about commercial media bias, i.e., about advertisers inuencing the
content choice of media outlets (e.g., Ellman and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2013; Blasco
and Sobbrio, 2012). Chapter 2 of my thesis adds to this strand of literature by demonstrating that
advertising has a causal eect on individual YouTubers’ content choice; Chapter 6 contributes by
analyzing a model of a two-sided media market with commercial media bias, where advertisers
can exert pressure on the media outlets’ content decisions.
Second, media content can in many circumstances be characterized as a public good. Moreover,
media markets are of general interest since the working of these markets aects not only their
active participants, but also generates important externalities, for example by helping citizens to
take well-informed political decisions (see Batina and Ihori, 2005, for a review on the provision of
public goods and Anderson and Coate, 2005, for the provision of public goods via advertising).
While this applies to all media markets that are covered in this thesis, Chapters 4 and 6 emphasize
this feature of media content.
Finally, media consumption is moving online; in particular, user-generated content is becoming
more and more important (Luca, 2016b). Indeed, three out of the top ve websites by Internet
trac – YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia – are based on user-generated content.1 My thesis
1See https://www.alexa.com/topsites (Dec 2018).
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takes this important development into account and focuses on online media markets. Chapter 2,
for instance, studies the eect of advertising on content dierentiation on YouTube, which is the
world’s most important user-generated content platform. Chapter 4 presents a measure of political
media bias on Wikipedia and Chapter 5 uses the Tweets of German Members of Parliament Twitter
to assess the political position of online media outlets.
1.2 Contribution to the co-authored chapters
Following the graduation regulations of the Faculty of Economics, Management, and Social
Sciences at University of Cologne, this section explicates how I contributed to the co-authored
chapters of this thesis.
The chapter “Advertising and Content Dierentiation: Evidence from YouTube” is single-
authored.
The chapter “Incumbency Dominance in Letters to the Editor: Field Experimental Evidence”, pub-
lished in Political Communication (2019), Vol. 36:3, 337-356, is joint work with Markus Dertwinkel-
Kalt and Johannes Münster. The research idea was developed jointly after we taught the paper
by Butler and Schoeld (2010) in a course on media economics. Moreover, the research design
and the hypotheses resulted from joint discussions. The implementation of the experiment was
mostly done by me. The data collection and the data analysis were entirely done by myself.
The chapter “Coverage Bias on Wikipedia? Evidence from the Biographies of German Members
of Parliament” is joint work with Johannes Münster. The research idea and the empirical strategy
were developed jointly. Furthermore, the data collection was done by me and two research
assistants. The data analysis was conducted entirely by myself. Finally, the current version of the
paper was written by myself.
The chapter “Selective Sharing of News Items and the Political Position of News Outlets” is joint
work with Julian Freitag and Johannes Münster. The paper builds on the research idea and data
collection of Julian Freitag. My contributions to this project include pinning down the current
version of the research question and the precise contribution to the existing literature, extending
the data analysis, and re-writing the entire draft.
Finally, the chapter “Quantity restrictions on Advertising, Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare”,
published in Journal of Public Economics (2015), Vol. 131, 124-141, is joint work with Johannes
Münster and outgrew an early idea that we developed together. Both of us contributed to the
theoretical model and to writing down the nal version of the paper.
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Evidence from YouTube
Awarded the Reinhard-Selten-Preis 2019 and the Best Paper Award at the 3rd Doctoral Workshop
on the Economics of Digitization.
2.1 Introduction
Media diversity and content dierentiation between media outlets are important for modern
societies. A diverse media landscape sustains democracy, freedom, and the public discourse
(Downs, 1957; Coase, 1974; Gentzkow et al., 2016; Puglisi and Snyder, 2016). Moreover, preferences
over media content dier substantially across dierent groups of consumers (e.g., men and women
prefer dierent types of media content) and the more dierentiated the content in media markets,
the more likely it is that all consumers’ preferences are served (Waldfogel, 2007). Hence, it is
no surprise that policy makers undertake great eorts to achieve and maintain diverse media
markets.1
The media outlets’ typical business model – charging low prices to attract consumers and
generate revenue via advertising – provokes a persistent debate about the consequences of
advertising on content dierentiation, however. While media scholars argue that advertising
revenue induces media outlets to duplicate mainstream content – i.e., content in high demand by
the audience – to sell a maximum number of eyeballs to advertisers (e.g., Herman and McChesney,
1997; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney, 2004), predictions from economic theory are ambiguous. On
the one hand, pioneering models on media outlets’ content choice by Steiner (1952), Beebe (1977),
and Gabszewicz et al. (2001) follow the above argumentation and predict that advertising leads to
minimum dierentiation à la Hotelling (1929). More recent models, on the other hand, acknowledge
that many consumers perceive advertising as nuisance and thereby as a “price” they have to pay
(Wilbur, 2008; Huang et al., 2018; Anderson and Jullien, 2016). Taking this into account leads to
the opposite prediction: when incentivized by ad revenue, media outlets prefer to dierentiate
1The European Council, for instance, has recently passed ocial guidelines for the protection of media diversity in
the EU (CM/Rec(2018)1).
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their content from each other to soften competition in the ad “price.” Does advertising increase or
diminish content dierentiation in media markets? Empirical evidence on this question is scarce.
This paper studies the eect of advertising on content dierentiation on YouTube – the world’s
most visited user-generated content platform2 – to resolve the open question. I exploit two features
of YouTube’s monetization policy to identify the causal eect of advertising on the YouTubers’
probability to duplicate mainstream content, where I dene mainstream content as the content
that attracts the largest number of views. First, I make use of the “ten minutes trick”, which is a
discontinuity in YouTube’s mapping from video duration to the technically feasible number of ad
breaks per video. If a video is shorter than ten minutes, YouTubers can permit for exactly one
ad break in it. If the video is ten minutes or longer, YouTubers face no such limitation. Second,
the ten minutes trick was unknown to the majority of YouTubers until Oct 2015, when YouTube
launched a new ad break tool that made its existence prominent to the community.
To identify the eect of advertising on the YouTubers’ content choice, I focus on YouTubers
who produced short videos before Oct 2015, because those YouTubers were likely to be unaware of
the ten minutes trick before the new ad break tool was launched. I classify a YouTuber as “treated”
if she could increase her feasible number of ad breaks by increasing her share of videos that are
ten minutes or longer after Oct 2015, and as control otherwise. Then, I compare the change in
the probability to duplicate mainstream content before vs. after Oct 2015 for YouTubers in the
treatment vs. the control group in a dierence-in-dierences framework.
Since the YouTubers have perfect control over their videos’ duration, they might self-select into
the treatment group. To account for self-selection in the YouTubers’ treatment status, I use their
median video duration before Oct 2015 – in a sense, their “closeness” to the ten minutes threshold
– as an instrument for being treated. The YouTubers in the sample did not choose their videos’
duration before Oct 2015 bearing the ten minutes trick in mind, because they were unaware of
the feature. As a result, a YouTuber’s median video duration before Oct 2015 is uncorrelated to
omitted variables that drive self-selection into the treatment group (e.g., commercial interests). On
the other hand, extending their videos’ duration to ten minutes or more is easier for YouTubers
who were “closer” to the threshold before Oct 2015, i.e., median video duration before Oct 2015 is
correlated to the YouTubers’ (potentially endogenous) treatment status. A broad range of validity
checks supports the identication strategy.
The analysis of around one million YouTube videos shows that an increase in the feasible number
of ad breaks per video leads to a twenty percentage point reduction in the YouTubers’ probability
to duplicate mainstream content. The eect size is considerable: it corresponds to around 40%
of a standard deviation in the dependent variable and to around 50% of its baseline value. The
2See www.alexa.com/topsites (July 2019)
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large sample size allows me to conduct several subgroup analyses to study eect heterogeneity. I
nd that the positive eect of advertising on content dierentiation is driven by the YouTubers
who have at least 1, 000 subscribers, i.e., the YouTubers whose additional ad revenue is likely to
exceed the costs from adapting their videos’ content. In addition, I nd heterogeneity along video
categories: some categories are more exible in terms of their typical video duration than others,
hence, exploiting the ten minutes trick is more easy (e.g., a music clip is typically between three
and ve minutes long and cannot be easily extended).
Recent economic models on content choice in media markets acknowledge that consumers
perceive advertising as a nuisance and similar to a “price” they have to pay; media outlets
dierentiate from each other to avoid competition in the ad “price” as a consequence (see Anderson
and Jullien, 2016, for a survey). I show that the avoidance of ad “price” competition is a plausible
economic mechanism behind my main results. First, I demonstrate that mainstream content –
i.e., content in high demand – is also supplied by many YouTubers. Thus, viewers could easily
switch to a competitor if a YouTuber increased her ad “price.” Switching becomes less likely,
however, when the YouTuber uploads content that is less mainstream and thereby covered by
fewer competitors. Indeed, I nd that an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks leads to a
twenty percentage point reduction in the YouTubers’ probability to upload content that is covered
by many other YouTubers, too. Finally, I support this result by demonstrating that the audience of
YouTubers who could increase the feasible number of ad breaks per video becomes more stable,
i.e., the viewers become less likely to switch to competitors. I nd no evidence for other economic
mechanisms behind my results.
The paper makes at least two important contributions. First, I advance the knowledge on the
eect of advertising on content dierentiation in media markets. To my knowledge, this is the rst
paper that provides evidence of a causal positive eect of advertising on content dierentiation,
whereby it challenges the widespread opinion that the media ineciently duplicate mainstream
content when incentivized by ad revenue. This is a major insight, especially because the media’s
options to generate ad revenue are often subject to external regulation.3
Second, my results contribute to recent discussions about the eect of digitization on content
dierentiation and diversity in media markets (Waldfogel, 2017, 2018). The traditional cost
structure of media markets – xed costs are high and marginal costs are low – impedes media
diversity, because the number of outlets that can co-exist is limited. Goldfarb and Tucker (2019),
however, point out that digital technology has “reduced the cost of storage, computation, and
transmission of data” (p.3). As a result, online media outlets can aord to provide niche content,
3The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, for instance, requires that the proportion of television advertising and
teleshopping spots within a given clock hour shall not exceed 20% (Article 23 §1).
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while enhanced search technologies enable consumers to nd it – a phenomenon that Anderson
(2006) summarizes as “the long tail.”4 YouTube serves as a point in case to study the determinants
of content dierentiation in digital media markets in general when xed costs are low (e.g., online
news markets or alternative user-generated content platforms). In particular, technology alone
may not ensure a more diverse media landscape: although a large number of media outlets can
co-exist, they might duplicate the most mainstream content, while niche preferences remain
unserved. My paper shows that advertising provides additional incentives for media outlets to
dierentiate their content that – when falling on the fertile ground of digitization – can help to
increase media diversity.
I contribute to two additional strands of literature. First, my paper adds to the extensive literature
on horizontal product dierentiation (see, e.g., Graitson, 1982; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986;
Lancaster, 1990; Anderson et al., 1992), which shows that rms’ degree of product dierentiation is
determined by two contrasting eects. On the one hand, a direct eect induces rms to move closer
to their competitors to increase their consumer base, leading to minimum dierentiation (Hotelling,
1929). On the other hand, a strategic eect prompts rms to move away from their competitors
to soften price competition, which leads to maximum dierentiation (d’Aspremont et al., 1979;
Economides, 1986).5 Accordingly, models on content dierentiation in media markets that ignore
consumers’ ad aversion nd that advertising leads to minimum content dierentiation (Steiner,
1952; Beebe, 1977; Gabszewicz et al., 2001, 2002; Garcia Pires, 2014; Behringer and Filistrucchi,
2015). Models that acknowledge the conceptual equivalence between direct prices and consumers’
nuisance costs from advertising, in contrast, predict that media outlets prefer to dierentiate
from each other to avoid ruinous competition in the ad “price” (Bourreau, 2003; Dukes, 2004;
Gabszewicz et al., 2004; Peitz and Valletti, 2008; Anderson and Jullien, 2016).6 My paper provides
causal empirical evidence for the theoretical considerations from this literature. While a related
paper by Seamans and Zhu (2014) shows that an increase in subscription prices is correlated to a
higher degree of content dierentiation, I demonstrate that an increase in the feasible number of ad
breaks per video leads to content dierentiation, because YouTubers want to soften competition in
the ad “price.” Most closely related to my work is Sun and Zhu (2013), who study the introduction
of an ad-revenue-sharing program on a major Chinese online platform and nd that advertising
4See also Brynjolfsson et al. (2003, 2011) for a discussion on the long tail and how consumer surplus benets from
increased product variety.
5De Palma et al. (1985) show that if the consumers are suciently heterogeneous in terms of their taste parameter,
the direct eect prevails.
6Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) nd minimal dierentiation even if consumers are ad averse, but the result is driven by the
assumption of informative advertising. When the outlets minimally dierentiate their content, advertisers choose
lower levels of advertising, because the consumers are ad averse. This implies lower levels of product information
to consumers, whereby the advertisers gain higher margins on their products. As a result, the media outlets can set
higher prices for advertisers (p.292).
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leads to the duplication of mainstream content. Our results do not contradict each other, though.
While ad breaks before or during YouTube videos are a true nuisance to viewers, Sun and Zhu
(2013) explicitly state that the ads appearing on the bloggers’ posts are not intrusive (p. 2317),
which means that only a direct, but no strategic eect operates in their setting. The papers can
therefore be seen as complements supporting the plausibility of each other’s results.
In addition, my work makes three contributions to the literature on user-generated content
(see Luca, 2016b, for a survey). First, I present a novel empirical strategy to identify causal eects
on a user-generated content platform. While existing approaches use variation in institutional
features across platforms (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Mayzlin et al., 2014), within platforms
(Anderson and Magruder, 2012; Luca, 2016a), or conduct randomized experiments (Bond et al.,
2012; Aral and Walker, 2012), I exploit two distinctive features of YouTube’s monetization policy to
identify the causal eect of advertising on the YouTubers’ content choice. Second, I apply this novel
identication strategy to a unique dataset of newly collected data on several thousand German
YouTubers with more than a million videos that have not been investigated before. Third, my
paper explores how monetization aects user-generated content. Since many other user-generated
content platforms such as Wikipedia, TripAdvisor or Twitter do not allow their contributors to
earn money, YouTube oers a unique environment to study this question. Previous analyses show
that users contribute to user-generated content platforms for two main reasons: reputation (Wang,
2010; Anderson et al., 2013; Easley and Ghosh, 2013) and beliefs about a high impact of their
contributions (Zhang and Zhu, 2011). These motives are non-pecuniary and render it unclear
whether the YouTubers react to economic incentives at all. My results demonstrate that economic
considerations matter. In particular, when incentivized by ad revenue, the YouTubers are willing
to deviate from the content they provided before. Moreover, I show that ad revenue does not
necessarily improve the YouTubers’ video quality. Although the number of views goes up when a
video has more ad breaks, the relative number of likes decreases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides background information
on YouTube, its monetization policy, and the institutional features that the empirical strategy
builds on. A stylized example introduces the central ideas of identication in Section 2.3, before I
illustrate the data collection process and how I construct a dataset that is suitable for the analysis
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the details of the empirical strategy; the results are presented
in Section 2.6. Next, in Section 2.7, I explore the economic mechanism that drives these results.
Section 2.8 studies content dierentiation in the aggregate; Section 2.9 investigates changes in
video quality. Section 2.10 concludes.
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2.2 YouTube: Background
2.2.1 Platform, audience, and contributors
YouTube is a video sharing platform founded in 2005 and acquired by Google in 2006. Its reach is
tremendous: with 800 million unique users and 15 billion visits per month, it is the second-most
popular website in the world (after google.com).7 As of Oct 2018, several billion hours of video
content from YouTube are watched every day.8
YouTube is based on user-generated content. While unregistered users are limited to watching,
registered users can upload, share, and comment on videos. Registered users who upload videos
on a regular basis are called YouTubers; YouTubers, in turn, operate a YouTube channel under their
user name to distribute their videos.9
2.2.2 Monetization
YouTubers have the option to monetize their content; in particular, they can generate advertising
revenue by permitting YouTube to show ads to viewers before or during their videos. However,
while YouTubers can permit that ads may be shown, YouTube’s algorithm determines if and which
ad is displayed to a particular viewer. Thus, there is no direct relationship between YouTubers
and advertisers.10 According to anecdotal evidence – ocial statistics do not exist – YouTubers
earn about three to ve USD per 1,000 views per ad per video.11
Monetization via ad breaks is not open to all YouTubers, though. First, a YouTuber’s content must
be advertiser-friendly, i.e., free of violence, sex, and crime.12 In early 2017, YouTube introduced
a new policy of automated demonetization of non-advertiser-friendly content (also known as
“adpocalypse”) that aims at videos on sensitive social issues, tragedy, or conict; many YouTubers
reported losing more than half of their income as a result.13 Second, while not bounded to a
subscriber threshold before, YouTube disabled the monetization option for YouTubers with fewer
than 1,000 subscribers in Feb 2018. This policy, too, is a reaction to advertisers’ complaints about
their products appearing next to dubious video content.14 The subscriber threshold, YouTube
7See www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com (Oct 2018).
8See www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/ (Oct 2018).
9I use the terms “YouTuber” and “channel” synonymously; cases where one YouTuber operates several channels are
rare.
10In addition to permitting for ad breaks in their videos, YouTubers might also earn money through product placement
and aliate links. In this case, there exists a contractual basis with the advertiser.
11See influencermarketinghub.com/how-much-do-youtubers-make/ (Dec 2018).
12See support.google.com/youtube/answer/6162278?hl=en (Dec 2018).
13See nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/12/can-youtube-survive-the-adpocalypse.
html (Dec 2018).
14See turbofuture.com/internet/YouTube-Screwed-Small-YouTube-Channels-With-
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argues, gives them enough information to determine the validity of a YouTuber’s channel and to
conrm that it is following the YouTube community guidelines and advertiser policies.15
2.2.3 The ten minutes trick
YouTube’s monetization policy exhibits one distinctive feature, which is known as the “ten minutes
trick.” The ten minutes trick refers to a discontinuity in YouTube’s mapping from a video’s duration
to the technically feasible number of ad breaks that the YouTuber can permit. If a video is shorter
than ten minutes, YouTubers can permit for exactly one ad break in it. If, on the other hand,
the video is ten minutes or longer, YouTubers face no technical restriction on the number of ad
breaks.16 Hence, the ten minutes trick can be summarized as
feasible number of ad breaks =
1 if video duration < 10min∞ if video duration ≥ 10min. (2.1)
While the ten minutes trick had long been a hidden feature, it gained sudden prominence in Oct
2015, when YouTube launched a new ad break tool for YouTubers.17 The tool had two eects. First
and foremost, it made the ten minutes trick apparent. In its old version, only a small additional
input box would appear for videos exhibiting the ten minutes threshold (A in Figure 2.1). In
contrast to that, the option to embed additional ad breaks is now permanently visible and points
YouTubers to its existence (B in Figure 2.2). Second, editing additional ad breaks became less
cumbersome. The new tool allows YouTubers to drag ad breaks back and forth on their video time
line and it also oers a preview option to check whether an ad appears at an appropriate point in
time during the video (C and D in Figure 2.2). The old version, in contrast, required typing and
re-typing the point in time where the ad breaks were supposed to appear (A in Figure 2.1).
Their-New-Memorization-Policy (Dec 2018).
15support.google.com/youtube/answer/72857?hl=en&ref_topic=6029709 (Dec 2018).
16support.google.com/youtube/answer/6175006?hl=en (Oct 2018).
17See www.youtube.com/watch?v=z58Ed6q6xQg (Oct 2018).
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Figure 2.1: Old ad break tool (before Oct 2015).
Figure 2.2: New ad break tool (after Oct 2015).
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2.3 Identification: Stylized example
An ideal experiment would randomly assign some YouTubers to the option of showing just one,
and others to the option of showing several ads per video to their viewers, and then compare
the groups’ probabilities to upload mainstream content. Given that the YouTubers’ real life
monetization settings are endogenous, however, the identication of a causal link from advertising
to content choice requires a thoughtful empirical strategy. Though highly stylized, this section
illustrates how combining the ten minutes trick with the launch of the new ad break tool yields
variation in the YouTubers’ feasible number of ad breaks per video that I exploit to identify the
causal eect of interest.
Figure 2.3 illustrates YouTube’s mapping from video duration to the technically feasible number
of ad breaks per video as described in Section 2.2. Consider three hypothetical YouTubers A, B,
and C before Oct 2015, where A’s videos are very short, B’s videos are close to but still below
the ten minutes threshold, and C’s videos are longer than that. Hence, while A and B may only
permit for one ad break per video, C faces no such limitation. Note that this is no regression
discontinuity setting, because the YouTubers have perfect control over their videos’ duration. In
particular, C could have chosen her videos’ duration strategically to benet from the jump in the
feasible number of ad breaks per video.
max ad breaks
video duration (min)
1
many
10
A B
C
Figure 2.3: Stylized example of the identication strategy.
Next, consider the launch of the new ad break tool in Oct 2015. While C is unaected, A
and B realize that they can increase the feasible number of ad breaks per video by uploading
videos that are ten minutes or longer. Pushing her video duration beyond the threshold, however,
15
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is easier to accomplish for B than for A. The key identifying assumption is that although a
YouTuber has perfect control over her videos’ duration, A and B, who were initially ignorant
of the threshold’s existence, did not choose their videos’ distance to the ten minutes threshold
having the discontinuity in mind. As a consequence, the cost of moving beyond the threshold
after it became prominent – and thereby also the probability to actually do so – is orthogonal
to unobserved characteristics such as, for instance, commercial incentives that may also drive a
YouTuber’s decision to increase her feasible number of ad breaks.18
I exploit the variation in the YouTubers’ cost to move beyond the threshold as follows. First, I
consider only YouTubers likeA andB, i.e., YouTubers who were “left” to the ten minutes threshold
before Oct 2015. Then, I compare the change in the probability to upload mainstream content
before and after Oct 2015 of YouTubers who could increase the feasible number of ad breaks
per video by uploading videos that are ten minutes or longer (treatment group) to YouTubers
who did not do so (control group) in a dierence-in-dierences framework. Finally, I account
for self-selection into the treatment group by using a YouTuber’s “closeness” to the ten minutes
threshold before Oct 2015 as an instrument for her treatment status. Thus, my empirical strategy
boils down to exploit variation YouTubers who were close to the threshold before Oct 2015 to
YouTubers who were further away from it (in contrast to comparing YouTubers just left to the
threshold to YouTubers just right to it, as one would do in a regression discontinuity design). A
detailed discussion of the empirical strategy follows in Section 2.5.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data collection
To carry out the above analysis, I collect data via the YouTube Data API and via HTML webscraping.
First, I use the website channelfinder.com to compile a list of all active German YouTube
channels as of Oct 2017. Based on this list, I collect data on the YouTuber level, including a full
history of video uploads by each YouTuber, from the Data API. Finally, I retrieve data on the video
level, including the date of upload, video duration, views, likes, dislikes, category, and keywords.
Note that views, likes and dislikes are accumulative measures; thus, I retrieve these numbers as
they are on the day of data collection.
Data on the YouTubers’ monetization settings is, unfortunately, highly limited; the Data API,
18To be precise,A andB could correspond to three types of YouTubers: (i) those who did not know about the threshold,
as discussed above, (ii) those who knew about the threshold, but found it too cumbersome to permit for additional
ad breaks, and (iii) those who knew but did not want to increase their videos’ duration. The logic that applies to
YouTubers in group (i) holds for YouTubers in group (ii) as well. YouTubers in group (iii) can be interpreted as
“never takers”, see Section 2.5.2 for a discussion of IV heterogeneity.
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for instance, does not provide any information regarding a video’s number of ad breaks. Moreover,
YouTube technically prohibits any automated program from collecting data “faster than a human
could.”19 Hence, although the permitted ad breaks are detectable in a video’s HTML code, a
webscraper could not crawl each video in the dataset within a reasonable amount of time. Instead,
I let a webscraper crawl twenty randomly drawn videos per YouTuber.20 If it detects at least
one ad break in at least one video, I classify the YouTuber as “advertising YouTuber”, and as
“non-advertising YouTuber” otherwise. This compromise allows me to collect monetization data
on the YouTuber level for all YouTubers in my dataset, but forgoes more ne-grained information
on the video level. Appendix A.2.1 discusses the consequences of a potential measurement error.
2.4.2 Definition of mainstream content
I use the number of video views and the videos’ keywords to construct a measure for mainstream
content. Each video is given illustrative keywords by its YouTuber – for instance, a funny cat
video would be equipped with the keywords “funny” and “cat” – which help viewers to nd them
via YouTube’s search engine.21 For each month, for each video category, I compute how many
views a certain keyword has attracted and rank them in descending order; the upper one percent
of the keywords in this distribution is then classied as “mainstream.”22 Finally, I assign a dummy
variable that is equal to one to all videos equipped with a mainstream keyword.23 Note that it is
important to consider each month and each video category separately. First, what is mainstream is
likely to change over time, second, dierent video categories attract very dierent audiences whose
preferences need to be considered separately. Moreover, it is crucial to dene mainstream content
based on the universe of all active YouTubers, i.e., before I exclude observations to construct the
nal dataset. Otherwise, I would compute the most mainstream keywords within the sample of
YouTubers selected for the main analysis (see Section 2.4.3), which is conceptually dierent.
Take the category “Science & Technology” in April 2015 as an example. Videos are given
13, 555 dierent keywords; the three most viewed are “diy”, “homemade”, and “selfmade”. Figure
2.4 shows that the distribution of views over keywords is heavily skewed: a small number of
keywords accounts for a large part of the views. For instance, the upper one percent of the
keywords accounts for 45.1%, while the lowest ten percent of the keywords account for just
19See www.youtube.com/static?gl=de&template=terms&hl=en (Oct 2018).
20The webscraper pauses for eight seconds before proceeding to the next video; crawling each video this way would
take several years. Crawling twenty videos per YouTuber, in contrast, is feasible within three and four months.
21If a video is not given keywords, I generate keywords from its title.
22I ignore trivial keywords that appear in the video categories’ titles. For instance, I ignore “people” and “blog” for
videos in the category “People & Blogs” and “science” and “technology” for videos in the category “Science &
Technology.”
23In that, I follow the procedure by Sun and Zhu (2013), only that instead of blogs’ hashtags I use videos’ keywords.
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0.02% of the views. The numbers are similar for other categories and other points in time.
Figure 2.4: Log-log plot of the number of views a keyword attracts and its associated rank in the
category “Science & Technology” in March 2015.
2.4.3 Final dataset
In a last step, I construct my nal dataset. First, I dene an appropriate observation period. The
central event – the launch of the new ad break tool – took place in Oct 2015. Including videos
uploaded between Jan 2013 and Jan 2017 into the nal dataset yields a sucient number of before
and after observations. At the same time, this choice excludes both videos that are too old – and
therefore not well comparable to more recent ones in terms of content or duration – as well
as videos that were too “recent” on the date of data collection. By leaving at least nine months
between the latest upload of a video and the data collection process (that started in Oct 2017) all
videos in my dataset can be considered as “old”, which minimizes any potential bias that may arise
through the accumulative nature of some descriptive variables such as likes, dislikes, and views.
Moreover, an observation period from Jan 2013 to Jan 2017 excludes the two big demonetization
waves from 2017 and 2018 (see Section 2.2) that could have aected the YouTuber’s content choice.
Robustness checks on my main results using other observation periods and a summary of minor
events that occurred between Jan 2013 and Jan 2017 are presented in Appendix A.1.1 and Appendix
A.2.2.
Second, I determine which YouTubers to include. Following the outline from Section 2.3, I
restrict the analysis to YouTubers “left” to the ten minutes threshold before Oct 2015 (YouTubers
A and B in the example), where I use a YouTuber’s median video duration before Oct 2015 to
dene her “position” on the x-axis in Figure 2.3. Thus, I include only YouTubers whose median
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video duration before Oct 2015 is smaller than ten minutes into the nal dataset. In addition, I
include only YouTubers who uploaded at least one video before and after Oct 2015. Finally, due to
the “adpocalypse” (see Section 2.2), I exclude all videos from the category “News & Politics”, since
many of these videos were forcefully demonetized by YouTube. The nal panel dataset includes
15, 877 YouTubers with 1, 349, 267 videos over a time period of 49 months. Table 2.1 summarizes
all variables used in the main analysis. Appendix A.1.2 shows several robustness checks based on
dierent selections of YouTubers.
2.4.4 Illustrative evidence
Based on the nal dataset, this section provides illustrative evidence of the two major arguments
in Section 2.3. That is, I conrm that the launch of the new ad break tool made the ten minutes
trick more apparent and that YouTubers who were closer to the ten minutes threshold before Oct
2015 are more likely to exploit it. In addition, I provide video level evidence for an increase in the
actual (not the feasible) number of ad breaks per video.
First, Figure 2.5 demonstrates that the advertising YouTubers’ share of videos between ten and
fourteen minutes increases after Oct 2015. The non-advertising YouTubers, on the other hand, are
unaected. The diverging trends conrm that the launch of the new ad break tool in Oct 2015
made the ten minutes trick more apparent to the advertising YouTubers.
In what follows, I consider only advertising YouTubers. A further comparison of advertising
and non-advertising YouTubers is problematic, since they act based on entirely dierent motives:
non-advertising YouTubers had neither chance nor interest to exploit the ten minutes trick at any
point in time. Thus, I exclude the non-advertising YouTubers from my main analysis, but come
back to them for falsication checks in Section 2.6.2.
As a second step, I show that (advertising) YouTubers who were closer to the ten minutes
threshold before Oct 2015 are more likely to exploit it. Since “closeness” – in terms of a YouTuber’s
median video duration (see Section 2.4.3) – is a continuous measure, I cannot compare the trends
of distinct groups, though. Instead, Figure 2.6 illustrates that the increase in YouTubers’ share
of videos between ten and fourteen minutes after Oct 2015 is stronger for YouTubers whose
“closeness” is around the 75th percentile of its distribution than for YouTubers around the 25th
percentile.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Mainstreamvit 0.425 0.494 0 1 1,397,267
Competitivevit 0.641 0.480 0 1 1,397,267
Advertisingi 0.764 0.425 0 1 15,877
postt 0.475 0.499 0 1 1,397,267
Di 0.226 0.418 0 1 15,877
Durationvit 6.411 13.341 0 1440.033 1,397,267
Subscribersi 18,234.506 138,282.229 0 6,581,640 15,877
Film&Animationvit 0.086 0.280 0 1 1,397,267
Cars&V ehiclesvit 0.081 0.272 0 1 1,397,267
Musicvit 0.025 0.155 0 1 1,397,267
Pets&Animalsvit 0.026 0.159 0 1 1,397,267
Sportsvit 0.085 0.278 0 1 1,397,267
Travel&Eventsvit 0.056 0.229 0 1 1,397,267
Let′sP layvit 0.085 0.278 0 1 1,397,267
People&Blogsvit 0.202 0.402 0 1 1,397,267
Comedyvit 0.015 0.121 0 1 1,397,267
Entertainmentvit 0.201 0.401 0 1 1,397,267
HowTo&Stylevit 0.064 0.245 0 1 1,397,267
Educationvit 0.046 0.210 0 1 1,397,267
Science&Technologyvit 0.014 0.119 0 1 1,397,267
Nonprofit&Activismvit 0.015 0.120 0 1 1,397,267
I(1stto10th)vit 0.673 0.469 0 1 1,397,267
I(10thto25th)vit 0.581 0.493 0 1 1,397,267
I(25thto50th)vit 0.548 0.498 0 1 1,397,267
I(50thto75th)vit 0.390 0.488 0 1 1,397,267
I(75thto100th)vit 0.284 0.451 0 1 1,397,267
SumAffiliationsvit 2.472 1.160 0 5 1,397,267
Likesvit 631.945 5,993.188 0 1,269,177 1,397,267
Dislikesvit 33.452 532.98 0 149,614 1,397,267
V iewsvit 35,098.614 564,233.77 0 337,832,408 1,397,267
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis.
The variablesMainstreamvit,Competitivevit,Advertisingi, postt,Di, all percentile
indicators, and all category indicators are dummy variables. The variablesAdvertisingi,
Di, closei, and Subscribersi are available only on the YouTuber level.
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Figure 2.5: Trends in advertising vs. non-advertising YouTubers’ share of videos between ten and
fourteen minutes. The vertical line depicts Oct 2015.
Figure 2.6: Trends in advertising YouTubers’ share of videos between ten and fourteen minutes.
The vertical line depicts Oct 2015.
In addition to that, I examine the distribution of video durations before and after Oct 2015 for
the same two groups of YouTubers. Figures 2.7 to 2.10 illustrate three important facts. First, if the
YouTubers increase their videos’ duration after Oct 2015 to benet from YouTube’s discontinuous
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mapping from video duration to the feasible number of ad breaks, one should see bunching just
behind the ten minutes threshold after Oct 2015. Figures 2.8 and 2.10 show that this is the case.
In addition, Figures 2.8 and 2.10 illustrate that it is appropriate to focus on the share of videos
between ten and fourteen minutes: if the YouTubers exploit the ten minutes trick after Oct 2015,
they start to upload videos that just enable them to increase the feasible number of ad breaks per
video. Second, if exploiting the ten minutes threshold it is less costly for YouTubers whose median
video duration was closer to the ten minutes threshold before Oct 2015, the bunching should be
more pronounced for YouTubers with a higher median video duration before Oct 2015; Figures 2.8
and 2.9 conrm that this is the case. Third, the distributions of video durations before Oct 2015
in Figures 2.7 and 2.9 document that the dataset is likely to be limited to YouTubers who were
ignorant of the ten minutes trick before the launch of the new ad break tool, since – in contrast
to Figures 2.8 and 2.10 – the distributions of video durations are smooth around the ten minutes
threshold.
Figure 2.7: Histogram of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The vertical line
depicts the ten minutes threshold.
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Figure 2.8: Histogram of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration after Oct 2015. The vertical line
depicts the ten minutes threshold.
Figure 2.9: Histogram of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The vertical line
depicts the ten minutes threshold.
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Figure 2.10: Histogram of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration after Oct 2015. The vertical line
depicts the ten minutes threshold.
I augment this illustrative evidence with the results from a formal McCrary test (McCrary,
2008), which is based on an estimator for the discontinuity at a given threshold in the density
function of the running variable (H0: no discontinuity). Here, I apply a McCrary test to obtain a
measure for the discontinuity in the distributions of video durations in Figures 2.7 to 2.10. The
results are displayed in Figures 2.11 to 2.14. Before Oct 2015, in Figures 2.11 and 2.13, the estimates
for the discontinuities are small for both groups of YouTubers. In contrast to that, the estimate
discontinuity after Oct 2015 is still small in Figure 2.14, but much more pronounced in Figure
2.12, where I consider the YouTubers whose median video duration was closer to the ten minutes
threshold. Estimates and standard errors of the discontinuities can be found in Table 2.2.
Finally, I show that the actual number of permitted ad breaks in videos that are ten minutes or
longer has increased. To this end, I draw a random subsample of 500 advertising YouTubers and
collect video level data on their monetization settings (52, 462 videos).24 I consider only videos
that are ten minutes or longer. I nd that the average number of ad breaks in these videos has
grown from 0.86 before Oct 2015 to 1.04 after Oct 2015, which corresponds to an increase of
20%. Moreover, the share of videos that has more than one ad break has increased from 17.7% to
20.7%. Finally, while 23 is the largest number of ad breaks in a single video before Oct 2015, this
number has risen to 52 after Oct 2015. Thus, in the random subsample, the actual number of ad
breaks has increased on the intensive as well as on the extensive margin.
24Collecting this ne grained data is only feasible for a small subsample of YouTubers; see Section 2.4.1 for details.
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Table 2.2: McCrary test
Figure Estimate
70th to 80th percentile pre Oct 2015 0.1654***
(Figure 2.11) (0.0640)
70th to 80th percentile post Oct 2015 0.4049***
(Figure 2.12) (0.0604)
20th to 30th percentile pre Oct 2015 0.0035
(Figure 2.13) (0.1609)
20th to 30th percentile post Oct 2015 0.2659**
(Figure 2.14) (0.1356)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The esti-
mates depict discontinuity estimates (log dier-
ence in height) of a McCrary test with bin width
1 and band width 60. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
Figure 2.11: McCrary test of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The vertical
line depicts the ten minutes threshold.
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Figure 2.12: McCrary test of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 70th to 80th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The vertical
line depicts the ten minutes threshold.
Figure 2.13: McCrary test of the distribution of video durations before Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The vertical
line depicts the ten minutes threshold.
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Figure 2.14: McCrary test of the distribution of video durations after Oct 2015 for YouTubers from
the 20th to 30th percentile in median video duration before Oct 2015. The vertical
line depicts the ten minutes threshold.
2.5 Empirical strategy
2.5.1 Baseline regression
This section formalizes the empirical strategy outlined in Section 2.3. As a rst step in the empirical
analysis, I dene the treatment and the control group. Following the outline from Section 2.3,
I classify a YouTuber as treated if she could increase the feasible number of ad breaks in her
videos after Oct 2015. To this end, I compute each YouTuber’s share of videos between ten and
fourteen minutes before and after Oct 2015; if this share has increased by at least ve percentage
points, YouTuber i is assigned to the treatment group (2, 513 YouTubers), and to the control
group otherwise (8, 086 YouTubers). See Appendix A.1.3 for robustness checks that use other
classications of the treatment and the control group.
The baseline dierence-in-dierences regression is given by
Mainstreamvit = βDi ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τtit + vit, (2.2)
where Di indicates the treatment group, postt indicates all months after Oct 2015, Xvit controls
for video categories, φi and φt are YouTuber and monthly xed eects, respectively, and ti is a
YouTuber specic linear time trend. The dependent variable Mainstreamvit is a dummy variable
equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a mainstream keyword, and zero otherwise
(see Section 2.4.2 for details). Thus, I estimate a Linear Probability Model and the parameter β
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measures the average percentage point change in the probability to upload mainstream content
for YouTubers in the treatment relative to the control group.
2.5.2 IV regression
Model
An OLS estimation of equation (2.2) is unlikely to yield a causal estimate of the eect of advertising
on the probability to upload mainstream content for three interrelated reasons. First, YouTubers
can self-select into the treatment group. This applies, for instance, to particularly money-loving
YouTubers. If these YouTubers are at the same time more likely to upload mainstream content,
the OLS estimate for β would be upward biased. Second, omitted YouTuber specic time-varying
factors that are neither captured in the YouTuber specic linear time trend nor in YouTuber or
monthly xed eects may drive Mainstreamvit and Di at the same time. To stick with the
example, some YouTubers may develop a taste for money over time. If these YouTubers are more
likely to upload mainstream content, the OLS estimate of β would, again, be upward biased. Finally,
reverse causality may generate a spurious relationship between Mainstreamvit and Di. If, for
instance, YouTubers who produce more mainstream content are more likely and more willing to
increase their number of ad breaks per video, the OLS estimate for β would be upward biased, too.
To account for the endogeneity in a YouTuber’s treatment status, I use YouTubers’ median video
duration before Oct 2015 as an instrument for Di. The rst stage equation is given by
Di ∗ postt = piclosei ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τtit + uvit (2.3)
where closei denotes the median video duration of YouTuber i before Oct 2015. The interpretation
is as follows. If closei is a valid instrument (a discussion follows in Section 2.5.2), it initiates a
causal chain. As good as random variation in closei generates as good as random variation in Di,
which is isolated by the rst stage. Using this exogenous variation, I can consistently estimate β
in equation (2.2) using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS).
The reduced form of equations (2.2) and (2.3) is given by
Mainstreamvit = γclosei ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τtit + vvit. (2.4)
The parameters β in equation (2.2) and γ in equation (2.4) answer dierent questions. The
parameter γ is the average eect of an additional unit of closei – i.e., an additional minute –
on the dierence in the probability to upload mainstream content before and after Oct 2015.
In other words, γ measures how a better chance to increase the feasible number of ad breaks
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per video aects the probability to upload mainstream content, whereby it is comparable to an
intention-to-treatment eect. In contrast to that, β is the average eect of the actual treatment
status Di on the dierence in the probability to upload mainstream content before and after Oct
2015.
Instrument heterogeneity
The instrument closei is likely to aect dierent YouTubers in dierent ways. In particular, some
YouTubers’ treatment status may be entirely unchanged. On the one hand, some YouTubers have
no interest in increasing their feasible number of ad breaks per video; these YouTubers remain
untreated, no matter how close to the ten minutes threshold they are. On the other hand, some
YouTubers are desperate to increase the feasible number of ad breaks per video; these YouTubers
pursue the treatment, no matter how far away from the ten minutes threshold they are. Thus, the
2SLS estimate for β measures a Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE, see Angrist and Imbens,
1995), i.e., a weighted average of the individual treatment eects, where the weights capture the
individual magnitudes of pii, i.e., the extent to which closei aects Pr(Di = 1).
Instrument validity
The validity of closei as instrument for Di hinges on four requirements: Instrument relevance,
the exclusion restriction, instrument independence, and monotonicity. These requirements are
now discussed.
Instrument relevance First, the parameter pi in the rst stage equation (2.3) must be non-zero,
which means that closei must be correlated to Di. It is plausible that the closer a YouTuber’s
position to the ten minutes threshold before Oct 2015, the easier it is to produce videos that are
ten minutes or longer after Oct 2015, for instance, because she does not have to deviate far from
her former concepts or because she does not have to spend much additional eort. Illustrative
evidence is provided by Figures 2.6, 2.8, and 2.10 in Section 2.4.4. Moreover, a bivariate regression
of Di on closei yields a t-statistic of around 15. Finally, the rst stage diagnostics discussed in
Section 2.6.1 conrm the instrument’s relevance.
Exclusion restriction Second, closei must operate through the single, known channel Di ∗
postt. In other words, the instrument must not be correlated to the dependent variable. This
is a plausible assumption, too. A YouTuber’s median video duration before Oct 2015 – when
the YouTubers were ignorant of the ten minutes trick’s existence – is most likely a result of
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her personal style, taste, or preferred level of eort and orthogonal to whether the video covers
mainstream topics or not.
The panel structure of my dataset allows me to conduct an event study that conrms the
plausibility of the exclusion restriction. Based on the reduced form equation (2.4), I interact closei
with each monthly dummy, using Oct 2015 (t = 34) as the baseline. This specication allows me
to treat the coecients of the interaction terms as the eect of closei on Mainstreamvit relative
to a base month just before the YouTubers could start to adapt their content. The event study
regression equation is given by
Mainstreamvit =
33∑
t=1
γtclosei∗pret+
49∑
t=35
γtclosei∗postt+θXvit+φi+φt+τtit+vvit. (2.5)
The interpretation of this approach is analogous to checking the validity of a parallel trends
assumption. While the indirect impact of closei on Mainstreamvit may accumulate over time,
it should not begin before a YouTuber became aware of the new ad break tool, i.e., before the
treatment status Di was switched on. Thus, if the only way closei aects the dependent variable
Mainstreamvit is via Di ∗ postt, then all estimates γt, t ≤ 33, should be close to zero and be
statistically insignicant. In contrast, the estimates γt, t ≥ 35, should be unequal to zero and
statistically signicant.
Instrument independence In addition to the exclusion restriction, the instrument closei must
be independent of potential outcomes and potential treatments. In other words, closei must be as
good as randomly assigned such that the rst stage captures the causal eect of closei onDi. Note
that reverse causality is of no concern here, because closei is by denition determined before, and
Di after Oct 2015. Yet, YouTuber specic time-varying factors that drive both closei and Di as
well as the potential manipulation of closei on behalf of the YouTubers – in the sense that they
choose high values of closei to increase their treatment probability – may be an issue.
Four facts, however, argue against the manipulation of closei. First, the ten minutes trick was
unknown until Oct 2015. Second, YouTube did not announce the new ad break tool before its
launch, so the knowledge of the ten minutes trick caught the YouTubers unprepared.25 Third,
YouTubers do not benet from higher values of closei before Oct 2015, since the number of ad
breaks per video is limited to one, irrespective of how close their are to the threshold. Finally, if a
YouTuber chose a high value of closei to increase her treatment probability, she must know about
the ten minutes trick; if she knew about the ten minutes trick, she would either exploit or ignore
25I searched through the YouTube creators blog (https://youtube-creators.googleblog.com/) and
found no entries announcing the new ad break tool from before Oct 2015.
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it, but she would not just move closer to the threshold.
It remains to rule out that unobserved YouTuber specic time-varying factors drive both closei
and Di. Three arguments speak against such concerns. First, ti in equation (2.3) controls for
YouTuber specic linear time trends; in Appendix A.2.3, I also include higher order polynomials
of ti into equation (2.3). Second, while commercial interests are a plausible driver of Di, they are
unlikely to aect closei, as argued above. Third, YouTubers with a strong commercial interest
might self-select into particular video categories that, in turn, require a certain video duration.
The vectorXvit in equation (2.3), however, captures category specic characteristics and therefore
prohibits that closei is indirectly driven by a YouTuber’s commercial interest.
Monotonicity Finally, while closei may have no eect on some YouTubers (see Section 2.5.2),
those who are aected must be aected in the same direction, i.e., pii ≥ 0 ∀ i. Again, this is a
plausible assumption: it is hard to believe that a high value of closei prohibits treatment from
YouTubers who would have been treated if closei was low. Figure 2.15 provides illustrative
evidence. It plots all values of closei against the corresponding probability of treatment, Pr(Di =
1). With the exception of some outliers at the upper left and the lower right corner, the relationship
between closei and Pr(Di = 1) is monotone.
Figure 2.15: Plot of all values of closei on the associated average probability to be treated, Pr(Di =
1).
Note that I might violate the monotonicity assumption if I used a continuous measure of
treatment intensity – i.e., the extent to which a YouTuber increases her share of videos that are ten
minutes or longer – instead of the binary treatment status Di. As argued, YouTubers with high
values of closei have a higher probability to increase their share of videos that are ten minutes
or longer. At the same time, however, they have less scope to do so, because their initial share of
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videos that are ten minutes or longer is already high. Hence, while the impact of closei on the
extensive margin of treatment is monotone and increasing – as shown above – it might follow an
inverted U-shape on the intensive margin.
Additional requirements
In addition to the validity of the instrument, two further requirements must be fullled. First, to
be consistent with the idea of the identication strategy, the eect of an increase in the feasible
number of ad breaks per video on the probability to upload mainstream content must be driven by
the videos that are ten minutes or longer. Second, video duration as such must not have a direct
impact on the probability to upload mainstream content. These additional requirements are now
discussed.
Evidence from the video level The parameter β in equation (2.2) aggregates the eect of an
increase in the feasible number of ad breaks on the probability to upload mainstream content
on the YouTuber level. The aggregation is coherent with my empirical strategy: the instrument
provides as good as random variation on the YouTuber level, too. Yet, to check if the aggregate
eect is driven by videos that are ten minutes or longer, I augment the rst stage regression
equation (2.3) to
I(≥ 10)vit = αclosei ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τtit + υvit|Mainstreamvit, (2.6)
where I(≥ 10)vit indicates if video v of YouTuber i in month t is ten minutes or longer. Then, I
estimate equation (2.6) by OLS for mainstream and for non-mainstream content separately.
The interpretation is as follows. The parameter α measures the eect of an additional unit of
closei on the probability that a video is ten minutes or longer, conditional on whether the video
is mainstream or not. Suppose β in equation (2.2) is negative, i.e., an (aggregate) increase in the
feasible number of ad breaks per videos reduces the probability to upload mainstream content. If
the aggregate eect is driven by the videos that are ten minutes or longer, the OLS estimate for
α should be positive and statistically signicant when I condition on non-mainstream content,
because the probability that a video is ten minutes or longer increases within this subsample. In
contrast to that, the OLS estimate forα should be close to zero and not statistically signicant when
I condition on mainstream content. Note that reverse causality concerns prohibit an interaction
of the term closei ∗ postt in equation (2.6) with a dummy that indicates mainstream content
and a corresponding regression based on the entire sample. If, for instance, an increase in the
feasible number of ad breaks led to a reduction in the probability to upload mainstream content,
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the estimate for the triple interaction would be downward biased.
Video duration and mainstream content Finally, when a YouTuber is treated, not only
her treatment status Di changes, but – by construction – her videos’ duration increases, too.
Hence, I must also ensure that video duration as such does not aect the dependent variable
Mainstreamvit.
The diculty resembles a regression discontinuity design: when comparing observations left
and right to a cuto, not only the treatment status, but also the value of the assignment variable
determining the treatment status changes. Standard regression discontinuity designs would
include the assignment variable as a control. Simply controlling for video duration may, however,
be problematic in my application, since the videos’ duration after Oct 2015 may be manipulated to
exploit the ten minutes trick. In contrast to that, the videos’ duration before Oct 2015 is – similar
to the instrument closei – likely to be as good as randomly assigned. Hence, I run the following
regression
Mainstreamvit = δdurationvit + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + vit | t ≤ 33 (2.7)
including only the time period before Oct 2015, where I expect δ to be close to zero and statistically
insignicant.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main results
Table 2.3 presents the main results. Columns 1 to 3 show the results from the potentially biased
OLS estimation of equation (2.2). The estimates are close to zero and not statistically signicant
despite the large sample size. In contrast to that, the estimates obtained by a 2SLS estimation of
equations (2.2) and (2.3), displayed in columns 4 to 6, are negative and statistically signicant at the
1%-level. According to these estimates, an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video
decreases the probability to duplicate mainstream content by about twenty percentage points. The
eect size is considerable: it corresponds to 40% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable
Mainstreamvit and to around 50% of its baseline value 0.448. The large dierence between the
OLS and the 2SLS estimates conrms the endogeneity concerns expressed earlier: YouTubers’
self-selection into treatment, omitted YouTuber specic time-varying factors as well as reverse
causality may lead to an upward bias in the estimate for β when not taken into account.
The rst stage diagnostics in columns 4 to 6 conrm the validity of my empirical strategy. Having
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been closer to the ten minutes threshold before Oct 2015 leads to a higher treatment probability:
an additional unit of closei (i.e., an additional minute) increases the treatment probability by
about 2.9 percentage points. The estimate is highly statistically signicant. Moreover, an F -
statistic between 144 and 151 demonstrates the strength of the instrument (Stock and Yogo, 2002;
Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Finally, columns 7 to 9 show the reduced form estimates of equation (2.4). As argued in Section
2.5, these estimates measure the eect of an additional unit of closei on the probability to duplicate
mainstream content. Consistent with the results from the 2SLS regression, the estimates are
negative: a one unit increase in closei leads to a 0.6 percentage point reduction in the probability
to duplicate mainstream content. Though small, the estimates are statistically signicant at the
1%-level.
In sum, the results presented in Table 2.3 lead to the conclusion that the exogenous increase in
the feasible number of ad breaks per video causes a considerable reduction in the probability to
duplicate mainstream content. In other words, I nd evidence that advertising has a causal positive
eect on content dierentiation. The results match the theoretical considerations discussed in
Section 2.1: when the YouTubers increase the number of ad breaks in their videos, they raise the
ad “price” that their viewers have to pay. A higher ad “price”, in turn, goes along with higher
content dierentiation. A detailed discussion of the economic mechanism follows in Section 2.7.
Appendix A.1.5 shows that the main results are robust to alternative measures of mainstream
content.
2.6.2 Validity checks
Exclusion restriction
This section conrms the plausibility of the exclusion restriction as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
Figure 2.16 presents the results of the event study. The dots connected by the solid line display the
estimates γt from a regression of equation (2.5), the dashed lines depict a 95% condence interval.
The estimates for γt, t ∈ [1, 33], uctuate around zero without a visible trend. The lion’s share of
the estimates is not statistically signicant at the 5%-level. In contrast to that, the estimates for
γt, t ∈ [35, 49], are negative and downward trending. Moreover, most estimates are statistically
signicant at the 5%-level. Hence, closei had no clear and statistically signicant eect on the
dependent variable Mainstreamvit before Oct 2015, but a clear negative and increasingly strong
eect after Oct 2015. See Appendix A.1.6 for a series of placebo regressions that supports the
plausibility of the exclusion restriction, too.
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Table 2.3: Main results
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red.Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.009 0.006 0.006 -0.209∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0505) (0.0491) (0.0480)
closei ∗ postt -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
First stage 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 144.13 143.85 151.32
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on
using the advertising YouTubers only. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 2.16: Event study mainstream content (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots and the
solid line represent the estimates γˆt from equation (2.5). The dashed line depicts a
95%-condence interval.
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Additional requirements
Next, I show that the additional requirements from Section 2.5.2 are fullled. First, Table 2.4
displays the results from an OLS regression of equation (2.6) on the subsample of mainstream
videos (columns 1 to 3) and on the subsample of non-mainstream videos (columns 4 to 6). While
the OLS estimate of α is small and not statistically signicant in columns 1 to 3, it is around
six times larger and statistically signicant at the 5%-level in columns 4 to 6. These results are
consistent with the ideas from Section 2.5.2. If the estimate for β is negative and if this aggregate
eect is driven by the videos that are ten minutes or longer, the estimate for α should be close to
zero when considering only mainstream, and positive when considering only non-mainstream
content.
Table 2.4: Mainstream content – Evidence from the video level
Mainstream Mainstream Mainstream Non-main. Non-main. Non-main.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
closei ∗ postt 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Time FE X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X
YouTubers 9,855 9,855 9,855 10,248 10,248 10,248
Videos 477,532 477,532 477,532 589,468 589,468 589,468
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is I(≥ 10)vit which is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is ten minutes or longer, and 0 otherwise.
All estimates are obtained by OLS and based on using the advertising YouTubers only. In addition, the
estimates in Columns 1 to 3 are based on videos classied as mainstream. The estimates in Columns 4 to 6
are based on videos classied as non-mainstream. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Second, I consider the regression results from equation (2.7). Table 2.5 shows that the estimate
for δ in equation (2.7) is very small and statistically insignicant. Thus, I nd no evidence in my
data that video duration as such directly aects Mainstreamvit.
Non-advertising YouTubers
The non-advertising YouTubers, whom I do not consider in the main analysis, allow me to conduct
two additional validity checks. The non-advertising YouTubers’ content choices are not driven by
commercial considerations. As a consequence, their probability to upload mainstream content
cannot be aected by the launch of the new ad break tool in Oct 2015. Hence, non-advertising
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Table 2.5: Video duration and mainstream content
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
video 0.0000760 0.0000125 0.0000119
duration (0.000103) (0.000101) (0.000101)
Time FE X X X
YouTuber FE X X X
Controls X X
YouTuber Time Trend X
YouTubers 10,113 10,113 10,113
Videos 566,079 566,079 566,079
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is
equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The
estimates are based on using the advertising YouTubers only.
Moreover, the estimates are based on a regression that ex-
cludes all months t ≥ 34. Standard errors are clustered on
the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
YouTubers who are classied as “treated” must have increased their share of videos between ten
and fourteen minutes for reasons other than exploiting the ten minutes trick. As a consequence,
the estimate for β should be close to zero and statistically insignicant when I estimate equations
(2.2) and (2.3) by 2SLS on the non-advertising YouTubers only.
The regression results in Table 2.6 support these considerations. While the potentially biased
OLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 are positive and signicant at the 5%-level, both the IV estimates
(columns 4 to 6), and the reduced form estimates (columns 7 to 9) are close to zero and statistically
insignicant.
Figure 2.17 provides an additional plausibility check of the exclusion restriction. If the only way
the instrument closei aects the dependent variable Mainstreamvit is via the increase of the
feasible number of ad breaks per video, then all estimates γt obtained when estimating equation
(2.5) on the subsample of non-advertising YouTubers should be close to zero and be statistically
insignicant. Figure 2.17 demonstrates that this is the case.
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Table 2.6: Main results non-advertising YouTubers
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red. Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.033∗∗ 0.0364∗∗ 0.0364∗∗ 0.0227 -0.0121 -0.0125
(0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0938) (0.0894) (0.0886)
closei ∗ postt 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021)
First stage 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
F-test of excluded 45.74 45.81 47.70
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 5,278 5,278 5,278 5,278 5,278 5,278 5,278 5,278 5,278
Videos 329,725 329,725 329,725 329,725 329,725 329,725 329,725 329,725 329,725
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a popular keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on using
the non-advertising YouTubers only. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 2.17: Event study mainstream content (non-advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots
and the solid line represent the estimates γˆt from equation (2.5). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval.
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2.6.3 Eect heterogeneity
One particular strength of my dataset is its size, which allows me to conduct a series of subgroup
analyses. To this end, this sections illustrates eect heterogeneity along two dimensions. First, I
show that the average eect from Section 2.6.1 is driven by YouTubers with many subscribers.
Second, I document that some video categories are more exible regarding their typical video
duration, which leads to heterogeneity on the rst stage.
Heterogeneity along the subscriber count
The adaption of video content entails costs. The YouTubers must deviate from the content they
were producing before, which may force them to focus on topics that they are less intrinsically
motivated to cover. The larger a YouTuber’s audience, however, the higher is her benet from
additional ad breaks and therefore also the probability that the additional ad revenue covers
the costs. To conrm that the eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks on the
probability to upload mainstream content is stronger for YouTubers with a high subscriber count,
I split my sample at the 1, 000 subscriber threshold – which roughly corresponds to the median
number of subscribers – and consider YouTubers with at least 1, 000, and YouTubers with fewer
than 1, 000 subscribers separately.26 Note that reverse causality prohibits including the subscriber
count as an interaction term. If, for instance, YouTubers who upload much mainstream content
have a larger audience, I would overestimate the eect of a YouTuber’s subscriber count.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the results from regressing equations (2.2) and (2.3) on the two sub-
samples. The potentially biased OLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 are close to zero and statistically
insignicant in both tables. The 2SLS estimates, however, are larger than the average eect in
Table 2.3 when considering the YouTubers with at least 1, 000 subscribers, but close to zero for the
other subsample. The rst stage estimates follow a similar pattern: they are around 15% smaller
than in Table 2.3 when considering YouTubers with fewer than 1, 000 subscribers, but statistically
signicant at the 1%-level in both cases. Finally, consistent with the 2SLS results, the reduced
form estimates in columns 7 to 9 are larger than the average eect and statistically signicant for
the YouTubers with at least 1, 000 subscribers in Table 2.7, but close to zero for the YouTubers
with fewer than 1, 000 subscribers in Table 2.8. Thus, while an increase in the feasible number
of ad breaks leads to an increase in content dierentiation for YouTubers with a relatively large
audience, YouTubers with a low subscriber count refrain from adapting their content.
26YouTube has also recently disabled all YouTube channels with fewer than 1, 000 subscribers from monetization,
arguing that this is a meaningful threshold for a channel to be considered “eligible” for ad revenues (see Section 2.2
for details).
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Table 2.7: Main regression, subscribers ≥ 1, 000
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red. Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.009 0.008 0.007 -0.259∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0689) (0.0662) (0.0650)
closei ∗ postt -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First stage 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
F-test of excluded 83.08 83.23 86.28
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 5,183 5,183 5,183 5,183 5,183 5,183 5,183 5,183 5,183
Videos 677,590 677,590 677,590 677,590 677,590 677,590 677,590 677,590 677,590
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal to 1
if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based
on using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, only YouTubers with at least 1, 000 subscribers are included. Standard
errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.8: Main regression, subscribers < 1, 000
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red. Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.015 0.008 0.009 -0.050 -0.069 -0.070
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.082) (0.082)
closei ∗ postt -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First stage 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035)
F-test of excluded 48.26 47.79 48.81
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416
Videos 389,952 389,952 389,952 389,952 389,952 389,952 389,952 389,952 389,952
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal to 1
if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based
on using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, only YouTubers with fewer than 1, 000 subscribers are included. Standard
errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
40
2.6 Results
Heterogeneity along video categories
Next, I demonstrate that some video categories are more exible regarding their typical video
duration. For instance, a music clip typically takes between three and ve minutes and cannot be
easily extended to ten minutes. Similarly, a comedy video becomes boring if it does not get the
gag across. To illustrate heterogeneity between the fourteen video categories considered in the
analysis, I estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) on fourteen subsamples that include all videos from a
particular video category.
The results in Table 2.9 reveal eect heterogeneity in terms of the rst and also in terms of the
second stage. The rst stage estimate is close to zero for the categories “Music”, “Comedy”, and
“Let’s Play.” Let’s Play videos are often based on how YouTubers nish video game levels, many
of which include a time constraint. The rst stage estimate is largest for the categories “Cars &
Vehicles”, “Pets & Animals”, and “Sports”, hence, videos from these categories can either be most
easily extended to ten minutes or more, or YouTubers who have the strongest desire to increase
their feasible number of ad breaks self-select into these categories. The rst stage estimate for the
remaining categories is similar to the results from Section 2.6.1.
For the discussion of the second stage estimates, I focus on the categories with a rst stage
F -statistic above 10. Consistent with the main results from Section 2.6.1, all estimates are
negative; their size ranges from−0.0762 (“Cars & Vehicles”) to−0.922 (“Film & Animation”). The
estimates are statistically signicant for the categories “Film & Animation”, “People & Blogs”, and
“Entertainment”, which are also the categories with the highest number of observations. Hence, in
addition to heterogeneity on the rst stage, the video categories dier in the extent to which the
video content is adapted. There are, again, two plausible explanations. First, it could be easier to
create videos that cover non-mainstream content for some categories; in other words, the eect
heterogeneity is driven by category specic dierences (that are not captured by Xvit). Second,
YouTubers who are more creative or more willing to try out something new might self-select into
the video categories “Film & Animation”, “People & Blogs”, and “Entertainment” whose second
stage eect is strongest.
2.6.4 Dierentiation along the tail
Up to this point, I have considered the eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks
per video on the most mainstream content only. In this section, I study content dierentiation
along the “tail.” In particular, I show that the eect I document in Section 2.6.1 diminishes for
less mainstream content until it eventually switches its sign. To this end, I generate ve dummy
variables that indicate alternative percentiles of the distribution of most-viewed keywords (see
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Section 2.4.2 for details): the 1st to 10th, the 10th to 25th, the 25th to 50th, the 50th to 75th, and
the 75th to 100th percentile. Then, I replace the dependent variable Mainstreamvit in equation
(2.2) with each of these dummies and estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) by 2SLS.
The results in Table 2.10 illustrate the pattern. The estimate for β in column 1 is similar to its
counterpart in Table 2.3: an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video leads to a 20%
percentage point reduction in the probability to upload a video that is given a keyword from the
1st to 10th percentile of the distribution of most-viewed keywords. The eect size corresponds to
nearly 50% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable. The estimate, however, decreases
by half in columns 2 and 3, and by about two-thirds in column 4. Finally, in column 5, the estimate
switches its sign and becomes positive. The eect size, however, is small: it corresponds to 15%
of a standard deviation in the dependent variable. All estimates for β are statistically signicant.
To interpret these results, note that a video is given around eleven keywords on average and that
this number is constant over time. Hence, a video can be given keywords from several parts of the
distribution of most-viewed keywords. Bearing this mind, the estimates in Table 2.10 demonstrate
that the YouTubers who could increase the feasible number of ad breaks per video do not move
from exclusively uploading mainstream only to uploading non-mainstream content only. Rather,
they change the “mixture” of topics in a video: they abandon covering mainstream topics – the
more mainstream, the stronger the eect – and cover more of the less mainstream topics instead.
Thereby, the probability to upload very mainstream content decreases, while the probability to
upload not so mainstream content remains unchanged or increases only slightly. Indeed, when I
count each video’s number of “aliations” to the categories displayed in Table 2.10 and use this
count as dependent variable in equation (2.2), a 2SLS estimation shows that videos from YouTubers
who could increase the feasible number of ad breaks per video are given keywords from fewer
dierent categories after Oct 2015 than before (column 6 in Table 2.10).
2.7 Mechanism
This section studies the economic mechanism that drives the results from Section 2.6. In particular,
I show that YouTubers who increase the feasible number of ad breaks per video avoid competition
in the ad “price”: since mainstream content is also supplied by many YouTubers, viewers could
easily switch to a dierent channel if a YouTuber increased her ad “price.” Switching becomes
less likely, however, when the YouTuber uploads content that is less mainstream and thereby
supplied by fewer competitors. I dene a measure for “competitive content”, i.e., a measure for the
most-supplied content on YouTube, and show that it is highly correlated to mainstream content.
Then, I demonstrate that an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video reduces the
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Table 2.10: Dierentiation along the tail
1st to 10th 10th to 25th 25th to 50th 50th to 75th 75th to 100th Sum of
percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile aliations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di ∗ postt -0.200*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.068* 0.081** -0.376***
(0.0420) (0.0380) (0.0400) (0.0356) (0.0315) (0.0959)
First stage 0.0292*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.031***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 152.86 166.70 166.70 168.04 169.44 169.44
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,591 10,591 10,590 10,589 10,589
Videos 1,064,248 1,033,666 1,033,666 1,031,051 1,028,446 1,028,446
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column displays the results of a 2SLS estimation. In
column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given
a keyword from the 1st to 10th percentile of the distribution of most-viewed keywords. In column 2, the
dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from
the 10th to 25th percentile of the distribution of most-viewed keywords. In column 3, the dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from the 25th to 50th
percentile of the distribution of most-viewed keywords. In column 4, the dependent variable is an indicator
equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from the 50th to 75th percentile of the
distribution of most-viewed keywords. In column 5, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if
video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from the 75th to 100th percentile of the distribution of
most-viewed keywords. In column 6, the dependent variable is the sum of a video’s percentile indicators. The
estimates are based on using the advertising YouTubers only. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber
level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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YouTubers’ probability to upload competitive content. Since competitive content is typically also
mainstream – i.e., content in high demanded is also supplied by many YouTubers – competition
in the ad “price” ultimately leads to a reduction in the probability to upload mainstream content.
Finally, I support this result by demonstrating that the audience of YouTubers who could increase
the feasible number of ad breaks per video becomes more stable, i.e., the viewers become less
likely to switch to competitors. In contrast to that, I nd no evidence for a YouTuber learning
eect (see Appendix A.2.3).
2.7.1 Definition of competitive content
First, I construct a measure of “competitive content”, i.e., a measure for the most-supplied content
on YouTube. The procedure is analogous to the denition of “mainstream content” (see Section
2.4.2). For each month, for each video category, I compute how many times a certain keyword
has been used and rank them in descending order; the upper one percent of this distribution is
classied as “competitive.” Then, I assign a dummy variable that is equal to one to all videos
equipped with a competitive keyword. Note that a competitive keyword is not necessarily a
mainstream keyword, too. A keyword may attract many views although it is not used by many
YouTubers; similarly, a keyword may be used by many YouTubers, but does not attract many
views. In my sample, the correlation between mainstream and competitive content is equal to
0.57.
Take the category “Science & Technology” in April 2015 as an example again. The three most-
used keywords are “deutsch”, “test”, and “review” (note that they are dierent from the three
most-viewed keywords, see Section 2.4.2). Figure 2.18 shows that the distribution of usages over
keywords is heavily skewed. For instance, the upper one percent of keywords accounts for 17.4%,
while the lowest ten percent account for 4.4% of all keyword usages.27 The numbers are similar
for other categories and other points in time.
27Many keywords are used rarely – e.g., once or twice – which is responsible for the steps in the plot.
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Figure 2.18: Log-log plot of the number of usages of a keyword and their associated rank in the
category “Science & Technology” in March 2015.
2.7.2 IV regression
Analogous to Section 2.5, the baseline regression equation is given by
Competitivevit = β
′Di ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τtit + vit, (2.8)
where the dependent variable Competitivevit is equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month
t is given a competitive keyword as dened above. Thus, I estimate a Linear Probability Model,
where the parameter β′ measures the average percentage point change in the probability to upload
competitive content for YouTubers in the treatment relative to the control group.
As for equation (2.2), an OLS estimation of equation (2.8) is unlikely to yield the causal eect
of advertising on the probability to upload competitive content for three interrelated reasons
(see Section 2.5.2 for a detailed discussion of these concerns). First, YouTubers can self-select
into the treatment group. Second, omitted YouTuber specic time-varying factors might drive
Competitivevit and Di at the same time. Third, reverse causality may be an issue. To account for
the endogeneity in a YouTuber’s treatment status, I use equation (2.3) as a rst stage again and
estimate equations (2.3) and (2.8) by 2SLS.
Finally, the reduced form of equations (2.3) and (2.8) is given by
Competitivevit = γ
′closei ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τtit + vvit, (2.9)
where γ′ measures the eect of an additional unit of closei on the probability to upload competitive
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content.
2.7.3 Results
YouTubers avoid competition
The estimates for β′ in Table 2.11 are similar to the estimates for β in Table 2.3. Columns 1 to
3 in Table 2.11 show the results from a potentially biased OLS estimation of equation (2.8). The
estimates are close to zero and not statistically signicant. In contrast to that, the estimates
obtained by a 2SLS estimation of equations (2.3) and (2.8), displayed in columns 4 to 6, are negative
and statistically signicant at the 1%-level. According to these estimates, an increase in the
feasible number of ad breaks per video decreases the probability to upload competitive content by
about twenty percentage points; the eect size corresponds to 42% of a standard deviation in the
dependent variable Competitivevit and to around 30% of its baseline value 0.65. As in Section
2.6.1, the large dierence between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates conrms the endogeneity
concerns about a YouTuber’s treatment status Di. Finally, columns 7 to 9 show the reduced form
estimates of equation (2.9). Consistent with the results from the 2SLS estimation, the estimates are
negative: a one unit increase in closei leads to a 0.6 percentage point reduction in the probability
to upload competitive content. Though small, the estimates are signicant at the 1%-level.
The results in Table 2.11 show that an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video
reduces the YouTubers’ probability to upload competitive content. Given that the dependent
variablesMainstreamvit and Competitivevit are highly correlated, this is no surprise. Thus, the
estimates conrm that YouTubers who increase their ad “price” avoid competition over competitive
content, which is a plausible economic mechanism that drives the results from Section 2.6.
Validity checks
Although the measures are highly correlated, “competitive content” is conceptually dierent from
“mainstream content.” This section conducts three validity checks to show that the empirical
strategy from Section 2.5 is also valid when I useCompetitivevit as dependent variable in equation
(2.8). First, I conrm the plausibility of the exclusion restriction. Second, I show that the eect of
an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video on the probability to upload competitive
content is driven by videos that are ten minutes or longer. Finally, I rule out that video duration
as such has a direct eect on the probability to upload competitive content. See Appendix A.1.7
for further robustness checks.
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Table 2.11: Mechanism: Competitive content
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red. Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.212∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0481) (0.0477) (0.0456)
closei ∗ postt -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012)
First stage 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 144.13 143.85 151.32
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Competitivevit which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a competitive keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on
using the advertising YouTubers only. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Exclusion restriction To show that the instrument closei has no direct eect on the dependent
variable Competitivevit, I conduct an event study as outlined in Section 2.5.2. Based on the
reduced form regression equation (2.9), I interact closei with each monthly dummy, using Oct
2015 (t = 34) as the baseline.
Figure 2.19 shows the results. The estimates for γ′t, t ∈ [1, 33], uctuate around zero without
a visible trend; the lion’s share of the estimates is not statistically signicant at the 5%-level. In
contrast to that, the estimates for γ′t, t ∈ [35, 49], are negative with a downwards trend, and most
of them are statistically signicant. Thus, while closei has no clear and statistically signicant
eect on Competitivevit before Oct 2015, its impact is negative and increasingly strong after Oct
2015, when it could operate through the treatment status Di.
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Figure 2.19: Event study competitive content (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots and the
solid line represent the estimates γˆ′t from equation (2.9). The dashed line depicts a
95%-condence interval.
As a further plausibility check, I conduct the event study on the subsample of non-advertising
YouTubers. If closei aects Competitivevit only through an increase of the feasible number of
ad breaks per video, then all estimates for γ′t should be close to zero and statistically insignicant
when considering the non-advertising YouTubers only. Figure 2.20 shows that this is the case.
Although there is a downward trend in the estimates after Oct 2015, about a third of them has a
positive sign, all of them are small, and no estimate is statistically signicant at the 5%-level.
Figure 2.20: Event study competitive content (non-advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots
and the solid line represent the estimates γˆ′t from equation (2.9). The dashed line
depicts a 95%-condence interval.
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Evidence from the video level Similar to β, the parameter β′ in equation (2.8) aggregates the
eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks on the probability to upload competitive
content on the YouTuber level. Analogous to the approach from Section 2.5.2, I estimate
I(≥ 10)vit = α′closei ∗ postt + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + υvit|Competitivevit, (2.10)
by OLS for competitive and non-competitive content separately. If the aggregate eect from Table
2.11 is driven by the videos that are ten minutes or longer, the OLS estimate for α′ should be
positive and statistically signicant when I condition on non-competitive content, but close to
zero for competitive content (see Section 2.5.2 for a discussion). The results in Table 2.12 show that
this is the case: the estimate for α′ is close to zero and not statistically signicant for competitive
(columns 1 to 3), but several times as large and signicant at the 5%-level for non-competitive
content (columns 4 to 6).
Table 2.12: Competitive content – Evidence from the video level
Competitive Competitive Competitive Non-comp. Non-comp. Non-comp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
closei ∗ postt 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Time FE X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X
YouTubers 10,332 10,332 10,332 9,550 9,550 9,550
Videos 693,449 693,449 693,449 373,444 373,444 373,444
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is I(≥ 10)vit which is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is ten minutes or longer, and 0 otherwise. All estimates
are obtained by OLS and based on using the advertising YouTubers only. In addition, the estimates in Columns
1 to 3 are based on videos classied as competitive. The estimates in Columns 4 to 6 are based on videos
classied as non-competitive. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Video duration and competitive content To check if video duration as such has no eect
on the probability to upload competitive content, I estimate
Competitivevit = δ
′durationvit + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + vit | t ≤ 33 (2.11)
by OLS, including only observations from before Oct 2015. Table 2.13 shows that the estimate for
δ′ is close to zero and not statistically signicant (see Section 2.5.2 for a discussion). Thus, I nd
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no evidence in my data that video duration as such directly aects Competitivevit.
Table 2.13: Video duration and competitive content
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
video -0.0000298 -0.0000666 -0.0000695
duration (0.000116) (0.000114) (0.0001139)
Time FE X X X
YouTuber FE X X X
Controls X X
YouTuber Time Trend X
YouTubers 10,113 10,113 10,113
Videos 566,079 566,079 566,079
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is Competitivevit which is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is classied
as competitive, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on
using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, the estimates
are based on a regression that excludes all months t ≥ 34.
Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.7.4 Commentator fluctuation
Finally, I provide evidence of a decrease in the viewer uctuation of YouTubers who could increase
the feasible number of ad breaks per video. If a YouTuber uploads less mainstream content, she
decreases the probability that viewers switch to competitors, because the video supply is lower.
Thus, the YouTuber’s viewer uctuation should go down, which means that a given number of
views should be generated by a smaller number of dierent viewers than before.
Since data on a YouTuber’s viewers is not available, I use her videos’ commentators as a proxy
variable and dene YouTuber i’s commentator uctuation as
fluctuationi =
commentatorsi
commentsi
, (2.12)
where the numerator refers to the number of unique commentators of YouTuber i and the de-
nominator refers to the total number of comments she received. If each comment on i’s videos is
left by a dierent commentator, fluctuationi is equal to 1. If several comments are written by
the same commentator, fluctuationi is smaller than 1. Finally, if YouTuber i never receives any
comment, fluctuationi is not dened.
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Next, I compute each YouTuber’s change in fluctuationi before and after Oct 2015,
∆fluctuationi = fluctuationi,post − fluctuationi,pre, (2.13)
where fluctuationi,post is based on the fteen months after, and fluctuationi,pre is based on the
fteen months before and including Oct 2015.28 A decrease in YouTuber i’s commentator uctua-
tion after Oct 2015 implies that ∆fluctuationi < 0; an increase implies that ∆fluctuationi > 0.
To check if an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks leads to a decrease in the YouTubers’
commentator uctuation, I use ∆fluctuationi as dependent variable in the regression equation
∆fluctuationi = ρ0 + ρ1Di + i, (2.14)
where ρ1 measures how the YouTubers’ treatment status Di aects their average change in
commentator uctuation. To account for endogeneity in Di, I use
Di = ψ0 + ψ1closei + ei, (2.15)
as a rst stage and estimate equations (2.14) and (2.15) by 2SLS (see Section 2.5.2 for a detailed dis-
cussion of the endogeneity concerns). Since fluctuationi is sensitive to additional commentators
when the total number of comments is small – for instance, if a YouTuber has only received three
comments, it makes a big dierence if they are written by two or three dierent commentators – I
restrict the analysis to YouTubers who received at least 25 comments before and after Oct 2015
(see Appendix A.1.7 for alternative thresholds).
Table 2.14 shows the results. Column 1 presents the potentially biased OLS estimate for ρ1. The
estimate is negative: an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video leads to a decrease in
∆fluctuationi. The 2SLS estimate in column 2 is negative, too, but more than three times larger
in absolute value than the OLS estimate. The eect size corresponds to 18% of a standard deviation
in the dependent variable ∆fluctuationi. The reduced form estimate in column 3 is consistent
with the 2SLS estimate in column 2. All estimates are statistically signicant. In contrast to that,
the 2SLS and reduced form estimates are not statistically signicant when I conduct the same
analysis on the subsample of non-advertising YouTubers (Table 2.15). Thus, I nd that an increase
in the feasible number of ad breaks leads to a decrease in the YouTubers’ commentator uctuation,
which supports the plausibility of the results from Section 2.7.3 along with the argument that
YouTubers upload less mainstream content to avoid competition in the ad “price.”
28Since I have 34 observation periods before and including Oct 2015, but only fteen observation periods afterwards,
I restrict the computation of fluctuationi,pre to the fteen most recent ones to increase the comparability to
fluctuationi,post.
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Table 2.14: Commentator analysis
OLS 2SLS Red. Form
(1) (2) (3)
Di -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0232)
closei -0.0014∗∗
(0.0006)
First stage 0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0023)
F -test of excluded 159.78
instruments
YouTubers 5,907 5,907 5,907
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is ∆fluctuationi, which is the dierence
in the commentator uctuation before and after Oct 2015
for YouTuber i. The estimates are based on the adver-
tising YouTubers only. Only YouTubers who received
more than 25 comments before and after Oct 2015 are
included in the analysis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 2.15: Commentator analysis – Non-advertising YouTubers
OLS 2SLS Red. Form
(1) (2) (3)
Di -0.022∗∗∗ -0.039
(0.008) (0.055)
closei -0.0009
(0.0013)
First stage 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004)
F -test of excluded 34.33
instruments
YouTubers 1,462 1,462 1,462
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is ∆fluctuationi, which is the
dierence in the commentator uctuation before and
after Oct 2015 for YouTuber i. The estimates are based
on the non-advertising YouTubers only. Only YouTu-
bers who received more than 25 comments before and
after Oct 2015 are included in the analysis. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.8 Dierentiation in the aggregate
Up to this point, I have studied how advertising aects individual YouTubers’ content choice.
In contrast to that, this section shows how content dierentiation develops in the aggregate. In
particular, I study if the tail of keywords becomes “longer” (i.e., if the total number of keywords
increases), and if the tail becomes “fatter” (i.e., if the concentration of videos on keywords de-
creases). I do not make causal claims here; rather, I pursue a descriptive before-after comparison
to put the results from Sections 2.6 and 2.7 into a broader context.
I have two options to analyze content dierentiation in the aggregate: I could continue to focus
on the subsample of YouTubers whom I selected for the main analysis in Section 2.4.3 or I could
examine the entire population of German YouTubers. Proceeding with the subsample has the
advantage of computing aggregate measures that are solely based on YouTubers who have the
option to increase their feasible number of ad breaks per video, but would not reveal how the
entire video supply on YouTube develops after Oct 2015. Even YouTubers who are not directly
aected by the launch of the new ad break tool may adapt their video content as a reaction to
their competitors’ change in content; thus, studying the population of YouTubers might be more
informative about aggregate developments. On the other hand, the content choices of YouTubers
whom I did not select for the main analysis could be driven by motives that are orthogonal to
the launch of the new ad break tool and its consequences; such eects might superimpose the
treatment’s aggregate eect on content dierentiation and complicate the interpretation of the net
eect. Since no approach clearly excels the other, I pursue both options and interpret the results
adequately.
2.8.1 The tail becomes longer
To show that the tail of keywords becomes longer both within the subsample and the entire
population of YouTubers, I compute the absolute number of unique keywords before and after
Oct 2015. As I observe 34 months before (and including) Oct 2015, but only 15 months afterwards,
I limit the analysis to the 15 most recent months before (and including) Oct 2015.
In the subsample, there exist 607, 358 unique keywords before, and 875, 503 unique keywords
after Oct 2015, which corresponds to an absolute increase of 268, 145 unique keywords and
to a relative increase of 44.15%. Considering the population of YouTubers, I nd that there
exist 1, 090, 355 unique keywords before, and 2, 096, 373 unique keywords after Oct 2015, which
corresponds to an absolute increase of 1, 006, 018 keywords and to a relative increase of 92.27%.
The results match the ndings from Sections 2.6 and 2.7: it is plausible that the total number of
unique keywords increases when the YouTubers reduce the probability to upload mainstream or
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competitive content. The dierence in the results could stem from entry: by construction, the
population includes all YouTubers who entered the platform after Oct 2015, which may further
increase the number of unique keywords that exist after Oct 2015.
2.8.2 The tail does not become faer
To study if the tail becomes “fatter”, I compute a Gini coecient for the concentration of videos
on keywords before and after Oct 2015.29 Again, I restrict the analysis to the 15 most recent
months before (and including) Oct 2015. Note that the Gini coecient for the subsample measures
the concentration of videos on keywords that occur within the subsample, while the Gini for the
population measures the concentration of all videos on all keywords.
The Gini coecient for the subsample is high and remains nearly unchanged: it is equal to
0.800 before, and equal to 0.806 after Oct 2015, which corresponds to an increase of 0.75%. Thus,
the YouTubers whom I initially selected for the main analysis do not dierentiate from each other
after Oct 2015. The result does not contradict the ndings from Section 2.7, though. My measures
for mainstream and competitive content are based on all active German YouTubers. It is therefore
possible that the YouTubers in the subsample decrease their probability to upload competitive
content, where competitive content takes the population of YouTubers into account, but that
the concentration of videos on keywords within the subsample remains nearly unchanged. In
addition to that, the tail of keywords becomes longer after Oct 2015 (see Section 2.8.1). If many of
those additional keywords are used by a small number of videos, the Gini coecient as a relative
measure of concentration remains unchanged even if the concentration of videos on the remaining
keywords decreases.
The Gini coecient for the population of German YouTubers increases from 0.848 before
to 0.862 after Oct 2015, which corresponds to an increase of 1.65%. Here, too, the increase in
the relative concentration measure could be due to the large amount of additional keywords.
It is also possible that further developments – orthogonal to the launch of the new ad break
tool – superimpose the eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks on content
dierentiation in the aggregate. For instance, the growing popularity of the platform may have led
to a large number of entrants who copy from the most popular YouTubers and thereby increase
the concentration of videos on keywords.
29I.e., the keywords replace the households, and the number of videos that use a certain keyword replaces the income
in a conventional Gini computation. Note, also, that I do not use absolute measures of concentration such as the
Herndahl index, because the number of keywords before and after Oct 2015 is dierent.
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2.9 ality
As an extension of the main analysis, this section studies the eect of an increase in the feasible
number of ad breaks on video quality. Two predictions compete. On the one hand, a higher number
of ad breaks per video implies that each viewer is c.p. more valuable than before; hence, the
incentive to provide high quality goes up. In addition, the YouTubers may want to counterbalance
their viewers’ increased ad nuisance costs. On the other hand, YouTubers could not only avoid
competition in the ad “price”, but also competition in terms of video quality when they reduce
their probability to upload competitive content (see, e.g., Bourreau, 2003; Armstrong and Weeds,
2007; Weeds, 2013); as a result, the incentive to provide high quality diminishes. Moreover,
YouTubers deviate from the content they were providing before and which they might have been
more intrinsically motivated to cover. A lack of passion could have a negative eect on their
videos’ quality (see Sun and Zhu, 2013, for a similar argument). The results from two dierent
measurement approaches are ambiguous: while an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks
per video leads to a decrease in the fraction of likes, it leads to an increase in the number of views.
2.9.1 Likes and dislikes
First, I use a video’s number of likes and dislikes to measure its quality. To this end, I normal-
ize the number of likes of video v by YouTuber i in month t by its sum of likes and dislikes:
Likes
Likes+Dislikesvit
. Though straightforward to interpret, this measure reects the viewers’ general
satisfaction with a video, which is determined by its quality and the viewers’ ad aversion. Thus,
even if an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks led to an increase in video quality, a video’s
fraction of likes could decrease if the viewers’ additional ad nuisance costs prevail.
I replace the dependent variable Mainstreamvit in equation (2.2) with LikesLikes+Dislikesvit and
estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) by 2SLS. Table 2.16 shows the results. Again, the potentially
biased OLS estimates of equation (2.2) in columns 1 to 3 are close to zero and not statistically
signicant. In contrast to that, the 2SLS estimates in columns 4 to 6 are negative and statistically
signicant at the 1% level: an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks leads to a 4 percentage
point reduction in the fraction of likes. The eect size corresponds to around 25% of a standard
deviation in the dependent variable LikesLikes+Dislikesvit and to 4.4% of its baseline value 0.91. The
reduced form estimates in columns 7 to 9 are in line with these results. Note that I lose 77, 066
videos that have not received any likes or dislikes.
The results in Table 2.16 illustrate that viewer satisfaction has gone down. It is, however, unclear
if the eect is driven by a decrease in video quality or by the viewers’ irritation from additional ad
breaks. See Appendix A.1.8 for validity checks.
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Table 2.16: Quality - Likes / (Likes + Dislikes)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red. Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.041∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107)
closei ∗ postt -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
First stage 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 130.86 130.60 137.57
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,594
Videos 990,476 990,476 990,476 990,476 990,476 990,476 990,476 990,476 990,476
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is LikesLikes+Dislikesvit, i.e., the share of positive ratings for
video v of YouTuber i in month t. The estimates are based on using the advertising YouTubers only. Videos that received no
likes nor dislikes are excluded from the analysis. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
2.9.2 Views
Second, viewers “vote with their feet.” Hence, I use a video’s number of views as a further measure
of quality. YouTube counts a view if the video is watched for at least thirty seconds; if the video
is shorter than that, it must be watched entirely.30 If an increase in the feasible number of ad
breaks led to an increase in video quality, more viewers may watch the video for more than thirty
seconds. In addition, more viewers may watch the video repeatedly.
Analogous to Section 2.9.1, I replace the dependent variable Mainstreamvit in equation (2.2)
with the logarithm of the number of views of video v by YouTuber i in month t: log(V iews)vit.
Then, I estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) by 2SLS. Table 2.17 shows the results. The potentially
biased OLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 are positive and statistically signicant at the 1%-level.
According to these estimates, an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks leads to a 20%
increase in views. The 2SLS estimates in columns 4 and 5 are more than twice as large and
statistically signicant at the 1%-level, too. The 2SLS estimate is, however, sensitive to including a
YouTuber specic linear time trend: in column 6, it diminishes by about a third relative to columns
4 and 5. Moreover, the estimate is only weakly statistically signicant at the 10%-level. The
30See www.tubics.com/blog/what-counts-as-a-view-on-youtube/ (May 2019).
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reduced form estimates match the pattern. They are positive and statistically signicant at the
1%-level in columns 7 and 8, but only at the 5%-level when I add a YouTuber specic linear time
trend in column 9.
There are two potential explanations for the dierences to Section 2.9.1. First, video quality
may enhance, whereby more (repeated) viewers are attracted. At the same time, however, viewers
express their dissatisfaction with the additional breaks by a disliking the video. Second, there
could be algorithmic confounding of the data (Salganik, 2017, Ch. 3). YouTube, too, earns a
fraction of the YouTubers’ ad revenue. Thus, the platform has an incentive to treat videos with
many ad breaks favorably, for instance, through its ranking algorithm. In this case, the number of
views was not informative about a video’s quality, but only about an algorithmic advantage. See
Appendix A.1.8 for validity checks.
Table 2.17: Quality - log(Views)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. Form Red. Form Red. Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.207∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.297∗
(0.0201) (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.1586) (0.1592) (0.1518)
closei ∗ postt 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044)
First stage 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 144.26 143.98 151.44
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081 1,067,081
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is log(V iews)vit, which is the logarithm of the views video v
of YouTuber i uploaded in month t has received. The estimates are based on using the advertising YouTubers only. Standard errors
are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.10 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video leads to
an increase in content dierentiation between several thousand YouTubers. In particular, I nd
that an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks per video reduces the YouTubers’ probability
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to duplicate mainstream content by about twenty percentage points, because YouTubers avoid
competition in the ad “price.” The results provide empirical evidence for predictions from economic
theory: models that acknowledge the conceptual equivalence between direct prices and consumers’
nuisance costs from advertising nd that media outlets prefer to dierentiate from each other to
avoid ruinous competition in the ad “price.”
The paper advances debates on the eect of advertising on content dierentiation. In particular,
showing that advertising does not lead to the duplication of mainstream content entails two
implications for present policies. First, advertising quantities are often restricted in an attempt to
protect consumers.31 The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, for instance, requires that the
proportion of television advertising and teleshopping spots within a given clock hour shall not
exceed 20% (Article 23 §1). My paper demonstrates that consumers may benet from advertising,
because it increases content dierentiation; policy makers need to take this additional eect into
account when they determine advertising quantity restrictions. Similarly, public interventions in
television markets – i.e., public service broadcasters – grow from the claim that advertising funded
broadcasting fails to serve all viewers’ preferences over content (Armstrong and Weeds, 2007).
My results controvert this argument: advertising leads to more content dierentiation. Thus,
while valuable contributions to culture, education, and the public discourse certainly justify public
service broadcasting, concerns about content duplication by advertising funded broadcasters do
not.
My paper is limited in at least four respects. First, although I present competition in the ad
“price” as a plausible mechanism for my main results and rule out a YouTuber learning eect, I
cannot exclude the possibility that there are other potential mechanisms. For instance, YouTubers
might not only avoid competition to other YouTubers and acquire a more stable audience when
they upload less mainstream content, but the characteristics of their viewers may change, too.
Viewers of less mainstream content could be generally less ad averse or have a higher valuation
of the video content such that they are willing to endure more ads.
Second, I cannot evaluate the eect of advertising on welfare, because I lack measures for
consumer and producer surplus. Although I demonstrate that advertising leads to more content
dierentiation – which is likely to raise consumer surplus (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003) – the viewers
must also pay an increased ad “price”, which works into the opposite direction. Since I obtain no
estimates for the viewers’ ad aversion, my setup does not answer which eect overweights. On the
producer side, I remain agnostic about the eect of advertising on the surplus of YouTube itself,
the YouTubers, and the advertisers. YouTube as a platform is likely to benet from advertising,
31See www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/19083/advertising_
minutage.pdf (Dec 2018).
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though. Advertising leads to more content dierentiation, which attracts more viewers; more
viewers, in turn, generate more ad revenue. Likewise, the YouTubers’ surplus benets from an
increase in ad revenue; it is, however, unclear how their utility from covering dierent topics
than before is aected. Finally, the advertisers’ surplus may go up or down. On the one hand, a
higher ad quantity makes it more likely that potential customers click on their ads and buy their
products. On the other hand, the advertisers cannot inuence where exactly their ads appear,
whereby it is unclear how well the audience is targeted. Hence, it is possible that the additional
costs of advertising surmount the additional revenues.
The third limitation of my paper is that the YouTubers’ per-view-revenue from advertising is
unaected by the degree of targeting. Media outlets’ revenue per ad usually increases in the degree
of targeting, because the advertisers’ willingness to pay is higher. On YouTube, in contrast, the
price per ad is constant, whereby my results cannot be extrapolated to an environment where the
per-ad-revenue increases if a narrow and specic audience is attracted. It is likely, however, that
the eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks was higher, because the YouTubers
had an additional incentive to dierentiate their content.
Finally, I do not discuss any concerns related to commercial media bias, i.e., advertisers exerting
pressure on the media outlets’ content decisions. As argued, however, there is no direct relationship
between YouTubers and advertisers whose ads appear as breaks during the videos, so the issue is
of small importance in my application. Yet, it is possible that commercial media bias arises from
product placement contracts between advertisers and YouTubers, for instance, if the advertisers
want their products to appear within friendly and uncontroversial videos; studying the relationship
between product placement and commercial media bias on YouTube would be an interesting
question for further research.
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3.1 Introduction
Free and unbiased media are important prerequisites for democracy, as media inform, set the
agenda and inuence both voters and politicians. The neutrality of the media can be compromised,
however, by biases of the media themselves, as well as by the outside interference of actors such
as advertisers, lobbyists, domestic or even foreign governments (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996).
While the theoretical literature has singled out many dierent reasons for media bias (for an
overview see Lichter, 2017), its manifestations fall into one of two categories: the way bits of
information are culled and crafted by gatekeepers into media messages (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009).
In other words, media content can become distorted through newsmakers choosing “which events
or information to cover, and how to cover them” (Groeling, 2013). Similarly, Gentzkow et al. (2016)
dierentiate between ltering and outright distortion. The latter refers to a distorted representation
of facts whereas the former refers to a partisan omission of facts in news coverage. According to
Gentzkow et al. (2016) and Puglisi and Snyder (2016), ltering—the strategic selection of facts to
be reported—is more pervasive than an outright distortion of given facts.1
In order to test for the ltering of media content, we conducted a randomized eld experiment
in Germany three weeks before the federal election in 2017. In the experiment, we wrote four
dierent versions of a letter to the editor. The versions diered in the subject the letter was about,
the chancellor Angela Merkel versus the main challenger Martin Schulz, and in the evaluation of
this subject, positive versus negative. In all other respects, the letters were identical. We sent one
randomly drawn version of the letter to each of over 200 German daily newspapers and observed
1Filtering has been documented, for instance, by Larcinese et al. (2011). They unveil a signicant correlation between
the endorsement policy of newspapers and the dierential coverage of bad/good economic news as a function of
the president’s political aliation.
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whether the letter was published or rejected.
The goal of the experiment is to test whether dierent theories about ltering media content
apply to the selection of letters to the editor: political bias, negativity bias, and incumbency
dominance. We compare the acceptance rates of politically left-leaning versus right-leaning letters,
of negatively framed versus positively framed letters, and of letters about the incumbent versus
the main challenger, dening biases as unequal acceptance rates of dierent types of letters.2
The experiment uses a between-subjects design: every newspaper received exactly one of our
letters. Therefore, our study focuses on investigating whether the German newspaper system as a
whole has a systemic or structural bias, while we do not test for biases of individual outlets. In an
additional analysis, however, we investigate whether newspapers are more or less likely to accept
a letter with a political message that is close to their own political position.
Gatekeeping of media messages has long been studied in the communications literature (Shoe-
maker and Vos, 2009). Moreover, a large literature has studied the news factors (which are intrinsic
properties of potential news items) and the news values (their importance for gatekeepers) shaping
media content (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; O’Neill and Harcup, 2009; Harcup and O’neill, 2017). Our
study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, letters to the editor are “an important but
poorly understood form of voluntary political participation” (Cooper et al., 2009, p.131). We study
how central topics in political communication – gatekeeping, political biases, and news values –
play out in the newspapers’ selection of letters. Second, the eld experimental approach allows for
clean tests of several types of media bias by leveraging the methodological benets of randomized
controlled trials.
Not much is known about biases in letters to the editor even though they belong to the most read
sections of editorial pages (Hynds, 1994). They may sometimes even directly inuence politicians’
behavior; for example, it has been argued that Barry Goldwater overestimated his chances of
winning with a conservative platform partly because of the conservative tone of many letters
to the editor (Converse et al., 1965). Moreover, Richardson and Franklin (2004) present evidence
that, in election races, political parties orchestrate letter campaigns. Research on letters to the
editor has mostly studied their content, the demographic characteristics of letter writers, and
whether the published letters adequately gauge public opinion (Cooper et al., 2009). The process of
selecting letters for publication as well as the news values that guide editorial decisions have been
studied by qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews with letter editors (Wahl-Jorgensen,
2007; Raeymaeckers, 2005). Closest related to our study is the eld experiment by Butler and
Schoeld (2010) who compare whether a letter supporting McCain or Obama was more likely
2This concept of bias is related to “gatekeeping bias” as dened in D’Alessio and Allen (2000) and “selection bias” as
dened in Groeling (2013).
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to be published during the 2008 US presidential election. Our experiment adds an additional
dimension of comparison: the positive versus negative evaluation of the respective candidate.
Hence, unlike Butler and Schoeld (2010), our study allows to disentangle political bias from
incumbency dominance as well as to test for negativity bias.
Germany is an ideal country for our experiment because of its comparatively high number
of independent newspapers (Noam, 2016). It is also an interesting case from a media systems
perspective. Germany is a multi-party democracy with a democratic-corporatist media system
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In contrast, previous eld experimental work on letters to the editor
has studied newspapers in the USA (Butler and Schoeld, 2010), and the comparative political
communication literature has demonstrated that results concerning the liberal media system of
the USA do not necessarily carry over to other media systems (see de Vreese, 2017, for a survey).
Empirical studies of media bias face the methodological challenge that the researchers cannot
observe the population of all possible news items from which the media select what they publish.
Therefore, it is hard to establish any systematic tendencies or biases in the mapping from all
possible news items to actual media content. Groeling (2013) calls this the Problem of the Unobserved
Population. One research strategy to overcome this problem consists of narrowing down the set of
possible news items to a specic subset, such as press releases (e.g., Grimmer, 2013; Haselmayer
et al., 2017), war fatalities (Aday, 2010), or ocial economic statistics (Larcinese et al., 2011; Soroka,
2012), where all items in the subset are known to the researchers (see Groeling, 2013, p. 144 for
a review of further studies of this type). Alternatively, researchers can create the population of
news items themselves. As Groeling (2013, p.145) puts it, “Perhaps the ultimate way to observe
the unobserved population is to actually create it.” For instance, eld experiments in economics
that use the well-established correspondence method follow this approach. Here, ctitious CVs
are sent in order to study discrimination in the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004;
Bartoš et al., 2016; Bertrand and Duo, 2017; Riach and Rich, 2002; Guryan and Charles, 2013).
Relatedly, King et al. (2014) generated social media posts in order to study censorship in China in
a eld experiment. In order to study ltering, our study also follows the approach of generating
the otherwise unobserved population of news items the newspaper has to select from, which are
in our case letters to the editor.3
Most of the research on letters to the editor has focused on the printed letters, without observing
the population of all letters sent to the media. A few studies (Foster and Friedrich, 1937; Renfro,
1979) compared the population of all letters received by specic newspapers with all letters they
3In particular, our paper therefore adds to the literature on eld experiments using the media (Panagopoulos and
Green, 2008; Gerber et al., 2009; Butler and Schoeld, 2010; Green et al., 2014, 2017), and to a small experimental
literature on the content selection of newspapers (Butler and Schoeld, 2010; Helfer and Aelst, 2016).
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printed.4 Unfortunately, data on the population of all letters received by all newspapers in a
country are not available. It is dicult, moreover, to entirely eliminate confounding factors in such
observational studies of the relation between the content of potential items for publication and
their actual coverage in the media (see Grimmer, 2013, p.129). The experimental research design of
Butler and Schoeld (2010) oers a clever way to address both the unobserved population problem
and confounding eects by experimentally creating the population. In our randomized controlled
trial, the population is the set of letters that we have sent, and the dierent versions of the letters
are randomly assigned, alleviating concerns about confounding.
3.2 Design and hypothesis
The aim of the experiment is to test for three dierent potential manifestations of media bias, that
is, political bias, negativity bias, and incumbency dominance. We therefore designed four versions
of a letter to the editor that could be classied as (1) pro chancellor Merkel, (2) contra challenger
Schulz, (3) pro challenger Schulz, and (4) contra chancellor Merkel. For brevity, Appendix 3
contains only the translations of the letters (2) and (3) into English.
First, we would like to know whether newspapers are biased, on aggregate, toward the right
or left, when comparing Merkel and Schulz. More precisely, we ask whether letters praising
Merkel or criticizing Schulz are more or less likely to be accepted than letters criticizing Merkel
or praising Schulz.
There are several competing theories about political bias or partisan bias in the media (see
Gentzkow et al., 2016; Lichter, 2017, for surveys). Since many newspapers are prot-maximizing
rms, one might conjecture that their political position is more in line with the center-right and
the comparatively business-friendly Merkel. If this is the case, and newspapers tend to select
letters to the editor that are in line with their own political position, the right-leaning versions of
our letter (i.e., positive letters about Merkel and negative letters about Schulz) should have a better
chance of publication than the left-leaning versions (i.e., positive letters about Schulz and negative
letters about Merkel). On the other hand, many journalists in Germany are themselves more
politically left leaning, and therefore the left-leaning letter might have a better chance of being
published (Kepplinger, 2011). Moreover, newspapers might counterbalance their own political
position by preferring letters expressing dierent political opinions (Butler and Schoeld, 2010),
or they might adjust their content to the political opinions of their readers (Gentzkow et al., 2016;
Haselmayer et al., 2017). We therefore have no strong prior expectation whether left-leaning or
4Perrin and Vaisey (2008) also observe all letters received by one newspaper within a three-month period, and focus
on the content of these letters.
64
3.2 Design and hypothesis
right-leaning letters are published more often.
Hypothesis I (Political Bias). The acceptance rate of letters “pro Merkel” and “contra Schulz” is
dierent from the acceptance rate of letters “pro Schulz” and “contra Merkel.”
Next we ask whether newspapers are more likely to publish positive letters (stating that one
candidate is clearly better, with an optimistic outlook in case this candidate wins), or negative
letters (stating that one candidate is clearly worse, with a pessimistic view of the future in case
this candidate wins).5
Galtung and Ruge (1965) argued that negativity is one of the important news factors in the
selection of news (see also O’Neill and Harcup, 2009). Psychological studies document a negativity-
bias (Ito et al., 1998; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Soroka and McAdams, 2015) whereby people pay
more attention and react more strongly to bad news than to good news. Similarly, Trussler and
Soroka (2014) show that politically interested news consumers have a preference for negative
content. In line with this, studies on media content have found that newspapers are more likely to
cover negative news. For example, Heinz and Swinnen (2015) show that German newspapers report
20 times as much about downsizing rms than about rms creating an equal number of new jobs.
Relatedly, Niven (2001) and Garz (2014) nd a dominance of negative reports on unemployment
in the United States and Germany, respectively. Baumgartner and Chaqués Bonafont (2015)
document a strong negativity bias in general political coverage so that partisan media focus on
the opponent’s failures instead of the own party’s virtues. We test for a negativity bias among
letters to the editor by investigating whether a negative, critical letter stating a worried outlook
for the future is more likely to be published than a positive and optimistic letter.
Hypothesis II (Negativity Bias). Letters “contra Schulz” and “contra Merkel” are more often
printed than letters “pro Schulz” and “pro Merkel.”
The third type of media bias that we test for is incumbency dominance whereby incumbents
obtain more media coverage than their challengers. Incumbency dominance describes the phe-
nomenon that politicians in the government obtain more media coverage than those in the
opposition (see Vos, 2014, for a survey of the correlates of the media coverage of individual politi-
cians, and Vos and Van Aelst, 2018, for a recent contribution). Schoenbach et al. (2001) documented
incumbency dominance in TV news in Germany in the 1990s. More recently, Holtz-Bacha et al.
(2014) found that the press coverage of the 2009 general election in Germany concentrated on the
two main candidates, with more coverage of the chancellor than of the challenger.
5By changing as little as possible only between the positively and the negatively connotated letter, we can be condent
that dierences in print probabilities can be traced back to the use of the positive and the negative connotation,
and not to dierences in the content of the letter, for instance.
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Dierent explanations for incumbency dominance have been proposed. On the one hand, it
can be explained by referring to the “universal news value of political power” (Van Dalen, 2012)
according to which incumbents have a higher news value than their competitors due to the
political power they wield. In particular, in the German political system, the chancellor has a
powerful position, which makes him or her comparatively newsworthy (Hopmann et al., 2011).
On the other hand, incumbency dominance can be explained by the “watchdog role of the media”
(Green-Pedersen et al., 2017) whereby media make societal problems a subject of discussion and
therefore put an emphasis on the responsibility of those that design policy—the incumbents.
Not all of this coverage is positive, however; incumbency dominance often also means more crit-
ical coverage (Green-Pedersen et al., 2017).6 In contrast to a political bias, incumbency dominance
would predict that a letter about Merkel is more likely to be published than an otherwise identical
letter about Schulz, irrespective of whether these letters denounce or applaud their subject.
Hypothesis III (Incumbency Dominance). Letters “pro Merkel” and “contra Merkel” are more
often printed than letters “pro Schulz” and “contra Schulz”.
We test Hypotheses I to III using the non-parametric Fisher’s exact test. In a robustness check,
we control for circulation as Butler and Schoeld (2010) have found that larger newspapers were
less likely to publish their letters. One possible explanation is that bigger newspapers receive
more letters and can thus be more selective. Controlling for circulation might therefore improve
the accuracy of our estimates. Similarly, national newspapers may handle letters in a dierent
way than regional newspapers. We therefore also perform a regression analysis that controls
for national (as opposed to regional) newspapers. In a further robustness check, we control for
the state in which a newspaper is published. Finally, we run a regression where we weight each
newspaper by its circulation.
Ethical issues. The experimental design may raise ethical concerns since the methodology
does not allow us to obtain informed consent by the experimental subjects. These concerns apply
similarly to audit and correspondence studies, which represent established and widely accepted
methodologies for studying discrimination (see Riach and Rich, 2002; Guryan and Charles, 2013;
Bertrand and Duo, 2017, for surveys). By one count, there are 117 studies from 17 dierent
countries using this approach (Salganik, 2017). In this literature, four conditions are pointed out
that jointly justify forgoing informed consent (Riach and Rich, 2004; Pager, 2007; Salganik, 2017):
(i) any potential harm to subjects is minimal, (ii) the study generates socially valuable insights
that (iii) cannot be achieved with other empirical methods, and (iv) the experiment takes place
6In the literature, the term incumbency bonus is widespread. We instead speak of incumbency dominance as this
highlights that coverage does not have to be a bonus for the incumbent, but can be positive or negative.
66
3.2 Design and hypothesis
in a context where some forms of deceptions are not unheard of, so that it does not “pollute an
already pristine ethical landscape” (Salganik, 2017, p. 304).
We believe our experiment fullls these requirements.7 We consciously designed the experiment
to minimize any potential harm for the newspapers’ readers and the wider public. The number of
letters that we sent is small in comparison to the overall number of letters in German newspapers.8
Sending equal numbers of letters supporting and criticizing Merkel and Schulz ensures that our
experimental intervention is politically balanced, although a biased selection of the letters by the
newspapers might result in an unbalanced eect on voters. The letters do not contain any wrong
or misleading statement of facts. They contain an expression of a personal opinion about which
candidate is better or worse, but do not contain an argument supporting that opinion—after all,
the text had to t all four versions of the letter equally well. All letters call for fairness in reporting
and high participation in the election; these are widely shared democratic values to which we
fully subscribe ourselves.
Potentially adverse eects of our study for newspapers could comprise the time required to
read and process our letter, or the opportunity cost of newspaper space when printing our letter.
We believe these costs to be minimal. The decision to print the letter is, after all, the newspaper’s
decision. Dealing with letters to the editor is a typical everyday activity both for newspapers
and readers. Our experiment does not expose anyone to a harm or discomfort greater than those
ordinarily encountered in daily life, and thus meets the appropriate standard for minimal risk
(Morton and Williams, 2010, pp. 479-483).
One might also be concerned that a newspaper might suer a loss of reputation when it becomes
known as biased. Our study is not, however, designed to test for discrimination by individual
newspapers. Indeed our method does not allow this type of inquiry, which would require sending
dierent letters to the same newspaper. We test for the prevalence of biases across the newspaper
landscape, and no newspaper can be identied from our research as biased, as this would require
sending dierent letters to the same newspaper.
To summarize, we designed and executed the experiment to ensure minimal harm (condition i).
Media bias is a hotly debated topic both in academia and the public more generally. Our study
contributes scientically to this debate, generating socially valuable insights (condition ii). As
mentioned in the introduction, any study of media bias faces the unobserved population problem,
and creating the population in a eld experiment is a unique way to overcome this challenge
7At the time of writing, the faculty of economics and social sciences at our university is establishing an ethics
commission. At the time of our experiment, however, no such internal review board had been established, so we
could not have asked it for approval.
8To give a rough estimate, 1604 letters have been published in our study period (September 5 to 24, 2017) in newspapers
that make the letters to the editor available on Nexis; 12 of them (or about 0.7%) stemmed from our experiment.
Note that these are not all letters published (see Section 3.3 for details on our data collection).
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(condition iii). Finally, given the recent debates about media bias, the media are rarely perceived
as a “pristine landscape” that our experiment might pollute (condition iv).
3.3 Implementation and data collection
Between September 5 and 8 in 2017—in the third week before the general elections—we sent out
letters to the editor to over 200 daily German newspapers.9 Our letters were highly topical as we
referred to the reporting of the TV debate between chancellor Merkel and her challenger Schulz
that took place shortly before, on September 3. According to election forecasts, the study period
was quite representative of the last few months before the election, with no major swings for the
biggest parties.10
For the selection of newspapers in the study, we relied on a compilation of German daily news-
papers published by the Federation of German Newspaper Publishers (Bundesverband Deutscher
Zeitungsverleger).11 We visited the websites of all these newspapers to nd out whether there is
an online form or an e-mail address for submitting letters to the editor. If no form and no specic
e-mail address for letters to the editors was presented, we used the e-mail address of the editors.
Many newspapers in Germany have common owners, common publishing houses, or share one
and the same section on federal politics. To prevent interference between experimental units,
we submitted only one letter to dierent newspapers that handle letters to the editor through
one and the same online form or e-mail address. On the other hand, when newspapers that have
common owners or dierent local editions handle letters to the editor by independent editorial
departments, we treated them as independent experimental units.12
One of our four dierent letters was sent to each newspaper, either via the contact form of
the homepage or via e-mail. In addition, we provided the contact details of a ctitious sender,
“Annamarie Richter.” We wanted to use a common name that would not raise any suspicions,
while at the same time making sure we would not accidentally write a letter with the name and
address of an actual person. We chose a common German family name, “Richter”, and combined
it with a comparatively rare rst name, “Annamarie”, which is a version of the more common rst
name “Annemarie.” On online telephone books, such as dastelefonbuch.de, no person
with the name Annamarie Richter can be found. Her address was always the same, except for
the city she lived in. For each newspaper we chose the address Hauptstr. 14, in or near the city
9Our randomization ensures that the version of the letter is independent of the time the letter was sent.
10See, for example, http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/allensbach.htm (accessed on Dec. 9,
2017).
11See http://www.bdzv.de/maerkte-und-daten/zeitungslandschaft (accessed on Aug. 9,
2017).
12This leaves us with about two thirds of the 333 newspapers that are registered in Germany according to BDZV.
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where the newspaper has its headquarters, and the respective postal code.1314 Hauptstrasse is by
far the most common street name in Germany (“main street”) and can be found in most cities
and communities.15 If requested on the online form, we also provided the mobile number of one
of the co-authors, but we did not answer any phone calls. Mobile numbers in Germany cannot
be ascribed to particular locations or cities. We answered e-mails that asked for further contact
details (such as the telephone number) with one standard e-mail providing the requested details.
All letters to the editor and all e-mails included the statement that we would appreciate receiving
a notication of whether the letter would be printed as we would not be reading the newspaper
in the following weeks due to a vacation.16
To nd out which newspapers did publish our letter, we collected notications by e-mail and
telephone from the newspapers as to whether our letter had been printed or rejected. In addition,
we searched newspapers’ websites and the Internet using the general search engines Google
and Bing, for the name “Annamarie Richter.” 17 We also made use of the Nexis and the Genios
newspaper databases, which contain about one half of the newspapers in our study. The coverage
of letters to the editor in these databases, however, is not 100% complete: some newspapers
that are available in Nexis or Genios had published our letter, but it was impossible to nd our
letter in these databases. Therefore, we contacted the remaining newspapers—those that had not
informed us directly and where our search had not shown positive proof that the letter had been
published—by e-mail and telephone after the federal election. For two newspapers, the status
of our letter remained unclear, and we had to leaf through their print issues in order to learn
whether our letter had been printed or not.18
13If the contact form did not indicate that the address was obligatory we did not provide it.
14As most daily newspapers are regional newspapers we had to vary the postal code and the city of the address across
newspapers to avoid suspicions.
15See http://www.strassen-in-deutschland.de/die-haeufigsten-strassennamen-
in-deutschland.html (accessed on Aug. 9, 2017).
16Vote shares of the two main parties dier signicantly across the German Bundeslaender (states). We therefore
stratied on the state level from BDZV (2017), which reports the newspapers’ state by merging the city-states of
Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg with the surrounding territorial states, so that there are 13 dierent states.
17German newspapers typically publish letters to the editor with the full name. As “Annamarie” is very similar to the
more common name “Annemarie”, we also searched for “Annemarie Richter.” We also searched for “A. Richter”, and
for snippets from the text of the letter, but this did not result in additional information.
18We cannot rule out that some newspapers realized that the letter had already been published elsewhere and therefore
rejected the letter. This would have reduced the number of printed letters. Importantly, the probability of a
newspaper discovering the letter elsewhere should be independent of the treatments. Moreover, it seems plausible
to assume that a newspaper that discovers any version of our letter published in another newspaper will reject our
letter, no matter what version itself has received. Under this assumption (which is unfortunately not testable with
our data), such cases of interference would bias our results towards zero and thus render our tests conservative as
the treatment eects might have been stronger absent the interference.
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3.4 Results
Out of 214 letters in our data set, 89 (i.e., 41.6%) were printed.19 Table 3.1 gives an overview of
the data.
Table 3.1: Overview of the data
Sent Printed Printed (%)
Version 1 (pro Merkel) 51 24 47%
Version 2 (contra Schulz) 53 21 40%
Version 3 (pro Schulz) 54 16 30%
Version 4 (contra Merkel) 56 28 50%
Notes: Column one gives the number of observations in each treat-
ment. Column two states for each treatment how many letters were
printed. Column three gives the share of printed letters in percent-
ages.
When submitting letters we supplied all the information asked for by the newspaper. Conditional
on this information, 28 newspapers (13.1%) asked for further information by e-mail or by calling
the phone number we provided. Out of these 28 newspapers, seven eventually printed the letter.
Moreover, four newspapers informed us that they would print the letter if they could reach us by
telephone, but did not print it nally since we never answered their phone calls.20
3.4.1 Nonparametric tests
In order to test our three hypotheses we use the Fisher’s exact test. The subject pool in our
experiment is not a sample from some bigger population, but rather the population of all German
daily newspapers that handle letters to the editor independently. Therefore, a test which relies on
the randomization distribution for inference is appropriate.
First, as we are agnostic about the direction of a potential political bias, we used a two-sided test
to test Hypothesis I. We do not nd a political bias: out of 104 pro-Merkel and contra-Schulz letters
19Among the newspapers we initially selected for our study, one turned out to be out of business and one was
strikebound. We used defunct e-mail addresses for two further newspapers. In addition, some newspapers informed
us that they had forwarded our letter to a central editorial board dealing with letters to several newspapers,
potentially inducing interference between the corresponding experimental units. This eliminated 24 further
newspapers from our sample. In a robustness check, we included these 24 newspapers as not having published
the letter. Our results from the non-parametric tests on Hypotheses I to III remain largely unaected in the sense
that we do not nd evidence of a political bias or a statistically signicant negativity bias, but for incumbency
dominance (p = 0.047, one-sided).
20As a randomization check, we regressed newspaper circulation and the left-right score by Garz et al. (2019) on the
three main indicator variables. None of the coecients is signicant, so our randomization seems to have worked.
Moreover, there is no signicant dierence in the acceptance rate of letters submitted via online form or via e-mail.
The former were accepted in 40.8%, the latter in 42.9% of the cases.
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45 (43.3%) were printed, while out of the 110 contra-Merkel or pro-Schulz letters 44 (40.0%)
were printed (p = 0.678). Thus, publications in our data set do not seem to be biased toward the
political left- or right-wing.21
Second, we test for negativity bias. Since we had a clear prediction that negative letters were
more likely to be printed, we use a one-sided test here. Out of 109 negatively connotated letters
49 (45.0%) were printed; out of 105 positively connotated letters only 40 (38.1%) were printed.
Thus, negatively connotated letters are more likely to be printed, but this eect is not statistically
signicant (p = 0.190).22
Third, we nd a signicant eect of incumbency dominance (p = 0.026, one-sided) whereby
letters about Merkel were more likely to be printed than letters about the challenger. Out of 107
letters about Merkel, 52 (48.6%) were printed, while only 37 out of 107 letters (34.6%) about
the challenger were printed. Hence, a letter about Merkel had a 48.6/34.6− 1 ≈ 40.5% higher
chance of publication. Thus, newspapers were more likely to publish letters about Merkel than
about Schulz. This indicates a higher newsworthiness of the Merkel letters.
Notably, testing three hypotheses on the same sample may increase the false discovery rate. To
take this into account, we conduct a Bonferroni correction by multiplying the p-values by the
number of hypotheses, that is, n = 3. Although this is a very conservative correction, incumbency
dominance stays (weakly) signicant (p = 0.078).
3.4.2 Regression Analysis
As argued in Section 3.2, larger newspapers or national newspapers might have a dierent approach
to handling letters to the editor than smaller newspapers or regional newspapers, for example,
because they may receive more letters and can thus be more selective. Controlling for these
covariates might thus improve the precision of our estimation. For ease of interpretation, we
estimate the linear probability model23
Printi = β0 + β1Lefti + β2Negativei + β3Incumbenti + β4Xi + εi. (3.1)
21Using Butler and Schoeld (2010) result of a 26% acceptance rate as a baseline, a power calculation shows that given
our sample size and a desired power of 80%, the minimal eect size for a political bias that we would have been
able to detect on a signicance level of 5% would have been 0.19 (0.17 on the 10%-level). Our estimate, however, is
close to zero (0.033).
22Using, as before, a 26% acceptance rate as a baseline, the minimal eect size for negativity bias (i.e., the dierence in
acceptance rates of negative and positive letters) that we would have been able to detect on a signicance level of
5%, with a desired power of 80% and our given sample size, would have been 0.17 (0.15 on the 10%-level). Our
estimate, however, is considerably smaller (0.069). To obtain a statistical signicance of 5% for that eect size, we
would have needed a sample of more than 1000 newspapers.
23We also ran a logistic regression and the results are similar.
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The dependent variable Printi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if newspaper i has printed the
letter. Lefti is an indicator variable for the left-leaning letters (the versions pro Schulz and contra
Merkel), Negativei is an indicator variable for the negative letters (contra Merkel and contra
Schulz), and Incumbenti is an indicator for letters about the incumbent chancellor Merkel (the
versions pro Merkel and contra Merkel).24 Xi contains the control variables. We use quarterly
circulation (measured in 1,000 units, as reported in BDZV (2017), a dummy for national newspapers,
and dummies for the state (Bundesland) where the newspaper is published. The εi is mean zero
noise.
It is straightforward to see that β1 gives the expected dierence between the average acceptance
rates of a left-leaning and a right-leaning letter. Similarly, β2 is the expected dierence between the
average acceptance rates of a negative and a positive letter. Finally, β3 is the expected dierence
between average acceptance rates of a letter about Merkel and Schulz.
Table 3.2 reports the results. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the newspaper
printed the letter. Column 1 does not control for any covariates and basically reproduces our
results above: only the incumbent dummy is statistically signicant (at the 5% level), and indicates
that the probability of a letter on Merkel being accepted is 13.9 percentage points higher than for
a letter on Schulz.25 Next, we control for circulation and for national newspapers. We do not enter
these control variables simultaneously, since they are highly correlated: national newspapers have
a higher circulation. As expected, larger newspapers were less likely to publish our letter. The
dummy for national newspapers is statistically signicant, while circulation is not. Finally, we
add state dummies to these regressions. None of the state dummies are statistically signicant.
The estimation results for the parameters of interest remain basically unchanged. In particular,
across all specications, the coecient of the incumbent dummy is estimated between 13.6 and
15.8 percentage points.
We conclude that our results are robust when controlling for the covariates. Our results are also
robust to dierent choices of standard errors, that is, classical standard errors and bootstrapping.
Furthermore, our results are robust to running separate regressions for the three hypotheses. One
further robustness check concerns the publishing houses. Newspapers within the same publishing
house may not decide independently whether to print the letter. As argued in Section 3.3, we only
24Note that the three dummy variables Lefti, Negativei, and Incumbenti are not perfectly collinear.
25Apart from being based on a dierent statistical method, this test diers in a minor detail from the nonparametric
tests discussed above. The OLS estimator of, for example, β1 can be shown to be equal to the dierence between (i)
the unweighted average of the acceptance rates of versions pro Schulz and contra Merkel, and (ii) the unweighted
average of the acceptance rates of versions pro Merkel and contra Schulz. In contrast, the test statistic for Hypothesis
I used above considers the dierences between the respected weighted averages, with weights equal to their share
of observations. This also explains why the coecients in Table 3.2, column 1, are slightly dierent from the raw
dierences used in the non-parametric tests. Since we have an almost equal number of versions, this dierence is
minor.
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Table 3.2: Regression results
Print Print Print Print Print Print
Left Letter -0.0353 -0.0373 -0.0406 -0.0511 -0.0540 -0.0607
(0.0672) (0.0674) (0.0671) (0.0670) (0.0671) (0.0666)
Negative Letter 0.0647 0.0702 0.0644 0.0561 0.0622 0.0548
(0.0672) (0.0677) (0.0671) (0.0676) (0.0679) (0.0672)
Incumbent Letter 0.139∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.0672) (0.0675) (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0676) (0.0668)
Circulation -0.000209 -0.000282∗
(0.000132) (0.000146)
National Newspaper -0.263∗ -0.425∗∗
(0.151) (0.164)
State dummies X X X
Constant 0.332∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.391 0.432 0.397
(0.0672) (0.0692) (0.0676) (0.339) (0.361) (0.342)
N 214 214 214 214 214 214
R2 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.112 0.117 0.129
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if newspaper i has printed the letter. Left Letter is an indicator variable for
left-leaning letters, Negative Letter an indicator for negative letters, and Incumbent Letter an indicator for
letters on Merkel. Control variables include the quarterly circulation of a newspaper in thousands, a dummy
variable equal to 1 if newspaper i is a national newspaper, and state dummies.
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sent one letter per publishing house if the associated newspapers’ editorial departments are not
independent. To account for potential non-independent decisions in the few cases where we sent
more than one letter per publishing house, we clustered standard errors at the publishing house
level and our results are unaected.
Weight by newspaper circulation. So far, all observations are given equal weight in the
analysis, but typically only a handful of newspapers shape the whole market. For an equal
number of right- and left-leaning letters being printed, our preceding analysis would not indicate
a political bias, even if the newspapers that print the left-leaning letter have a much higher
readership than those printing the right-leaning letter. As a consequence, it might be more natural
to use ci∑
j cj
· Printi as the dependent variable, where cj gives the circulation of newspaper j.
Whereas our above regression answers whether the average newspaper has certain biases, the
weighted regression answers whether the newspaper of the average reader has these biases.26
Table 3.3 shows our results. While the signs of the coecients are analogous to our ndings from
Table 3.2, their magnitudes are not directly comparable. We can, however, compare the eect sizes
in terms of standard deviations of the dependent variables. For instance, according to our main
regression (Table 3.3, Column 1) a letter on Merkel leads to a change that corresponds to 0.28
standard deviations, while the change corresponds to 0.32 standard deviations if we weight by
circulation (Table 3.3, Column 1). Hence, our results are robust to weighting the newspapers by
their share of circulation.
Exploring the role of previously published leers. To put our ndings into perspective,
we investigated how many letters to the editor about Merkel, Schulz, or both of them had been
published in the three months before our experiment. We relied on the coverage of letters to the
editor in all German newspapers available on Nexis.27 The search resulted in 270 letters about
Merkel and 158 about Schulz, so there were 70.9% more published letters about Merkel than
Schulz. Another 62 letters contained references to both candidates. Our nding that letters about
Merkel have a 40% higher chance getting published can partially explain the higher number of
published letters on Merkel.28
26Note that this analysis diers from weighting the squared residual for each observation with its respective circulation.
The latter leads to similar results as our main regression.
27We searched Nexis for publications containing the key words “Merkel” and “Schulz” in combination with the German
word for letter to the editor (“Leserbrief”), in the time period June 1 to August 31, 2017. A research assistant read
through all the results in order to count only those letters that were really about the respective candidates, as
opposed to, e.g., letters about (or written by) some other person named Merkel or Schulz.
28Our estimation results are conditional on the given supply of other letters to the editor reaching the newspapers.
To explore whether the acceptance decisions depend on the number of letters concerning Merkel or Schulz that
have already been published in a newspaper, we had a closer look at all letters published in the three weeks prior
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Table 3.3: Circulation
Print(W) Print(W) Print(W) Print(W) Print(W) Print(W)
Left Letter 0.000398 0.000452 0.000376 0.000304 0.000342 0.000249
(0.000456) (0.000443) (0.000456) (0.000435) (0.000429) (0.000435)
Negative Letter 0.000798∗ 0.000652 0.000797∗ 0.000536 0.000457 0.000528
(0.000456) (0.000425) (0.000456) (0.000417) (0.000405) (0.000414)
Incumbent Letter 0.00109∗∗ 0.00116∗∗ 0.00109∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ 0.00125∗∗∗ 0.00122∗∗∗
(0.000456) (0.000445) (0.000456) (0.000427) (0.000425) (0.000425)
Circulation 0.00000553 0.00000367
(0.00000468) (0.00000385)
National -0.00108∗ -0.00242∗∗∗
(0.000625) (0.000832)
State Dummies X X X
Constant 0.000548 0.000184 0.000590 0.00711 0.00658 0.00714
(0.000456) (0.000495) (0.000459) (0.00566) (0.00543) (0.00569)
N 214 214 214 214 214 214
R2 0.044 0.089 0.046 0.219 0.237 0.231
Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if newspaper i has printed the letter weighted by i’s share of overall newspaper circulation. Left Letter
is an indicator variable for left-leaning letters, Negative Letter an indicator for negative letters, and Incumbent Letter an
indicator for letters on Merkel. Control variables include the quarterly circulation of a newspaper in thousands, a dummy
variable equal to 1 if newspaper i is a national newspaper, and state dummies.
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3.4.3 Additional findings: Do newspapers prefer leers that oppose their
political position?
Our study also allows us to test whether newspapers are more likely to print a letter to the
editor that reects a political view which is opposite to the political orientation of the newspaper.
The German Press Code, a voluntary ethical agreement among German publishers, explicitly
encourages the publication of such letters. It states under Guideline 2.6: “The Press Code must
be observed when publishing readers’ letters. It is in the interest of informing the public to
allow opinions not shared by the editorial team to be expressed in the Readers’ Letters section.”29
Moreover, Butler and Schoeld (2010) found evidence of such a balancing behavior in the context
of the 2008 US presidential election.
German newspapers do not publish election endorsements, however, which makes it harder to
determine their political positions. This problem is amplied by an internal plurality of German
newspapers whereby the political orientation changes over time or between dierent parts of
the newspapers (e.g., politics vs. feuilleton). That a newspaper’s political position is less clear
for German than for US newspapers might also be driven by the larger number of parties in the
parliament—Germany has a multi-party system—and by a greater similarity of the biggest parties,
that is, CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany are more similar than the Democrats and Republicans in
the US. Nevertheless, recent studies have attempted to classify a number of German newspapers
according to their political position. Dewenter et al. (2016) rely on Media Tenor’s human coding
of the tonality of news about the biggest parties, CDU/CSU and SPD. Their data cover only seven
newspapers used in our study. Due to the small number of observations, we just classify these
newspapers as left-leaning (taz, Frankfurter Rundschau, and Süddeutsche Zeitung) versus right-
leaning (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt, BILD and Berliner Zeitung), based on the Index of
Political Coverage from Dewenter et al. (2016).30 Among those seven newspapers, three received
a letter that opposed their political position, and they printed it; the remaining four received a
letter that matched their position, and none of them printed it. This ts nicely with the idea that
newspapers prefer to publish letters that oppose their own position.
Garz et al. (2019) have ordered a number of German newspapers according to their relative
to our study in a convenience sample of 21 newspapers in our data, which make the letters available on Nexis.
The letters were coded as pro Merkel, contra Merkel, pro Schulz, contra Schulz, andother by two student research
assistants (intercoder reliability as measured by percent agreement of 96%). Dissenting codings have been decided
by discussion between the students. In this sample, we found evidence for incumbency dominance (p < 0.05), but
no eects of previously published letters on the printing decision.
29See presserat.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_Dateien/
Pressekodex13english_web.pdf (accessed on Dec. 8, 2017).
30In an earlier study, Eilders (2002) investigated the positioning for ve of these newspapers (taz, FR, FAZ, SZ and
Welt) and came to a similar conclusion on their positioning.
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political position. They rely on an automated text analysis comparing word frequencies in media
outlets and party programs. Using their left-right scores, we obtain the political position of 46
of the newspapers used in our study. Since Garz et al. (2019) selected the media outlets for their
study by audience reach, this subsample represents newspapers with a larger audience.31
Table 3.4.3 reports regression results with the left-right score of the respective newspapers and
an interaction term as regressors. The estimation equation is32
Printi = β0 + β1Lefti + β5Scorei + β6Scorei · Lefti + εi. (3.2)
A higher score indicates a more conservative newspaper. The coecient of interest is that of the
interaction term. It shows that conservative newspapers are more likely to publish a left-leaning
letter. The eect size is substantial. Consider two newspapers that dier by one standard deviation
in their left-right score, which is about 0.014. Then the estimated dierence across the two
newspapers, between the dierences in acceptance rates of left- and right-leaning letters, is about
23.91 · 0.014 · 100 ≈ 33 percentage points.33
In summary, our data support the hypothesis that newspapers tend to publish letters that
oppose their own political position.34
3.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This study reports results from a eld experiment on letters to the editor in order to test for dierent
implications of media bias. In particular, it allows us to test for three dierent manifestations of
ltering bias with respect to media coverage of political content, that is, political bias, negativity
bias, and incumbency dominance. Our between subjects design allows for a test of systemic
biases of the German newspapers as opposed to individual outlet bias. We found no political bias
among German newspapers with respect to the publication of letters to the editor. Moreover, the
newspapers seem to follow the recommendation in the German press code to print letters that
oppose their own political position. Indeed, we nd that letters that oppose a newspaper’s political
31The average quarterly circulation of a newspaper in the subsample is 177,566 copies as opposed to 68,071 copies for
the whole dataset.
32Alternatively, we ran a logistic regression and the results are similar.
33This result is partly driven by one observation with an extreme score, that is, the self-proclaimed “Socialist” newspaper
Neues Deutschland. When removing this observation from the sample, the estimated coecient still has the same
sign, but it is about 30% smaller in absolute value and loses statistical signicance.
34The results in this section also show that the regression in the main results section do not capture all relevant
explanatory variables. Given random assignment, however, the estimates of (3.1) should nevertheless be unbiased.
Moreover, controlling for newspapers’ political position in a test of political bias of the newspapers’ landscape as a
whole would control for too much: the object of interest is the average reactions of newspapers, not the average
reactions conditional on their political leanings.
77
3 Incumbency Dominance in Letters to the Editor: Field Experimental Evidence
Table 3.4: Additional results
Print Print Print Print
Left Letter -0.00469 -0.00586 -0.0152 -0.0752
(0.139) (0.149) (0.153) (0.155)
Score -22.18∗∗∗ -22.38∗∗∗ -21.45∗∗∗ -27.25∗∗∗
(2.982) (4.451) (4.520) (4.624)
Left Letter x Score 22.85∗∗∗ 23.76∗∗∗ 22.97∗∗∗ 23.91∗∗∗
(5.840) (6.909) (7.043) (6.514)
Negative Letter 0.0602 0.0680 0.0282
(0.160) (0.162) (0.159)
Incumbent Letter 0.0446 0.0348 0.0388
(0.160) (0.163) (0.155)
Circulation -0.000155
(0.000118)
National Newspaper -0.425∗∗∗
(0.138)
Constant 0.390∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.452∗∗
(0.0958) (0.151) (0.163) (0.174)
N 46 46 46 46
R2 0.103 0.110 0.115 0.176
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if newspaper i has printed
the letter. Left Letter is an indicator variable for left-leaning letters, Negative Letter
an indicator for negative letters, and Incumbent Letter an indicator for letters on
Merkel. Score represents the political position of newspaper i on a left-right score
and ranges from -1 (extremely left) to +1 (extremely right). Control variables include
the quarterly circulation of a newspaper in thousands and a dummy variable equal
to 1 if newspaper i is a national newspaper.
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position have a higher chance for publication in this newspaper. In line with the literature, we
observed that our negatively connotated letters were printed more often than positively connotated
ones. They were not statistically signicantly more likely to be printed, however. Finally, we
observed a strong eect of incumbency dominance, which gives a relation to the literature on
incumbency advantages in elections. Incumbents are more likely to win elections, and the eect
that the incumbent gets more media attention may contribute to this fact. Some care needs to be
taken when interpreting the incumbency dominance we found, however, since we cannot control
for other dierences between the candidates.
We stay agnostic with respect to the reasons for media bias. When testing for political bias,
negativity bias, and incumbency dominance, we did not impose any assumptions on whether
these eects should be driven by the intrinsic preferences of the journalists or by readers’ demand
for biased media coverage, for instance. While we document signicant support for incumbency
dominance, the reasons for the occurrence of this eect need to be addressed in future research.
Our study was inspired by Butler and Schoeld (2010) who conducted a similar experiment in
the US in 2008 with letters to the editor that were either supportive of McCain or Obama. Our
2×2 design has various advantages over the design of the original study. If we had sent only
supporting versions for either of the candidates (Versions 1 and 3), we might have observed a
political bias as the pro-Merkel-letter would have been printed more often. By including the
criticizing versions, however, we see that in fact we do not have a political bias, but an eect
of incumbency dominance: Not only letters supportive of Merkel, but also those that criticize
Merkel are more likely to be printed. The original study could also neither elicit this eect nor test
for negativity bias as only supportive letters were sent. Finally, it could not test for incumbency
dominance as none of the candidates—neither Obama nor McCain—were incumbents. Our data
also have advantages over those by Butler and Schoeld (2010). While we count publications, they
treated publications and contacts made by the newspaper equivalently. Just making a contact
by the newspaper, however, does not necessarily indicate that the newspaper wants to print the
letter. Furthermore, our sample is much larger as we included all the German daily newspaper
that handle letters to the editor independently. Altogether, our study has various advantages over
the original study with respect to the experimental design and the data set.
Finally, our study contributes to the debate on the manipulation of user-generated content (see,
e.g., Mayzlin et al., 2014). We have observed that it is relatively easy to place a ctitious letter in a
newspaper. While our experiment was balanced with respect to the political message (as we sent
roughly equal numbers of all versions of the letter), our ndings raise the question whether it
is possible to aect the press and therefore also public opinion through fake letters that are less
balanced in the aggregate.
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4 Coverage Bias on Wikipedia? Evidence
from Biographies of German Members of
Parliament
with Johannes Münster
4.1 Introduction
User-generated content is becoming more and more important. Consumers turn to Yelp to nd a
restaurant, to TripAdvisor to plan a vacation, and to Wikipedia to search for information (Luca,
2016b). Three out of the top ve websites by Internet trac – YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia –
are based on user-generated content.1 These websites rely on millions of voluntary contributions,
each being a public good in its own, with no price mechanism steering the contributors’ choices,
and little if any centralized coordination of eorts. Research on the private supply of such multiple
public goods shows that the equilibrium mix of public goods is typically inecient; this ineciency
comes in addition to the well known result that overall contribution levels fall below the Samuelson
optimum (e.g., Bilodeau, 1994; Ghosh et al., 2007; Cornes and Itaya, 2010). Whether the individual
contributions to user-generated content websites lead to an overall balanced mix of content, or to
systematic coverage biases, is therefore unclear.
This paper studies if Wikipedia, the world’s largest online encyclopedia, has a coverage bias in its
biographies of German members of Parliament (MPs). That is, we ask if the individual contributions
of Wikipedia users lead to the unbalanced coverage of otherwise comparable MPs from dierent
political parties. Our main proxy for coverage is biography length. Biography length is easy to
measure objectively; moreover, the MPs’ biographies contain little if any criticism. In addition,
biography length is a meaningful measure in itself: the length of a biography may inuence
opinion formation if voters interpret it as an indication of an MP’s valence characteristics.2 Hence,
1See https://www.alexa.com/topsites (Dec 2018).
2To check the plausibility of this claim, we conducted a classroom survey, nding that a longer biography signals
knowledge, strength as a public servant, and the ability to inspire people (see Appendix C.1).
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a coverage bias on Wikipedia – in other words, an unbalanced coverage of comparable MPs
from dierent political parties in terms of their biography length – may aect the workings of
democracy.
A major challenge is to disentangle the eect of party aliation on biography length from the
eect of an MP’s characteristics. Partisan contributors could amplify the biographies of MPs from
a specic party, leading to a coverage bias as dened above. If, on the other hand, MPs about
whom there is more to write self-select into a particular party, dierences in Wikipedia coverage
between MPs from dierent political parties would – according to our denition – not be classied
as bias. Since many MP characteristics are unobserved (e.g., ability, wittiness, or looks), we cannot
easily distinguish their impact on biography length from the impact of the MPs’ party aliation.
We address this issue in two steps. First, we study a sample of relatively homogeneous observa-
tions. We consider the 18th German Bundestag (2013 to 2017) and focus on MPs from Germany’s
two biggest political parties, the center-right CDU/CSU and the center-left SPD, who jointly
comprised more than three quarters of all MPs and formed a coalition government. In particular,
when we compare the biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU and the SPD, dierences in length
cannot originate from dierences in government versus opposition parties, centrist versus more
extreme parties, or big versus fringe parties.3 To further increase comparability, we exclude MPs
in distinguished oces such as Chancellor Angela Merkel, ministers, and party heads from the
analysis.
As a second step, we compare the length of German and English Wikipedia biographies in a
dierence-in-dierences framework. Partisan contributors are less likely to amplify the English
biographies, since German voters are unlikely to read them. Assuming that unobserved MP
characteristics aect the German and the English biography length equivalently, a dierence-in-
dierences estimation using language as a rst, and party aliation as a second dierence, yields
unconfounded estimates of the eects of party aliation on biography length. Since English
biographies are only available for about a quarter of our observations, we also take potential
selection eects into account.
We nd that biographies of MPs from the SPD are, on average, about half a page shorter than
biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU. These dierences remain after controlling for gender,
political experience, outside earnings, education, and MPs’ constituency demographics. To put
the eect size into perspective, note that the average biography length is about 2.33 pages, the
median length is about 1.66 pages, and the standard deviation in biography length is about two
pages. The dierence-in-dierences estimate for coverage bias, i.e., the eect of party aliation
on biography length, is about twice as large as our basic estimate, conrming that the unequal
3The literature on the news coverage of politicians has found a clear incumbency eect on coverage (Vos, 2014).
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coverage between MPs from CDU/CSU and SPD is not driven by unobserved MP characteristics.
While biography length is our main proxy for coverage, biographies of MPs from the SPD also
dier from those of the CDU/CSU in several additional dimensions of coverage: they exhibit
fewer images, fewer adjectives, a lower adjective to word ratio, and a smaller number of links
to external websites under the control of the MP or her party than biographies on MPs from the
CDU/CSU. Images and adjectives brighten texts and contribute to a more positive coverage, and a
high number of weblinks under party control indicates that Wikipedia is used more extensively
for election campaigns. Biographies of MPs from the SPD are also assigned to a lower number of
Wikipedia categories, which makes them harder to nd.
As argued, dierences in coverage between SPD and CDU/CSU may be driven by partisan
contributions to Wikipedia. We check the plausibility of this explanation in three ways. First, we
identify all anonymous edits conducted from the Bundestag network by tracking the users’ IP
addresses. Consistent with our explanation, we nd that biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU
are edited nearly 50% more often from the Bundestag building than biographies of MPs from
the SPD. Second, we document that there are fewer authors who repetitively contribute to SPD
biographies only. Finally, if partisan contributions drive the dierences in coverage, they should
generate debates within the Wikipedia community. A testable implication is that Wikipedia’s talk
pages for MPs from the SPD should be shorter. Indeed, there are fewer talk pages for MPs from
the SPD, and these pages are also shorter on average.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, our results provide empirical evidence that the
individual contributions to user-generated content websites can lead to systematic coverage biases.
Wikipedia is an interesting case in point, since it is a well known privately provided public good
(e.g., Zhang and Zhu, 2011) that attracts millions of readers every month.4 Second, we present a
novel empirical strategy to detect coverage biases on user-generated content platforms. While
existing approaches use variation in institutional features across or within platforms (e.g., Anderson
and Magruder, 2012; Mayzlin et al., 2014), we exploit variation between dierent language versions
of a platform.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related literature. Section 4.3 describes
our dataset. The empirical strategy and the results with respect to biography length are presented
in Section 4.4; Section 4.5 investigates the occurrence of adjectives, images, categories, and
weblinks under party control as further measures of coverage and shows that the results are
similar. In Section 4.6, we show that partisan contributors are a likely driver of coverage bias.
Section 4.7 conrms that negative coverage of MPs does not confound our analysis. Section 4.8
discusses the external validity and limitations of our analysis.
4See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Statistics (Dec 2018).
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4.2 Related literature
The paper relates to three overlapping strands of literature: user-generated content, media bias,
and the private supply of public goods. The literature on user-generated content and social media
has shown that user-generated content has large causal eects on economic and social outcomes
(see Luca, 2016b, for a survey). Our paper is related to Mayzlin et al. (2014) who study promotional
content in hotel reviews. Moreover, there are several studies showing that Wikipedia exhibits
only few factual errors (Mesgari et al., 2015), but has frequent errors of omission (Brown, 2011),
which motivates our focus on coverage. It is often stated that coverage in Wikipedia suers
from a systemic bias induced by its contributors’ demographics: a majority is English-speaking,
white, male, and Internet ane (Halavais and Lacka, 2008), which leads, for instance, to the
underrepresentation of women (Reagle and Rhue, 2011; Hinnosaar, 2019). Our analysis shows
that while biographies of women are shorter on average, the eect is not statistically signicant
and even changes sign when adding controls for the demography of the MPs’ constituencies.
Most of the research on media bias (see Gentzkow et al., 2016; Puglisi and Snyder, 2016, for
surveys) has focused on traditional media – such as newspaper and television – while compara-
tively little is known about political biases in user-generated content. An exception is Greenstein
and Zhu (2012) who apply automated text analysis to measure the slant in Wikipedia articles
on political issues. In their paper, slant is an intrinsic property of an article, measuring whether
its language is more typical for the Republican or Democratic party in the USA. In contrast to
that, our measure of coverage bias is based on the overall coverage of German MPs from dierent
political parties. In addition, research on media bias has mainly focused on media in the USA,
while research on biases of media in other languages is rare. The political systems and the media
systems of the USA and Germany dier along many dimensions (Persson and Tabellini, 2005;
Hallin and Mancini, 2004), and it is a priori unclear whether results obtained in the US will hold
in the German case. Indeed, a naive extrapolation of the result that the English Wikipedia has a
pro-liberal bias (Greenstein and Zhu, 2012) might suggest that, when comparing the two biggest
German parties, the German Wikipedia is biased in favor of the center-left SPD relative to the
center-right CDU/CSU. Our results, however, show the exact opposite.
A large literature has studied public goods (see Batina and Ihori, 2005, for a book length survey).
As argued, theory has shown that the equilibrium mix of multiple privately provided public goods
may be inecient (Bilodeau, 1994; Ghosh et al., 2007; Cornes and Itaya, 2010). Further related
papers are Ihori et al. (2014), who apply the theory of multiple public goods to the burden sharing
in the NATO, and Hellwig (2007) and Fang and Norman (2010) who study the provision of multiple
excludable public goods. We provide empirical evidence on the mix of multiple privately provided
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public goods, a topic that has not received much attention in the empirical literature, except in the
contexts of charities (Vesterlund, 2016). Our study also relates to the literature on the motivation
and incentives of individual contributors (e.g., Zhang and Zhu, 2011) by pointing out that partisan
political activity may be a motivation of some Wikipedia authors.
4.3 Data
Kürschner (2015) provides a list of all members of the 18th Bundestag, including information on
their education, political experience, and party aliation. Data on the MPs’ oces during the 18th
Bundestag stems from bundestag.de. Information on the MPs’ ancillary incomes is collected
from abgeordnetenwatch.de: German MPs are obliged to declare their ancillary income
by means of ten dierent categories; following the literature, we use these categories’ mean values
in our analysis (e.g., Becker et al., 2009).5 Data on constituency demographics stems from the
electoral management body.6
From the initial list of MPs, we exclude Chancellor Angela Merkel, 35 MPs in distinguished
oces (party heads and ministers from the 18th or a preceding Bundestag), and nine MPs who
had already left the 18th Bundestag before we started our data collection.7 Of 598 remaining MPs
in our dataset, 294 MPs are from the CDU/CSU, 184 from the SPD, 62 from the Left, and 58 from
the Greens; no MP switched parties during the observation period. Moreover, 266 of the 598 MPs
were directly elected to the Bundestag.8
German Wikipedia biographies exist for all MPs in our dataset, English biographies are available
for 138 MPs. The numbers of characters, words, adjectives, images, and categories per biography
are obtained via Wikipedia’s API. In addition, each biography links to a background site that
provides a list of unique authors and the number of edits. Information on the number of weblinks
under party control, translation indicators, MPs’ English homepages, and criticism is hand coded.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of all the variables used in our analysis.
5See www.abgeordneten.watch.de/blog/nebeneinkuenfte2016 (June 2015).
6See www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/strukturdaten/
(Dec 2017).
7See Appendix C.2 for robustness checks that include these observations.
8In Germany, each voter casts two votes in elections to the Bundestag. The rst vote decides which local candidate
from each of Germany’s 299 constituencies will be sent to the Bundestag. The second vote is cast for a party list and
determines the parties’ relative strength in the Bundestag. The Bundestag has a minimum number of 598 seats. In
its 18th election term, it was amplied by four additional “overhang” seats, since the CDU won more constituency
seats than it would have been entitled to based on the second-vote share. A further 29 “balance seats” sustain the
parties’ relative strengths, leading to a total number of 631 seats.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Biography length German (characters) 5901.577 4890.87 1118 45316 598
Biography length English (characters) 4909.507 4119.552 838 28132 138
CDU/CSU 0.492 0.5 0 1 598
SPD 0.308 0.462 0 1 598
Greens 0.097 0.296 0 1 598
Left 0.104 0.305 0 1 598
Female 0.366 0.482 0 1 598
Former periods in Bundestag 1.577 1.748 0 9 598
Ancillary income (in 1000 Euros) 25.609 106.476 0 1411 596
Directly elected 0.453 0.498 0 1 598
Population density 910.613 1471.26 38 12842.9 271
Fraction population aged 18 to 35 20.114 2.7 15.6 28.9 271
Fraction population with Abitur 36.417 7.473 21.7 59.7 271
Number of international oces 0.209 0.496 0 3 598
Former periods in European Parliament 0.012 0.135 0 2 598
Number of adjectives 65.502 61.972 8 618 598
Number of images 2.475 1.198 0 11 598
Number of categories 9.206 2.446 5 24 598
Number of weblinks under party control 1.487 0.669 0 4 598
Number of unique authors 52.05 59.534 5 580 598
Edited from Bundestag network (German) 0.527 0.5 0 1 598
Number of edits from Bundestag network (German) 4.427 5.399 1 40 309
Characters added from Bundestag network (German) 533.176 919.954 0 7201 306
Characters deleted from Bundestag network (German) 198.373 648.166 0 6744 306
Net character change from Bundestag network (German) 171.321 801.527 -6743 7201 598
Edited from Bundestag network (English) 0.058 0.235 0 1 138
Length (talk pages) 5206.723 13030.45 7 130746 292
Criticizing sentences 0.281 1.041 0 10 598
Number of words 547.518 469.732 76 4326 598
English homepage 0.022 0.146 0 1 598
Translation template 0.017 0.128 0 1 598
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis. The variables CDU/CSU, SPD,
Greens, Left, Female, Directly elected, Edited from Bundestag network (German), Edited from Bundestag network (English),
English homepage, and Translation template are dummy variables. The variables Population density, Fraction population
aged 18 to 35, and Fraction population with Abitur are available only for a subset of MPs who are directly elected. The
variables Biography length English (characters) and Edited from Bundestag network (English) are available only for MPs
for whom an English Wikipedia biography exists.
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4.4 Empirical strategy and results
Our goal is to answer if there is a coverage bias on Wikipedia, i.e., if comparable MPs from dierent
political parties are covered dierently in terms of their biography length. We proceed in two
steps. First, we focus on the biographies of a relatively homogeneous group of backbenchers
from CDU/CSU and SPD. Any dierences in biography length can therefore not originate from
dierences in government versus opposition parties, centrist versus more extreme parties, or
big versus fringe parties. Moreover, the personalities of single prominent MPs cannot aect our
results. Second, to disentangle the eect of party aliation from unobserved MP characteristics, we
compare the MPs’ German and English biography length in a dierence-in-dierences framework.
4.4.1 Basic estimation
Figure 4.1 shows the average biography length per party in characters. Since 2, 500 characters
roughly correspond to one DIN-A4 page of a biography’s PDF print version, biographies of MPs
from the CDU/CSU and the Greens are around two and a half pages, biographies of MPs from
the SPD are around two pages, and biographies of MPs from the Left nearly three pages long.
To put these numbers into perspective, note that the average biography length across all MPs is
around 2.33 pages (5901.6 characters) and the median around 1.66 pages (4487.5 characters), with
a standard deviation of nearly two pages (4890.87 characters). Hence, the dierence in average
biography length between the CDU/CSU and the SPD corresponds to roughly 25% of a standard
deviation.
To control for observable MP characteristics, we further estimate the regression equation
lengthGi = β
G
0 + β
G
1 Pi + β
G
2 Xi + u
G
i , (4.1)
by OLS, where lengthGi corresponds to the German biography length of MP i, Pi is a vector
of party dummies with the SPD as omitted category, and Xi is a vector of control variables
including MP i’s gender, political experience, education, ancillary income, and – if MP i is directly
elected – constituency demographics.9 The parameter of interest is βG1 , as it measures the eect
of party aliation on biography length relative to the omitted category SPD. In other words, βG1
corresponds to the average coverage bias relative to the SPD.
Table 4.2 shows the results. Column 1 replicates the party averages from Figure 4.2 relative to
the omitted category SPD, i.e., the CDU/CSU coecient corresponds to around half a DIN-A4 page.
9Several large cities such as Cologne and Berlin are divided into several electoral districts. The data on those cities
are aggregated and therefore not independent. We account for that by clustering the standard errors at the city
level, and obtain 249 clusters.
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Figure 4.1: German biography length across parties in characters
When we control for gender (column 2), political experience (column 3), and doctoral degrees as
well as ancillary incomes (column 4), the size of the CDU/CSU coecient decreases to a third
of a DIN-A4 page (which corresponds to 15% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable),
but remains statistically signicant. Plausibly, when we consider only the directly elected MPs
and account for their constituency demographics in column 5, population density has a highly
signicant eect on biography length: broadband connections in urban areas are usually better
than in rural areas, which facilitates the use of Wikipedia and increases the biographies’ likelihood
of being read. In contrast to that, education or a constituency’s share of voters aged 18 to 35
– those who are most prone to use the Internet as a source of political information – have no
statistically signicant eect. The CDU/CSU coecient is statistically signicant despite the
decreased sample size and corresponds to around 30% of a standard deviation in the dependent
variable.10
In addition, we perform several two-sided t-tests to check whether dierences in coverage
between other parties are statistically signicant. In columns (1) and (2), no other dierences
in biography length between any two parties are signicant, while in columns (3) and (4), the
dierence between CDU/CSU and Left is signicant at the 5%-level.
10Note that we do not consider observations from the Greens and the Left here, since only three Left MPs and one
Green MP are directly elected.
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Table 4.2: Basic results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Length Length Length Length Length
CDU/CSU 1165.8∗∗∗ 1057.0∗∗∗ 971.3∗∗∗ 870.4∗∗ 1614.8∗∗
(374.1) (385.9) (366.6) (353.1) (738.7)
Left 2182.2∗∗∗ 2297.7∗∗∗ 2388.3∗∗∗ 2396.4∗∗∗
(728.7) (730.6) (694.6) (656.1)
Greens 1597.2 1692.7∗ 1736.4∗ 1733.5∗
(972.0) (985.2) (906.8) (917.7)
Female -689.1 -474.8 -216.0 299.0
(435.6) (403.9) (402.0) (749.8)
Former periods in BT 869.6∗∗∗ 875.5∗∗∗ 723.1∗∗∗
(161.5) (160.2) (197.6)
Ancillary Income 2.002 1.681
(1.702) (1.621)
PhD 1915.3∗∗∗ 886.2
(608.9) (868.8)
Population density 0.896∗∗∗
(0.278)
Fraction pop. 18–35 255.2
(155.5)
Fraction pop. with Abitur -1.997
(48.21)
Constant 4947.3∗∗∗ 5231.9∗∗∗ 3810.6∗∗∗ 3327.6∗∗∗ -2578.2
(232.7) (305.5) (347.0) (373.3) (3436.9)
N 598 598 598 596 266
R2 0.021 0.025 0.121 0.150 0.185
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable lengthGi measures
Wikipedia coverage of MP i in terms of her biography length in characters. CDU/CSUi,
Lefti, and Greensi are dummy variables equal to 1 if MP i is aliated to that party; SPD is
the omitted category. Femalei is equal to 1 if MP i is a woman. Former periods in BTi
counts the election terms that MP i has been in parliament. Ancillary incomei is the mean
ancillary income of MP i during the 18th election term in 1,000 Euros based on the estimation
of abgeordnetenwatch.de. PhDi is equal to 1 if MP i has a PhD. Population densityi,
Fraction pop. 18− 35i, and Fraction pop.withAbituri refer to i’s constituency demography.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 4.2: English biography length across parties in characters
4.4.2 Dierence-in-dierences estimation
If party aliation is correlated to unobservable MP characteristics (e.g., if more salient politicians
self-select into a particular party) an OLS estimation of equation (4.1) might suer from an omitted
variable bias. To disentangle the eect of party aliation on biography length from the eect that
unobserved MP characteristics could have, we exploit variation between the MPs’ biographies in
the German and in the English Wikipedia. Under the identifying assumption that unobserved MP
characteristics aect the German and the English biography length equivalently, a dierence-in-
dierences estimation using language as a rst, and party aliation as a second dierence, yields
unconfounded estimates of the eects of party aliation on biography length.
English Wikipedia biographies exist for 138 MPs in our sample; Figure 4.2 shows their average
length. English biographies of MPs both from the CDU/CSU and the SPD are nearly two pages,
English biographies of MPs from the Greens are around three pages, and English biographies of
MPs from the Left are around one and a third page long. To put these numbers into perspective, note
that the average English biography length across all MPs is around two pages (4909.5 characters)
and the median around one and a half pages (3817 characters), with a standard deviation of 1.66
pages (4119.6 characters).
Suppose that the MPs’ English biography length is determined analogously to equation (4.1).
Then,
lengthEi = β
E
0 + β
E
1 Pi + β
E
2 Xi + u
E
i . (4.2)
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Dierencing equations (4.1) and (4.2) yields
lengthGi − lengthEi = β0 + β1Pi + β2Xi + ui, (4.3)
where βk = βGk − βEk and ui = uGi − uEi . The parameter of interest in equation (4.3) is β1, whose
interpretation hinges on further assumptions on βE1 . As argued, biography length may serve as a
positive signal about MPs’ valence characteristics (see Appendix C.1), so partisan contributors
have an incentive to amplify the Wikipedia biographies of MPs from one specic party. While
partisan contributions may lead to a coverage bias in the German Wikipedia, this is unlikely
to occur in the English Wikipedia version, since German voters are unlikely to read their MPs’
English biographies. Thus, we assume that βE1 = 0; see Appendix C.3 for further discussion. If
party aliation has no eect on the MPs’ English biography length, β1 corresponds to βG1 in
equation (4.1). Hence, under the identifying assumption that unobserved MP characteristics aect
the German and the English biography length equivalently and thereby cancel out, equation (4.3)
yields an unbiased estimate for βG1 , the average coverage bias relative to the SPD.
Naively regressing equation (4.3) on the subsample of MPs where we observe English biographies
may lead to sample selection bias, though. Thus, we also consider a selection model consisting of
equation (4.3) and the selection equation
di = 1[δZi + i] > 0, (4.4)
where the dependent variable di indicates if there exists an English biography for MP i (see also
Greene, 2003). For the selection model to work well, Zi has to include additional variables that
determine whether or not there exists an English Wikipedia biography for MP i, but do not aect
the dependent variable in equation (4.3). Thus, Zi = (Pi, Xi, Ii), where Ii is a vector of variables
that determine the international political relevance of MP i: the number of election terms in the
European Parliament and the number of international oces during the 18th Bundestag (Com-
mission of Foreign Aairs, Commission of European Aairs, and being head of an international
parliamentary group). While international oces plausibly increase the probability that an English
biography will be set up, they are not very salient, and hardly anything is written on them. We
estimate the selection model by Heckman two-step and by maximum likelihood.11
Table 4.3 shows the results. Column 1 shows the results of an OLS estimation of equation (4.3).
Although the size of the CDU/CSU coecient is considerable – it corresponds to nearly a DIN-A4
page, which is nearly 60% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable and around twice as
11We do not believe that the probability of having an English Wikipedia biography is aected by MP preferences: only
ve of the 138 MPs with an English Wikipedia biography even provide their personal homepage in English.
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much as in Table 4.2 – it is not statistically signicant. Columns 2 and 4 show the results from a
two-step and a maximum likelihood estimation of equations (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. Since
the magnitude of the coecients is not directly comparable to the OLS estimates in column 1 of
Table 4.3, we also display their marginal eects at the mean (MEM) in columns 3 and 5, which
are similar to the OLS estimates.12 In contrast to the OLS regression, the CDU/CSU coecient
is statistically signicant at the 10%-level in the two-step, and at the 1%-level in the maximum
likelihood specication. Hence, the dierence-in-dierences estimation provides even stronger
evidence of a coverage bias against MPs from the SPD than our results from section 4.4.1.
4.5 Further dimensions of coverage
This section shows that our results on coverage bias from Section 4.4.1 hold for alternative
dependent variables in equation (4.1): adjectives, images, categories, and weblinks under party
control. First, we study the occurrence of adjectives in the biographies. Adjectives can make a
text more lively and colorful. Moreover, the literature on sentiment analysis shows a correlation
between the presence of adjectives and the subjectivity of a sentence, i.e., the degree to which
opinions are expressed (e.g., Bruce and Wiebe, 1999; Wiebe et al., 2004; Pang and Lee, 2008). We
nd that biographies on MPs from the CDU/CSU have around ten more adjectives and a higher
adjective-to-word ratio than biographies on MPs from the SPD; the former dierence corresponds
to around 18% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable and is statistically signicant at
the 5%-level (Table 4.4, columns 1 and 2).
Similarly, images make biographies more lively and attractive. We nd that biographies of
MPs from the CDU/CSU contain on average 0.33 images (30% of a standard deviation) more than
biographies of MPs from the SPD; the dierence is statistically signicant at the 1%-level (Table
4.4, column 3).
Next, Wikipedia articles are usually assigned to categories, that “help readers to nd, and
navigate around, a subject area, to see pages sorted by title, and to thus nd article relationships”.13
Thus, assigning a biography to many dierent categories enhances its chances to be found by
readers. Biographies on MPs from the CDU/CSU are assigned to 0.65 more categories than
biographies on MPs from the SPD; this dierence corresponds to 25% of a standard deviation in
the dependent variable and is statistically signicant at the 1%-level (Table 4.4, column 4).
12MEMs measure the eect of a change in one of the regressors on the conditional mean of the dierence in biography
length, evaluated at the mean values of all other covariates, and given that this dierence is observed. MEMs for
dummy variables show how the biography length changes as the dummy changes from 0 to 1, holding all other
covariates at their mean values.
13See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Category (Dec 2018.)
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Table 4.3: Dierence-in-dierence results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Two-step MEM Two-step ML MEM ML
CDU/CSU 2230.8 3165.4∗ 2275.5 6010.6∗∗∗ 2963.0
(1378.3) (1749.1) (1720.4)
Left 6447.0∗∗∗ 7892.4∗∗∗ 6488.2 11842.6∗∗∗ 6843.8
(1627.8) (2489.3) (2365.9)
Greens 2901.8 4365.4∗ 3183.5 7941.9∗∗∗ 3385.0
(2805.8) (2510.7) (2432.1)
Female -1237.8 -1409.9 -1184.7 -1443.3 -356.8
(1265.4) (1284.4) (1419.8)
Former periods in BT 670.0∗∗ 1030.4∗∗ 577.0 1902.7∗∗∗ 187.7
(332.0) (472.2) (370.7)
PhD 2509.2∗ 3180.6∗∗ 2536.5 3845.3∗∗ 849.9
(1477.9) (1518.9) (1599.4)
Ancillary Income 10.18 9.837 11.32 1.398 5.105
(9.853) (8.039) (7.474)
Constant -245.1 -5430.1 -18997.1∗∗∗
(1607.3) (5347.4) (2375.3)
Mill’s 2837.6 10558.6∗∗∗
Lambda (2792.9) (906.1)
N 136 596 596 596 596
R2 0.124
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), and (4) is
lengthGi − lengthEi that measures the dierences in Wikipedia coverage of MP i in terms of her
biography length in characters. CDU/CSUi, Lefti, and Greensi are dummy variables equal to
1 if MP i is aliated to that party; SPD is the omitted category. Femalei is equal to 1 if MP i is
a woman. Former periods in BTi counts the election terms that MP i has been in parliament.
Ancillary incomei is the mean ancillary income of MP i during the 18th election term in 1,000
Euros based on the estimation of abgeordnetenwatch.de. PhDi is equal to 1 if MP i has a
PhD. Population densityi, Fraction pop. 18 − 35i, and Fraction pop. with Abituri refer to i’s
constituency demography. The MEMs in columns (3) and (5) show the coecients’ marginal eect at
the mean, i.e., the change in the dierence in biography length, given that it is observed, and holding
all other factors at their mean. MEMs for dummy variables show the eect in the dependent variable
for a discrete change from 0 to 1. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Finally, many Wikipedia biographies provide weblinks to external websites. A link is “under
party control” if it directs to a website that is under the obvious and substantial inuence of an
MP’s party (e.g., MPs’ personal or party homepages). Weblinks under party control facilitate the
use of Wikipedia as a platform for political campaigns. We nd that biographies on MPs from the
CDU/CSU contain about half a weblink more than biographies on MPs from the SPD (60% of a
standard deviation); the dierence is statistically signicant at the 1%-level (Table 4.4, column 5).14
4.6 Partisan contributions
Next, we demonstrate that dierences in partisan contributions to Wikipedia are a likely driver
of the unbalanced coverage of MPs from CDU/CSU and SPD. To this end, we study authorship
patterns and the biographies’ talk pages.
4.6.1 Authorship paerns
This section shows that there are more Wikipedia authors who repetitively contribute to the
biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU than to biographies of MPs from the SPD. Moreover, we
show that biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU are edited more often from the Bundestag
building.
First, we check if there exist authors who repetitively amplify the biographies of MPs from one
specic party. For each article, Wikipedia displays either the authors’ user name or, in case of
anonymous contributions, their IP address. We identify all authors who contribute to at least 10%
of the biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU or from the SPD and classify them as “repetitive
contributors.” Next, we check which of these repetitive contributors amplify the biographies of
just one specic party and classify them as “party-specic repetitive contributors.” We nd that
there exist 37 repetitive and three party-specic repetitive contributors for the SPD. Moreover,
there exist 42 repetitive and ve party-specic repetitive contributors for the CDU/CSU.
Next, we track all contributions of anonymous users whose IP addresses are displayed. Building
on a study by Bayerischer Rundfunk (2017), we consider all IP adresses that can be linked to the
Bundestag building.15 We nd that 50.3% of the biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU, and 52.2%
of the biographies of MPs from the SPD were edited at least once from the Bundestag. Moreover,
14The nding is supported by one particular incident. According to the Wikipedia talk pages, it is dicult to incorporate
weblinks into articles, partly because of the German umlauts (ä, ö, ü). There exists, however, a user called “Cducsu”
who has written a program to facilitate the procedure and has used it to install weblinks underneath biographies of
MPs aliated to the CDU/CSU that redirect to the homepage of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group.
15According to bundesedit.de (June 2018), the digits “193.17.” at the beginning of an IP address indicate the
Bundestag network.
94
4.6 Partisan contributions
Table 4.4: Further results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjectives Adj / Words Images Categories Weblinks
CDU/CSU 10.35∗∗ 0.00123 0.344∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(4.376) (0.00170) (0.0987) (0.195) (0.0567)
Left 28.08∗∗∗ -0.00184 0.454∗∗∗ 2.772∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(8.294) (0.00244) (0.171) (0.325) (0.103)
Greens 19.24∗ -0.00563∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.510 0.399∗∗∗
(11.55) (0.00237) (0.257) (0.360) (0.0946)
Female -4.064 -0.00237 -0.173∗ -0.0350 -0.0573
(4.992) (0.00148) (0.101) (0.184) (0.0555)
Former periods in BT 11.46∗∗∗ 0.000925∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.0620∗∗∗
(2.039) (0.000396) (0.0422) (0.0581) (0.0139)
Ancillary Income 0.0198 -0.000011∗∗ 0.00009 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0211) 0.000005) (0.00004) (0.00123) (0.0002)
PhD 22.35∗∗∗ -0.00406∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.433∗ 0.00588
(8.269) (0.00192) (0.124) (0.254) (0.0714)
Constant 34.12∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 1.983∗∗∗ 7.737∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗
(4.722) (0.00175) (0.109) (0.188) (0.0559)
N 596 596 596 596 596
R2 0.149 0.039 0.087 0.212 0.133
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in column (1) isAdjectivesi,
which measures the number of adjectives in the Wikipedia biography of MP i. The dependent
variable in column (2) is Adjectives/Wordsi, which measures the adjective-to-word ratio of MP
i. The dependent variable in column (3) is Imagesi, which measures the number of images in
the biography of MP i. The dependent variable in column (4) is Categoriesi, which measures
the number of categories that the biography of MP i is assigned to. The dependent variable in
column (5) isWeblinksi, which measures the number of weblinks under party control underneath
the biography of MP i. CDU/CSUi, Lefti, and Greensi are dummy variables equal to 1 if
MP i is aliated to that party; SPD is the omitted category. Femalei is equal to 1 if MP i is a
woman. Former periods in BTi counts the election terms that MP i has been in parliament.
Ancillary incomei is the mean ancillary income of MP i during the 18th election term in 1,000
Euros based on the estimation of abgeordnetenwatch.de. PhDi is equal to 1 if MP i has
a PhD. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU were edited on average 5.2 times, while biographies of
MPs from the SPD were edited 3.8 times on average. There exist also dierences in terms of the
number of characters added or deleted: while on average 627.02 characters are added and 482.20
characters deleted from biographies of MPs from the CDU/CSU by Bundestag contributors, only
232.49 characters are added and 157.65 characters deleted from biographies of MPs from the SPD.
Note that the dierence in the net number of characters added between the CDU/CSU and the
SPD – around thirty – is much smaller than the eect we nd in Section 4.4. Hence, edits by
anonymous users from the Bundestag alone cannot explain the coverage bias documented above.
4.6.2 Talk pages
Partisan contributions are likely to entail discussions if additional content should be included or
not. The purpose of a Wikipedia talk page “is to provide space for editors to discuss changes to its
associated article or project page.”16 Hence, existence and length of a talk page can indicate the
occurrence of partisan contributions.
We nd that talk pages exist for 132 MPs from the CDU/CSU and for 79 MPs from the SPD.
Moreover, talk pages on MPs from the SPD are on average half a page shorter than talk pages
on MPs from the CDU/CSU (3589.52 versus 5029.30 characters), which corresponds to 10% of a
standard deviation in talk page length.
4.7 Negative coverage
Our analysis assumes that Wikipedia coverage is benecial for MPs. Media coverage is generally
benecial for politicians, e.g., because it increases name recognition (Burden 2002); this applies
in particular to less well-known politicians such as the MPs in our dataset. In addition, we have
conducted a classroom survey that shows that a longer biography signals knowledge, strength
as a public servant, and the ability to inspire people (see Appendix C.1). Wikipedia coverage
could hurt MPs, however, if the biographies contained large amounts of criticism. To resolve such
concerns, this section shows that negative coverage is a minor concern.
To explore the extent of negative coverage, we systematically identify negative sentences in the
biographies. In a rst step, we search each biography for sentences that contain the word stems
of “Kritik” (“criticism”), “Diskussion” (“discussion”), “Rück- / Austritt” (“resignation”), “Skandal”
(“scandal”), and “Aaire” (“aair”). Next, we determine if these sentences actually criticize the MP.
We nd that negative coverage is a minor issue: only 7% of the biographies contain more than
one sentence of negative coverage, and 90% do not contain any negative coverage at all.
16See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Talk_page_guidelines (Dec 2018).
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To conrm that the results from Section 4.4 are not driven by dierent amounts of negative
coverage, we estimate equations (4.1), (4.3) and (4.4) on the subsample of MPs whose biographies
do not contain any criticism at all. Table 4.5 shows the results. Although the estimates are smaller
and not as statistically signicant as in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, they are qualitatively similar.17
4.8 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the individual contributions to the privately provided public good
Wikipedia lead to a coverage bias against the SPD. To disentangle the eect of party aliation on
coverage from the eect that unobserved MP characteristics may have, we focus on a sample of
relatively homogeneous backbenchers from the 18th German Bundestag. Moreover, we compare
the length of German and English Wikipedia biographies in a dierence-in-dierences framework.
We also present empirical evidence that supports partisan contributions as a likely driver of our
results.
Our analysis is limited in at least two ways. First, to disentangle the eect of party alia-
tion on coverage from the eect that MP characteristics may have, we focus on MPs from just
one Bundestag. The external validity of our study is, however, supported by similar patterns
of Wikipedia coverage of members of the 16 German State Parliaments and of the European
Parliament.18 Biographies of CDU/CSU aliates in a State Parliament are on average about a
quarter page (or about 0.15 standard deviations) longer than biographies of SPD aliates. Similarly,
biographies of CDU/CSU aliates in the European Parliament are on average about half a page (or
about 0.25 standard deviations) longer than biographies of SPD aliates. These numbers suggest
that our main results reect a general pattern, rather than being specic to the sample at hand.
Interestingly, when we compare the Wikipedia coverage of judges in the German Constitutional
Court – who are usually nominated by a particular party – we do not nd dierences in coverage.
These judges are, however, elected for a lifetime and not by the public, and thus have no incentive
to amplify their Wikipedia biographies. These observations therefore also t our hypothesis about
partisan contributions as the main driver of our results.
Second, our analysis cannot explain why there is a coverage bias against MPs from the SPD.19
On the one hand, the SPD has fewer potential voters than the CDU/CSU. Hence, there may
17We also perceive pure vandalism as a minor issue: false statements are quickly detected by Wikipedia’s control
mechanisms and are thereupon erased. Moreover, if MPs are involved in scandals such as plagiarism or the
consumption of illegal drugs, they usually resign, and these observations are excluded from our analysis.
18The data was collected on March 29, 2017.
19We contacted the parties’ press oces to inquire whether there are coordinated party activities in Wikipedia.
According to all replies, there exist no ocial guidelines for the handling of Wikipedia; every MP is responsible
herself for her Wikipedia biography.
97
4 Coverage Bias on Wikipedia? Evidence from Biographies of German Members of Parliament
Table 4.5: Negative coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Length Length Length Length Length ML
CDU/CSU 510.0∗∗ 451.1∗ 439.5∗ 454.7∗ 704.2 2927.9∗∗∗
(257.5) (255.0) (247.3) (238.3) (493.0) (1103.2)
Left 575.3 634.3∗ 728.9∗∗ 814.6∗∗ 3973.5∗∗
(356.9) (362.6) (349.0) (338.5) (1807.3)
Greens 131.9 185.5 285.4 323.8 1424.4
(312.0) (309.2) (300.6) (295.7) (1718.0)
Female -396.5∗ -312.1 -179.7 -132.9 -1091.6
(226.5) (219.1) (214.4) (336.7) (995.8)
Former periods in BT 370.2∗∗∗ 387.1∗∗∗ 354.1∗∗∗ 531.5∗
(79.43) (78.72) (118.7) (276.0)
Ancillary Income 1.662 1.656 5.578
(1.117) (1.201) (6.731)
PhD 1006.7∗∗∗ 446.8 2016.5∗
(344.0) (564.5) (1117.0)
Population density 0.719∗∗∗
(0.200)
Fraction pop. 18-35 39.03
(117.9)
Abitur -35.23
(30.28)
Constant 4539.5∗∗∗ 4703.6∗∗∗ 4121.9∗∗∗ 3810.0∗∗∗ 3781.0∗ -8857.4∗∗∗
(175.4) (196.1) (198.6) (188.9) (1951.8) (1993.7)
Mills 1.662∗∗∗
Lambda (0.275)
N 533 533 533 532 236 532
R2 0.009 0.014 0.069 0.095 0.132
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results are based on a subsample of observations whose
biographies do not contain any criticizing sentences. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (5) is
lengthGi which measures Wikipedia coverage of MP i in terms of her biography length in characters. The
dependent variable in column (6) is lengthGi − lengthEi , which measures the dierences in Wikipedia
coverage of MP i in terms of her biography length in characters. CDU/CSUi, Lefti, and Greensi are
dummy variables equal to 1 if MP i is aliated to that party; SPD is the omitted category. Femalei is
equal to 1 if MP i is a woman. Former periods in BTi counts the election terms that MP i has been
in parliament. Ancillary incomei is the mean ancillary income of MP i during the 18th election term
in 1,000 Euros based on the estimation of abgeordnetenwatch.de. PhDi is equal to 1 if MP i
has a PhD. Population densityi, Fraction pop. 18− 35i, and Fraction pop. with Abituri refer to i’s
constituency demography. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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be relatively less demand for Wikipedia biographies of MPs from the SPD, such that partisan
contributions have a comparatively smaller payo. Although voters of CDU/CSU and SPD are
equally Internet ane (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2014), potential voters of the SPD may also
perceive the new media as a less relevant information source. On the other hand, it is possible that
the dierences in partisan activity reect the parties’ perceptions of how important an extensive
Internet presence is. For instance, Peter Tauber, who was secretary general during our observation
period, provides a social media compendium that also points to the importance of Wikipedia
(Tauber, 2013, p.12), while nothing comparable exists for the SPD. A comprehensive analysis of
these channels promises insightful future research.
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5 Selective Sharing of News Items and the
Political Position of News Outlets
with Julian Freitag and Johannes Münster
5.1 Introduction
State-of-the-art research shows that the media have a causal eect on the economic and political
choices of individuals (DellaVigna and La Ferrara, 2015). The media are, however, repeatedly
accused of being biased towards the political left or right. For instance, six-in-ten US citizens see
political bias in the news media1 and four-in-ten German voters think that the government exerts
pressure on the media.2 Are the media really biased? A growing body of literature addresses these
questions by developing methods to assess political biases of news outlets (Groeling, 2013; Puglisi
and Snyder, 2016).
Measuring the political position of news outlets is challenging, though. In particular, researchers
must nd ways to overcome problems of subjectivity and the absence of suitable baselines against
which to assess bias (e.g., Groeling, 2013). Existing approaches are based on in-depth content
analyses – either by human or by automated coding – or on determining the political position
of the news outlets’ audience (Puglisi and Snyder, 2016). Many of these procedures are data
demanding, computationally burdensome, and time consuming. Easy to implement methods to
assess the political position of news outlets, in contrast, are rare.
We present a novel approach to measure the political position of online news outlets that is
based on the selective sharing of news items by politicians on social media. Our central argument
is that politicians predominantly share news items that are in line with their own political position,
i.e., left-wing politicians prefer to share news items from left-wing news outlets, while right-wing
1See https://news.gallup.com/poll/207794/six-partisan-bias-news-media.aspx,
viewed: Feb 2019.
2See https://docplayer.org/43364962-Glaubwuerdigkeit-der-medien-eine-
studie-im-auftrag-des-westdeutschen-rundfunks-dezember-2016.html, viewed:
Feb 2019.
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politicians prefer to share news items from right-wing news outlets.3 Consequently, we can utilize
the politicians’ revealed preferences over news items to infer the political position of the news
outlets.
Formally, we compute a Spearman rank correlation coecient for each news outlet under
consideration. The Spearman rank correlation coecient measures the correlation between the
rank of the political position of the politicians’ parties (from most left-wing to most right-wing on
a one-dimensional scale) on the one hand, and the rank of the politicians’ share of referrals to a
particular news outlet – aggregated on the party level – on the other hand. A positive correlation
indicates that the news outlet is positioned to the right, a negative correlation indicates that the
news outlet is positioned to the left.
Our approach has a number of advantages. First, it is quick and easy to implement. We infer
the political position of a news outlet from the selective sharing of news items by politicians,
whose political position is clear. Moreover, since sharing news items via social media channels is
nowadays part of the politicians’ profession, we observe the politicians’ choices over news items
in a setting where they have an incentive to reveal their preferences consciously and truthfully.
Thus, our approach does not require any elaborate content analysis, but circumvents problems of
subjectivity and the absence of suitable baselines against which to assess bias nonetheless.
Second, the results from our procedure are straightforward to interpret. The Spearman rank
correlation coecient for a particular news outlet is either positive, negative, or equal to zero,
whereby the news outlet can directly be classied as biased to the left, biased to the right, or
unbiased.
Finally, our approach is applicable widely beyond this paper. In particular, while many existing
procedures are limited to assessing political media bias in two-party democracies, our approach
can also be applied to multi-party democracies, as long as the parties’ political position can be
measured on an ordinal, one-dimensional scale.4 In addition to that, our approach is not data
demanding and can thus be applied to small datasets, too.
We apply our procedure to twelve major online news outlets in Germany and consider the
selective sharing of news items of German MPs via Twitter. The Spearman rank correlation
coecient is positive for ve news outlets, but only statistically signicant for two of them (BILD
and Welt). The Spearman rank correlation coecient is negative for seven further news outlets,
and statistically signicant for three of them (Zeit, Spiegel, and Deutschlandfunk). Following the
above considerations, we conclude that BILD and Welt are positioned on the right, Zeit, Spiegel, and
Deutschlandfunk are positioned on the left, and the remaining seven news outlets are positioned
3A robustness check to the application of this measure conrms that less than four percent of the politicians’ referrals
criticize the news item or the news source.
4Machine learning techniques, for instance, usually struggle when multiple parties are involved (Colleoni et al., 2014).
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in the center of the political spectrum. Several robustness checks support our main results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the related liter-
ature. Section 5.3 illustrates the application of the Spearman rank correlation coecient as a
measure of the political position of news outlets more closely. In Section 5.4, we describe the
data collection procedure and the data preparation process. Section 5.5 presents the results of our
application, compares them to existing measures of the political position of German news outlets,
and demonstrates their robustness. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Related literature
Our paper is related to three strands of literature. First, our approach to measure the political
position of news outlets contributes to the literature on political media bias (see Groeling, 2013;
Gentzkow et al., 2016; Puglisi and Snyder, 2016, for surveys). It is especially close to papers that
develop alternative approaches to measure political bias in the US (e.g., Groseclose and Milyo,
2005; Ho and Quinn, 2008; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010) and in Germany (e.g., Dallmann et al.,
2015; Dewenter et al., 2016; Garz et al., 2019). We contribute to this literature by presenting a
novel approach to determine the political position of news outlets that is easy to implement,
straightforward to interpret, and applicable to multi-party democracies and small datasets.
Next, our paper is related to the growing literature on the selective sharing of information on
social media. This literature is divided into two elds. One group of papers infers the political
position of users from their selective sharing of information whose political position is clear (e.g.,
Barberá et al., 2015; Boutet et al., 2012; Colleoni et al., 2014). A second group of papers takes the
reverse approach and provides evidence of the selective sharing of information by users whose
political position is clear. Adamic and Glance (2005), for instance, demonstrate that political
bloggers prefer to share hyperlinks that match their own political opinion. In addition, Shin
and Thorson (2017) and Aruguete and Calvo (2018) show that Twitter users selectively share
messages that are in line with their political position; An et al. (2014) provide analogous evidence
for selective sharing on Facebook. Our approach builds on the ndings from the latter group of
papers, since our measure is based on politicians’ selective sharing of news items that are in line
with their own political position.
Finally, we contribute to studies that examine the role of social media in political processes (Luca,
2016b, provides a survey on the economic and political impact of social media and user-generated
content). The selective exposure to social media content has attracted particularly much attention
(e.g., Bakshy et al., 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng, 2009, 2011; Garrett, 2009a,b). Selective
exposure to social media content is conceptually closely related to selective sharing of information;
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the two are often called “complementary processes” (Shin and Thorson, 2017). Most closely related
to our approach is An et al. (2012) who create a one-dimensional map of the political position of
US news media based on Twitter users’ subscription and interaction patterns.5 On top of that,
our paper adds to studies on politicians’ usage of Twitter and other social media (Jungherr, 2016),
coverage of politicians on Twitter (Jungherr, 2014), and the contribution of social media in political
mobilization (Bond et al., 2012) and social movements (Hermida et al., 2014).
5.3 Method
As argued, the idea of the approach is to assess the correlation between the political position of
a party and its politicians’ number of referrals to a specic news outlet. To avoid over-tting,
we use the Spearman rank correlation coecient, a well known non-parametric measure of the
correlation between two ordinal variables.6
Regarding our application to the selective sharing of news items by German MPs on Twitter, let
o, o = 1, ..., 12, denote the twelve news outlets under consideration (see Section 5.4 for details on
the selection process). Moreover, let i, i = 1, ..., 7, denote the seven parties in the 19th Bundestag.
The political position of party i is denoted by xi ∈ R.7 Let nio denote the absolute number of
tweets from MPs of party i that contain a reference to outlet o. These raw counts will depend on
the number of MPs belonging to party i and on how active they are on Twitter, two factors that
are not informative about the political position of outlet o. Therefore, our main measure considers
the relative number of Twitter referrals by party i to outlet o,
yio =
nio∑12
r=1 nir
. (5.1)
We observe seven dierent values yi – one for each party i – for each news outlet o.8
Next, the parties’ political positions, xi, are assigned to integer ranks rg(xi), where rank 1 is
given to the most left-wing, and rank 7 is given to the most right-wing party. Moreover, x a
news outlet o and consider the relative numbers of Twitter referrals yio by parties i = 1, ..., 7
to this news outlet o. Assign integer ranks rg(yio) from rank 1 to rank 7, where the smallest
5The intuition is that the closer the political position of two media sources, the more their audiences overlap.
6See Siegel and Castellan (1988), for a detailed discussion on the Spearman rank correlation coecient.
7By aggregating tweets on the party level, we abstract from political heterogeneity within parties. This simplication
makes our analysis more transparent and less data demanding. Moreover, we cannot use the MPs’ voting history to
determine their individual political position as, e.g., the ADA in the US (see https://adaction.org/ada-
voting-records/), because such data are not available for the AfD, who was never part of the Bundestag
before.
8See Section 5.5.3 for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using the relative number of Twitter
referrals.
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referral share to news outlet o is given the smallest rank. For outlet o, let ρo denote the correlation
coecient between rg(xi) and rg(yio). It is then given by
ρo =
∑7
i=1(rg(xi)− rg(x))(rg(yio)− rg(yo))√∑7
i=1(rg(xi)− rg(x))2
√∑7
i=1(rg(yio)− rg(yo))2
, (5.2)
where rg(x) and rg(yo) denote the average ranks of x and y for outlet o. In other words, equation
(5.2) gives the Spearman rank correlation coecient between the political position of a party and
the relative number of Twitter referrals from this party mentioning outlet o.
The values of ρo lie in the interval [−1, 1]. If ρo > 0, the parties’ ranked political position and
their respective ranked relative number of Twitter referrals to outlet o are positively correlated.
Thus, news items from o are shared relatively more often by right-wing MPs, which indicates that
news outlet o is biased to the right. If, on the other hand, ρo < 0, the parties’ ranked political
position and their respective ranked relative number of Twitter referrals to outlet o are negatively
correlated. Thus, news items from o are shared relatively more often by left-wing MPs, which
indicates that outlet o is biased to the left. Finally, if ρo = 0, the parties’ ranked relative number of
Twitter referrals to outlet o is independent from their political position; in this case, news outlet o
is unbiased.
We test the statistical signicance of ρo against the null hypothesis that rg(xi) and rg(yio) are
independent, i.e., we test
H0: There is no correlation between the parties’ ranked political position and their ranked referral
shares to outlet o.
against
H1: There is a correlation between the parties’ ranked political position and their ranked referral
shares to outlet o.
Given the small number of observations per news outlet o (N = 7), we consider the exact
p-values of the Spearman rank correlation coecients ρo, which we take from Owen (1962). Since
we test H0 for twelve news outlets, we also take multiple hypotheses testing into account with
the Bonferroni correction.
5.4 Data
To carry out the analysis, we rst determine which news outlets to consider. Our approach is
based on the assumption that the selective sharing of news items reveals politicians’ preferences
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over the news outlets’ content. Hence, a major requirement on the news outlets is that all German
MPs can potentially select from all outlets’ news items. Local and specialized news outlets (i.e.,
those that focus on a particular topic such as sports, fashion or economics) are thus excluded from
the analysis.9 Moreover, we do not consider news aggregators such as Google news or mixed
content providers such as e-mail providers. We retrieve the ten largest national online outlets
(by number of visits) from ivw.de.10 Nine out of these ten news outlets meet the requirements
discussed above.11 In addition, we include the online news sites of the two major German public
TV broadcasters and the major German public radio news broadcaster into the analysis, such that
we end up with twelve national online news outlets.12
Next, we collect tweets from all MPs of the seven parties in the 19th Bundestag (2017–) who
are active on Twitter via the Twitter API. In a rst step, we retrieve every tweet by every MP
between Oct 24, 2017 (rst session of the newly elected Bundestag), and May 11, 2018. Next, we
check which tweets share news items published by one of the twelve selected online news outlets
and aggregate these tweets on the party level (Table 5.1).13 The corresponding relative number of
Twitter referrals to each outlet for each party is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1: Absolute number of Twitter referrals by party
BILD Spiegel Focus n-tv Welt Zeit SZ Stern F.A.Z. ARD ZDF D.funk Total
LINKE 16 551 67 79 200 275 264 65 113 314 92 125 2,161
Grüne 99 896 63 64 430 425 619 32 382 349 94 217 3,670
SPD 73 749 58 51 324 290 347 48 237 188 78 133 2,576
FDP 123 293 102 85 542 128 117 23 375 88 37 66 1,979
CDU 280 283 130 89 707 145 193 28 484 256 69 140 2,804
CSU 17 22 4 3 54 6 23 0 25 9 5 7 175
AfD 674 564 912 286 2,175 255 202 86 572 363 81 95 6,265
Total 1,282 3,358 1,336 657 4,432 1,524 1,765 282 2,188 1,567 456 783 19,630
Notes: Table 5.1 shows the absolute number of Twitter referrals by party to each news outlet under consideration.
Newspapers and magazines: BILD refers to news items from bild.de. Spiegel refers to news items from
spiegel.de. Focus refers to news items from focus.de. Welt refers to news items from welt.de. Zeit
refers to news items from zeit.de. SZ refers to news items from sueddeutsche.de. Stern refers to news
items from stern.de. F.A.Z. refers to news items from faz.net. Public service broadcasters (television):
ARD refers to news items from tagesschau.de. ZDF refers to news items from zdf.de/nachrichten.
Public service broadcasters (radio): D.funk refers to news items from deutschlandfunk.de. Other online
news outlets: n-tv refers to news items from n-tv.de.
9See Section 5.6 for a discussion on how to apply the approach to local news outlets.
10The IVW (“Information Community for the Assessment of the Circulation of Media”) certies and audits the
circulations of major publications, including newspapers and magazines, within Germany.
11We excluded upday from the analysis, which is a news aggregator pre-installed on all Samsung mobile devices.
12The top ten news outlets by number of visits include all major German national news outlets. Technically, our
analysis could be extended to more online news outlets. The smaller the news outlet, however, the less likely it is
to meet the requirements.
13This includes reactions and comments on re-tweets that originally shared news items. Some illustrative examples
are displayed in Appendix D.
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Table 5.2: Relative number of Twitter referrals by party
BILD Spiegel Focus n-tv Welt Zeit SZ Stern F.A.Z. ARD ZDF D.funk Total
LINKE .0074 .2550 .0310 .0366 .0925 .1273 .1222 .0301 .0523 .1453 .0426 .0578 1
Grüne .0270 .2441 .0172 .0174 .1172 .1158 .1687 .0087 .1041 .0951 .0256 .0591 1
SPD .0283 .2908 .0225 .0198 .1258 .1126 .1347 .0186 .0920 .0730 .0303 .0516 1
FDP .0622 .1481 .0515 .0430 .2739 .0647 .0591 .0116 .1895 .0445 .0187 .0334 1
CDU .0999 .1009 .0464 .0317 .2521 .0517 .0688 .01 .1726 .0913 .0246 .0499 1
CSU .0971 .1257 .0229 .0171 .3086 .0343 .1314 .0 .1429 .0514 .0286 .04 1
AfD .1076 .0900 .1456 .0457 .3472 .0407 .0322 .0137 .0913 .0579 .0129 .0152 1
Notes: Table 5.2 shows the relative number of Twitter referrals by party to each news outlet under consideration. The relative numbers are
computed based on the absolute numbers in Table 5.1. Newspapers and magazines: BILD refers to news items from bild.de. Spiegel
refers to news items from spiegel.de. Focus refers to news items from focus.de. Welt refers to news items from welt.de.
Zeit refers to news items from zeit.de. SZ refers to news items from sueddeutsche.de. Stern refers to news items from
stern.de. F.A.Z. refers to news items from faz.net. Public service broadcasters (television): ARD refers to news items from
tagesschau.de. ZDF refers to news items from zdf.de/nachrichten. Public service broadcasters (radio): D.funk refers to news
items from deutschlandfunk.de. Other online news outlets: n-tv refers to news items from n-tv.de.
Finally, for each outlet o, we assign the ranks 1 to 7 to the seven parties referral shares to o,
where rank 1 is given to the smallest, and rank 7 to the largest referral share. For the ranking of
the political parties we rely on Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2017) who order the parties from left
to right in the political spectrum. An overview of all ranks is given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Overview of the ranks
Party BILD Spiegel Focus n-tv Welt Zeit SZ Stern F.A.Z. ARD ZDF D.funk
LINKE 1 1 6 4 5 1 7 4 7 1 7 7 6
Grüne 2 2 5 1 2 2 6 7 2 4 6 4 7
SPD 3 3 7 2 3 3 5 6 6 3 4 6 5
FDP 4 4 4 6 6 5 4 2 4 7 1 2 2
CDU 5 6 2 5 4 4 3 3 3 6 5 3 4
CSU 6 5 3 3 1 6 1 5 1 5 2 5 3
AfD 7 7 1 7 7 7 2 1 5 2 3 1 1
Notes: Table 5.3 shows the ranks (i) for the parties’ political position from most left-wing to most right-wing and (ii) for the parties’
relative number of Twitter referrals to the twelve news outlets. The ranks of the referral shares are computed based on Table 5.2.
Newspapers and magazines: BILD refers to news items from bild.de. Spiegel refers to news items from spiegel.de. Focus
refers to news items from focus.de. Welt refers to news items from welt.de. Zeit refers to news items from zeit.de. SZ
refers to news items from sueddeutsche.de. Stern refers to news items from stern.de. F.A.Z. refers to news items from
faz.net. Public service broadcasters (television): ARD refers to news items from tagesschau.de. ZDF refers to news items
from zdf.de/nachrichten. Public service broadcasters (radio): D.funk refers to news items from deutschlandfunk.de.
Other online news outlets: n-tv refers to news items from n-tv.de.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main results
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1 show the results from computing the Spearman rank correlation coecient
ρo for all twelve news outlets. We nd that ρo is positive for ve news outlets, but only statistically
signicant for two of them (BILD and Welt). Moreover, we nd that ρo is negative for seven further
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news outlets, and statistically signicant for three of them (Zeit, Spiegel, and Deutschlandfunk).
Hence, following our considerations from Sections 5.1 and 5.3, we conclude that BILD and Welt
are positioned on the right, Zeit, Spiegel, and Deutschlandfunk are positioned on the left, and the
remaining seven news outlets are positioned in the center of the political spectrum.14
Table 5.4: Main results
BILD Spiegel Focus n-tv Welt Zeit SZ Stern F.A.Z. ARD ZDF D.funk
ρo 0.964*** -0.857** 0.571 0.179 0.964*** -0.964*** -0.571 -0.393 0.286 -0.679 -0.679 -0.857**
p-value (0.0028) (0.024) (0.200) (0.714) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.200) (0.396) (0.556) (0.110) (0.110) (0.024)
Notes: Table 5.4 shows the Spearman rank correlation coecient computed for each news outlet under consideration based on the ranks given in Table 5.3.
Newspapers and magazines: BILD refers to news items from bild.de. Spiegel refers to news items from spiegel.de. Focus refers to news items from
focus.de. Welt refers to news items from welt.de. Zeit refers to news items from zeit.de. SZ refers to news items from sueddeutsche.de.
Stern refers to news items from stern.de. F.A.Z. refers to news items from faz.net. Public service broadcasters (television): ARD refers to news
items from tagesschau.de. ZDF refers to news items from zdf.de/nachrichten. Public service broadcasters (radio): D.funk refers to news
items from deutschlandfunk.de. Other online news outlets: n-tv refers to news items from n-tv.de. Exact p-values in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 5.1: Main results: The Spearman rank correlation coecient for each news outlet under
consideration.
5.5.2 Comparison to existing measures
The political position of German news outlets has been measured before; recent approaches
include Dallmann et al. (2015), Dewenter et al. (2016), and Garz et al. (2019). In this section, we
compare the results from our novel approach with the ndings from these papers.
Using automated text analysis, Dallmann et al. (2015) develop several distinct measures for the
political media bias in four online news outlets, including three of whom we consider, too. The
authors nd that F.A.Z. tends to favor the more right-wing parties CDU, CSU, and FDP, while their
results for Spiegel and Zeit are ambiguous. This matches or result that F.A.Z. is more right-wing
than Spiegel and Zeit, and that Spiegel and Zeit are similar in their political position.
Dewenter et al. (2016) introduce a political coverage index (PCI) that is based on human coding
of the tonality of media reports about Germany’s two major parties, the center-right CDU/CSU and
14Under the Bonferroni correction, ρo is statistically signicant (5% level) for three news outlets: BILD, Welt, and Zeit.
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the center-left SPD.15 As in our case, values of the PCI lie in the interval [−1, 1], where negative
values of the PCI indicate a bias to the left and positive values indicate a bias to the right. The
analysis by Dewenter et al. (2016) includes nine news outlets that we cover, too.16 Figure 5.2 shows
that the values of the PCI are strongly correlated to our Spearman rank correlation coecient
(correlation of 0.77). Moreover, the measures agree on the direction of biases in eight out of nine
cases.
Figure 5.2: Comparison of the Spearman rank order coecient to the weighted PCI by Dewenter
et al. (2016).
Garz et al. (2019) construct an index of media outlets’ political position that is based on comparing
the language of the outlet with the language of the Facebook pages of Germany’s main political
parties. Here, too, the index lies in the interval [−1, 1], where negative values indicate a bias
to the left and positive values indicate a bias to the right. The analysis by Garz et al. (2019)
includes eleven news outlets that we cover, too. Figure 5.3 shows that the values of their index are
strongly correlated to our Spearman rank correlation coecient (correlation of 0.74). Moreover,
the measures agree on the direction of biases in nine out of eleven cases. In sum, these comparisons
support the validity of our approach.
15The authors use tonality data from MediaTenor.
16Dewenter et al. (2016) analyzed two dierent news sources by ARD and ZDF, respectively. We used the mean values
of the PCI for these news outlets to conduct the comparison.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the Spearman rank order coecient to the score by Garz et al. (2019).
5.5.3 Robustness checks
Tonality check
In this section, we probe the robustness of our results. First, our analysis is based on the assumption
that politicians share only news items that are in line with their own political position. This
assumption would be violated if, for instance, politicians shared news items in order to criticize the
item itself or the respective news source, or if they disagree with a re-tweet that originally shared
the news item. To support the plausibility of our assumption, we let two Research Assistants
read 2, 998 randomly drawn tweets from our dataset.17 The Research Assistants were asked to
determine if a tweet criticizes the shared news item or its outlet, if it criticizes the content of a
re-tweet that shared a news item, if it criticizes the news item or its news outlet in a re-tweet, or
if it does not contain any of these. Appendix D displays some illustrative examples of tweets that
the Research Assistants classied as criticizing or non-criticizing. In sum, 113 tweets – i.e., 3.8% –
were classied as criticizing the news outlet (inter coder reliability of 99%). This small fraction
supports the plausibility of our basic assumption that the MPs share news items via Twitter that
are in line with their own political position.
As a further robustness check, we excluded these 113 criticizing tweets from the randomly
17We initially decided that the Research Assistants could code 3, 000 tweets within a reasonable amount of time. The
random tweets were drawn proportionally to the total amount of tweets. E.g., if the Twitter referrals of party i to
news outlet o constituted 1% of all tweets, we would randomly draw 1% ∗ 3, 000 = 30 tweets by party i to news
outlet o for the Research Assistants to check. Rounding of non-integer numbers of tweets resulted in 2, 998 instead
of 3, 000 tweets.
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drawn subsample of 2, 998 tweets and computed the Spearman rank correlation coecient on the
basis of the remaining 2, 885 tweets. Since the random subsample was drawn proportionally to
the entire sample, the referral shares yio – and thereby the Spearman rank correlation coecient
ρo – can only be aected if these criticizing tweets are unevenly distributed across parties and
outlets; otherwise, our results would remain unchanged.18 The rst row of Table 5.5 shows that
although the magnitude of the Spearman rank correlation coecient underlies small changes
compared to the results shown in Table 5.4, our main results are robust to taking out the criticizing
tweets. In addition, ρo is weakly statistically signicant (10% level) for two further outlets: Focus
and ARD, where the former is positioned on the right, and the latter is positioned on the left.19
Table 5.5: Robustness Checks
BILD Spiegel Focus n-tv Welt Zeit SZ Stern F.A.Z. ARD ZDF D.funk taz
No criticizing tweets 0.929*** -0.857** 0.750* 0.179 0.964*** -1.000*** -0.464 -0.500 0.429 -0.750* -0.464 -0.857**
p-value (0.0068) (0.024) (0.066) (0.714) (0.0028) (0.0004) (0.302) (0.266) (0.354) (0.066) (0.302) (0.024)
Exclude LINKE 0.943** -0.886** 0.771 0.371 0.943** -0.943** -0.771 -0.029 -0.143 -0.486 -0.486 -0.829*
p-value (0.0166) (0.034) (0.102) (0.498) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.102) (1.000) (0.802) (0.356) (0.356) (0.058)
Exclude AfD 0.943** -0.771 0.314 -0.314 0.943** -1.000*** -0.314 -0.657 0.714 -0.714 -0.486 -0.771
p-value (0.0166) (0.102) (0.564) (0.564) (0.0166) (0.0028) (0.564) (0.176) (0.136) (0.136) (0.356) (0.102)
Exclude LINKE and AfD 0.900* -0.800 0.600 -0.100 0.900* -1.000** -0.600 -0.400 0.500 -0.500 -0.100 -0.700
p-value (0.084) (0.134) (0.350) (0.950) (0.084) (0.0166) (0.350) (0.516) (0.450) (0.450) (0.950) (0.234)
Include taz 0.964*** -0.857** 0.571 0.321 0.964*** -0.929*** -0.464 -0.393 0.429 -0.571 -0.571 -0.857** -0.929***
p-value (0.0028) (0.024) (0.200) (0.498) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.302) (0.355) (0.556) (0.200) (0.200) (0.024) (0.0068)
Absolute no. of tweets 0.607 -0.464 0.321 0.321 0.429 -0.643 -0.643 -0.179 0.357 -0.107 -0.571 -0.500
p-value (0.166) (0.302) (0.498) (0.498) (0.354) (0.138) (0.138) (0.714) (0.444) (0.840) (0.200) (0.266)
Notes: The rst row of Table 5.5 shows the Spearman rank correlation coecient computed based on a randomly drawn subsample of tweets, excluding
all tweets that were classied as criticizing (Section 5.5.3). The second, third, and forth rows show the Spearman rank correlation coecient computed
when excluding the Tweets by LINKE, AfD, and both at the same time, respectively (Section 5.5.3). The fth row shows the Spearman rank correlation
coecients when taz is considered (Section 5.5.3). The sixth row shows the Spearman rank correlation coecient based on the absolute number of Twitter
referrals as given in Table 5.1 (Section 5.5.3). Newspapers and magazines: BILD refers to news items from bild.de. Spiegel refers to news items from
spiegel.de. Focus refers to news items from focus.de. Welt refers to news items from welt.de. Zeit refers to news items from zeit.de. SZ
refers to news items from sueddeutsche.de. Stern refers to news items from stern.de. F.A.Z. refers to news items from faz.net. taz refers to
news items from taz.de. Public service broadcasters (television): ARD refers to news items from tagesschau.de. ZDF refers to news items from
zdf.de/nachrichten. Public service broadcasters (radio): D.funk refers to news items from deutschlandfunk.de. Other online news outlets:
n-tv refers to news items from n-tv.de. Exact p-values in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Exclude extreme parties
Next, we conrm that our approach does not hinge on the selective sharing of the politically
extreme parties, LINKE and AfD, alone. It is, for instance, possible that only these parties follow
distinct patterns in their sharing behavior, while the sharing behavior of the more centrist parties
18For instance, if only a particular party criticizes all news outlets, but does so proportionally across outlets such that
for all outlets the same fraction of tweets is critical, its relative number of Twitter referrals is not aected when
dropping those negative tweets. Similarly, if only a particular news outlet is being criticized, but proportionally so
by all parties, the ranking within that outlet would not be aected, either.
19Under the Bonferroni correction, ρo is weakly statistically signicant (10% level) for three news outlets: BILD, Welt,
and Zeit.
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is similar and thereby uninformative about the political position of the news outlets.20 To this
end, we exclude (i) LINKE, (ii) AfD, and (iii) LINKE and AfD at the same time from the analysis
and compute the Spearman rank correlation coecient based on the relative number of Twitter
referrals by the remaining parties, respectively. Rows two, three, and four of Table 5.5 show the
results. The magnitude of the Spearman rank correlation coecient underlies small changes
compared to the results shown in Table 5.4. Moreover, given the smaller number of observations,
our results are less statistically signicant. While ρo is statistically signicant for BILD, Welt, and
Zeit in all three analyses, it is not statistically signicant for Spiegel and Deutschlandfunk when
excluding AfD (row three) or both AfD and LINKE (row four).21
Relative number of Twier referrals
Third, we use the parties’ relative number of Twitter referrals to each of the twelve news outlets
as a basis for their ranking (see Section 5.4). The major advantage over using the absolute number
of Twitter referrals is that the parties who are most active on Twitter are not automatically given
high referral ranks for each news outlet, which would undermine the idea of our measure. The
main disadvantage of this approach is, however, that the Spearman rank correlation coecient
that we compute for each outlet is dependent on the other news outlets included into the analysis,
because a party’s referral share to news outlet o – and thereby its rank – depends on the referrals
to all other news outlets that we consider.
We consider this to be a minor disadvantage. As argued, we are interested in the sign of
the Spearman rank correlation coecient and not in its precise magnitude. Thus, even if ρo’s
magnitude was aected by considering more or less news outlets, it would not be a threat to our
approach as long as its sign does not switch. Three robustness checks support this view. First,
we included Twitter referrals to taz, which is known to be a very left-wing news outlet, into the
analysis (Table 5.5, row ve). News items by taz are relatively often shared by left-wing, but not
by right-wing parties; as a result, the referral shares to the original twelve outlets change for
the left-wing, but not for the remaining parties. Accordingly, we nd that ρo decreases for Zeit,
but is still statistically signicant at the 1% level. Moreover, ρo for taz itself is negative and also
statistically signicant at the 1%-level, hence, taz is positioned on the left as expected. The results
20On the other hand, it has recently been argued that the extremely left-wing and the extremely right-
wing parties have become quite similar regarding certain topics such as immigration; see, e.g.,
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-07/afd-linke-rechts-links-
waehler-gemeinsamkeiten, viewed Feb 2019. If this was the case, our main results would be even too
conservative.
21Under the Bonferroni correction, ρo is statistically signicant for four outlets: Zeit and taz (10% level), BILD and
Welt (5% level).
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for the remaining news outlets are unaected.22
Next, we successively exclude the Twitter referrals to one of the originally selected twelve news
outlets and check how the results for the remaining eleven news outlets change.23 In each case, the
magnitude of the Spearman rank correlation coecient changes slightly, but never switches sign.
Moreover, with one exception, the news outlets that are classied as positioned on the political
left or right in Section 5.5.1 remain to be classied as such unless it is their turn to be excluded
(when we exclude Welt, ρo for Deutschlandfunk is no longer statistically signicant).
Third, we compare our results from Section 5.5.1 with the results we would have obtained when
using the absolute instead of the relative number of Twitter referrals.24 The most right-wing party
AfD – whose members are most active on Twitter – would then be given one of the highest ranks
for each news outlet, while the second-most right-wing party CSU – whose members are least
active on Twitter – would be given one of the lowest. As a result, the Spearman rank correlation
coecients would be very dierent from those presented in Table 5.4 (Table 5.5, row six). In
particular, the magnitude of the coecients computed based on the absolute number of Twitter
referrals is smaller and none of them is statistically signicant.
5.6 Conclusion
We present a novel and easy to implement measure for the political position of news outlets that
is based on the selective sharing of news items by German MPs. Its application to twelve major
German online news outlets shows that two news outlets, BILD and Welt, are biased to the right,
three news outlet, Zeit, Spiegel, and Deutschlandfunk, are biased to the left, and the remaining
outlets are unbiased. These results are in line with earlier ndings on the political position of
German news outlets.
Our approach is limited in at least two respects. First, while our approach can assess whether
a news outlet is positioned on the left or on the right, it is agnostic about the type of bias, i.e.,
whether there is a selection or a distortion bias or both. Similarly, we cannot determine whether
the bias is demand or supply driven.
Second, the approach is applicable only to online news outlets. Yet, since nowadays every major
news outlet also operates online, we do not consider this as an important caveat. Relatedly, the
measure cannot be applied to small news outlets whose news items are never shared by politicians.
22Under the Bonferroni correction, ρo is statistically signicant (10% level) for three news outlets: BILD, Welt, and Zeit.
23These results are unreported, but available upon request.
24Using the relative number of referrals to a news outlet also distinguishes our approach from a recent study by the Pew
Research Center that classies the political position of a number of US news outlets based on the absolute number
of Facebook shares by members of the 114th and 115th US Congresses. See http://www.people-press.
org/2017/12/18/sharing-the-news-in-a-polarized-congress/, viewed: Feb 2019.
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This does not, however, generally preclude the investigation of local news outlets. One could, for
instance, study the sharing patterns of local politicians to determine the political position of local
online news outlets, which would be an interesting direction for further research.
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6 antity Restrictions on Advertising,
Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare
with Johannes Münster. Published in: Journal of Public Economics (2015), Vol. 131, 124-141.
6.1 Introduction
It is widely agreed that a free and independent media is important for society and democracy.
While the independence of media can be endangered from many directions, recent discussions both
in academia and policy circles have shown that commercial media bias is an important concern.
Commercial media bias arises out of a conict of interest between advertisers and audiences over
media content. Studies from marketing have shown that advertisers prefer lighter content and
genres that put consumers in a more advertising receptive mood.1 Moreover, advertisers may
prefer the media not to report critically about their products.2 There are indications that the topic
of commercial media bias has become especially important in recent years. The FCC (2011) has
reported worries about the “crumbling ad-edit wall” in broadcast television: due to their dicult
nancial situation, media enterprises may be particularly vulnerable to advertisers’ pressures.3
This paper investigates the welfare eects of limits for the quantity of advertising in a com-
mercial free-to-air television market in the presence of commercial media bias. Since free-to-air
1For example, Wilbur (2008, p.373) nds that “advertiser genre preferences are nearly opposite those of viewers”:
viewers prefer action and news, while advertisers prefer reality and comedy. A case in point is that Coca-Cola and
General Foods have refused to advertise during news broadcasts, as “bad” news might aect consumers’ perception
of their products (Hawkins and Mothersbaugh, 2009).
2For example, tobacco advertisers have pressured media outlets to suppress information concerning the health risks
of smoking. Blasco and Sobbrio (2012) provide a survey of the evidence.
3For example, the FCC (2011) describes the case of a local Fox channel, KBTC-TV, that featured a story on a new
electronic rehabilitation system for injured kids. The reporter was introduced to the audience in a way that
suggested an independent report by the channel. The reporter did not work for KTBC, however, but for the
Cleveland Clinic. Lieberman (2007) reports that this is not an isolated case: “a hybrid of news and marketing (...)
has spread to local TV newsrooms all across the country (...). Viewers who think they are getting news are really
getting a form of advertising. And critical stories – hospital infection rates, for example, or medical mistakes or
poor care – tend not to be covered.” Recent academic contributions on commercial media bias include Reuter and
Zitzewitz (2006), Ellman and Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2013); we review the literature in Section 6.2.
The issue has also recently raised the interest of the FTC, which hosted a workshop on the “blurred lines” between
advertising and content in December 2013.
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broadcasters do not collect direct payments from their audiences, they may be especially suscep-
tible to advertisers’ inuence. In our model, broadcasters choose the quality of their program
for the viewers, and the quantity of advertising. The conict of interest between viewers and
advertisers gives rise to a trade-o: making the program more attractive for viewers increases the
number of viewers, but lowers the willingness to pay of the advertisers. Ceteris paribus, a cap on
advertising quantity will drive the per viewer price of advertising up, since the inverse ad demand
is decreasing in quantity. A higher per viewer price of advertising makes it more protable for
broadcasters to attract additional viewers. Therefore, the non-advertising program content of the
media will become more aligned with viewers’ preferences.
This result may help to understand cross country dierences in television content. News belong
to the viewers’ (but not advertisers’) most preferred television genres (Wilbur, 2008). We would
therefore expect that the supply of news is higher when advertising quantity is restricted, and
indeed Aalberg et al. (2010) show that the supply of news and current aairs by the biggest
commercial broadcasters during prime time is drastically higher in several European countries,
where advertising quantity is restricted, than in the USA, where it is not.4
A quantity restriction on advertising increases consumer surplus, but decreases producer surplus.
We study the conditions under which welfare (which we take to be the sum of consumer surplus
and all prots) increases. In particular, due to its eect on media content, a cap may improve
welfare even when consumers do not directly suer from advertising, or can easily avoid ads by
the use of ad avoidance technologies such as digital video recorders (DVRs).
Competition between many independently owned broadcasters helps overcoming commercial
media bias. Surprisingly, it increases at the same time the likelihood that a cap on advertising
improves welfare. Therefore, competition and regulation of advertising should not be seen as
substitutes; rather, they complement each other. The key reason for the complementarity is as
follows. A cap that marginally reduces advertising quantity crowds out the marginal advertisers.
The associated loss in producer surplus depends on the willingness to pay of the marginal adver-
tisers, which in equilibrium equals the price of an advertising spot. Competition on the media
market decreases this price. Correspondingly, the marginal advertiser has a lower willingness to
pay, and the loss in producer surplus from a cap is lower.
4Aalberg et al. (2010) compare the two biggest commercial broadcasters in each of ve European countries with
the two biggest commercial broadcasters in the USA. During peak hours, in 2007 the biggest two commercial
broadcasters in the USA devoted an average of 6 minutes a day on news and current aairs. In comparison, the
biggest two commercial broadcasters in Belgium provided 42, in the Netherlands 20, in Norway 19, in Sweden 27,
and in the UK 37 minutes. Of course, there are many dierences between these European countries and the USA.
The authors stress the higher importance of public service broadcasting in Europe. Within countries, public service
broadcasters have a higher news supply than commercial broadcasters; across countries, the biggest public service
broadcasters in the European countries show more news during prime time than those in the USA.
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The complementarity between regulation and competition is thus tightly linked to the eect
of competition on advertising prices. Empirically, it seems that competition on the broadcasting
market reduces advertising prices (see Brown and Alexander, 2005). As has been pointed out
by Athey et al. (2013, p.6) and Anderson et al. (2012), this poses a puzzle in media economics,
since standard models of free TV give the opposite prediction: competition between broadcasters
for viewers decreases advertising quantities since viewers are ad averse, and thereby increases
advertising prices. Our model provides a potential explanation for the empirical results. Strong
competition among broadcasters leads to low advertising quantities, but also to viewer friendly
programs. Other things being equal, the reduction of advertising quantity increases advertising
prices, as in the standard models. A more viewer friendly program, however, lowers the advertisers’
willingness to pay and thus equilibrium advertising prices. We show that the latter eect dominates
the former one.
Our model also contributes to understanding the “crumbling ad-edit wall” diagnosed by some
observers of today’s media markets. In times of low ad demand, for example due to advertisers
moving online or due to general economic conditions, the price of an ad per viewer is lower. There-
fore, attracting viewers is less important for the broadcasters. As a consequence, in equilibrium
media content will be more aligned with advertiser preferences.
A cap on advertising lowers broadcasters’ prots, and may thus induce exit and a higher con-
centration on the media market. We show, however, that our main results are qualitatively similar
when taking endogenous entry into account. In particular, a “local” cap (that slightly reduces
advertising quantity) improves consumer surplus, and is more likely to be welfare enhancing
when competition is erce. In contrast, a proportional tax on advertising revenues has rather
dierent implications than a cap. The reason is that a cap reduces advertising quantity, while a tax
increases it in the long run. Marginal costs are zero in television markets. A tax on advertising
revenue is therefore a tax on variable prots, and for a given number of broadcasters, equilibrium
decisions are unchanged. The tax lowers broadcasters’ prots, however, and thus induces exit,
and the reduced competition leads to an increase of advertising quantity.
Our paper contributes to two classic topics in public nance, the private provision of public
goods, and the comparison of price versus quantity instruments, in the specic setting of advertis-
ing nanced media. Media markets are of general interest since the working of these markets
aects not only their active participants, but also generates important externalities, for example by
helping citizens to take well-informed political decisions. For an adequate analysis, the structure
of media markets needs to be modelled in more detail than is customary in the theory of public
goods. We thus build on modeling tools developed in the economic analysis of advertising and in
the theory of two-sided markets, which is a comparatively new topic in public nance.
117
6 Quantity Restrictions on Advertising, Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the background by reviewing
(i) the empirical literature on the inuence of advertisers on media content, (ii) the conict of
interest between viewers and advertisers, (iii) the regulation of television advertising, and (iv)
the related literature. Section 6.3 gives a simple and highly stylized example that illustrates the
main eects in our model. Section 6.4 introduces the model, briey mentions its microfoundations
(which are presented in detail in Appendix F.2), and discusses the assumptions underlying our
welfare analysis. Section 6.5 characterizes the equilibrium and its welfare properties, investigates
the welfare eects of a cap, determines the welfare maximizing cap without and with endogenous
entry in the broadcasting market, and discusses advertising taxes. Section 6.6 studies Pay TV and
ad avoidance technologies. Section 6.7 summarizes our ndings, discusses robustness issues and
extensions (laid out in detail in Appendix F), and briey mentions the testable predictions of the
model. Proofs are relegated to Appendix E, and some lengthy technical proofs Appendix F.
6.2 Background
Ads inuence editors. Many media platforms depend heavily on advertising revenues. For example,
the 2014 Pew report on the state of the news media nds that advertising accounts for 69% of
US news revenues. At the same time, media reports about rms and their products inuence
prots.5 The media’s dependence on advertising revenues, combined with its impact on rms’
prots, implies that advertisers have economic incentives to inuence editorial decisions. Several
recent papers have shown econometrically that indeed advertisers systematically inuence media
content.6 Advertisers’ inuence on media content can be expected to be especially strong in solely
advertising funded media such as free TV or radio broadcasting. Moreover, the dicult nancial
situation of the news media today aicts the quality of news coverage (Pew Research Center,
2013) and has led to a reconsideration of the traditional separation between media companies’
news and business divisions (FCC, 2011).
Conict of interest between viewers and advertisers. At the center of our model is a conict
of interest between viewers and advertisers over media content. Here we discuss the empirical
literature that motivates this assumption. First, there is good evidence that viewers favor dierent
genres than advertisers. Wilbur (2008) estimates a two-sided empirical model of viewer demand for
programs and advertiser demand for audiences. In his data, viewers’ two most preferred programs
are action and news, accounting for 16% of program network hours, whereas advertisers’ two most
5See Appendix F.2 for empirical references.
6The seminal contribution is Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006). See Table F.1 in Appendix F for an overview of econometric
evidence. As we describe in Appendix F.1, interviews and surveys of key players in the market also conrm that
advertisers inuence media content.
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preferred programs are reality and comedy, accounting for 47% of program network hours. His
results suggest that advertisers’ preferences have a bigger impact on the networks than the viewers’
preferences. Similarly, Brown and Cavazos (2005, p.30) nd that “broadcast television programs
receive large and statistically signicant premia or discounts based on their content, holding
constant the number, income, age and gender of the viewers these programs attract. Sitcoms
receive large premia, while news shows and police dramas receive large discounts.” In their sample,
adjusting for the length of these program types, sitcoms aired more than one-and-a-half time
more often than news shows and police dramas combined.
A potential explanation for advertisers’ genre preferences is provided by the experimental
research concerning context eects on advertising eectiveness. Goldberg and Gorn (1987) show
that happier program content puts viewers in a more advertising receptive mood. Relatedly,
Mathur and Chattopadhyay (1991) nd that it improves viewers’ message recall as well as their
cognitive responses towards the commercials. Advertisers take these issues seriously. Hawkins and
Mothersbaugh (2009, p.298) report that “Coca-Cola and General Foods have refused to advertise
some goods during news broadcasts because they believe that ‘bad’ news aect the interpretation
of their products. According to a Coca-Cola spokesman: ‘It’s a Coca-Cola policy not to advertise
on TV news because there is going to be some bad news in there, and Coke is an up-beat, fun
product’.”
A second issue is that viewers but not advertisers may favor accurate reporting of any defects,
risks, or negative externalities of products (see Blasco and Sobbrio, 2012, for a review, and Appendix
F.2). An important and well documented case in point is the media coverage of the health risks
of smoking. Another important case is the media coverage of anthropogenic climate change,
where the discourse in the news media has signicantly diverged from the scientic consensus.
As pointed out by Ellman and Germano (2009), one potential reason behind this biased media
coverage is the inuence of big advertisers such as car manufacturers or airlines.
Regulation of TV advertising. The regulation of the quantity of advertising in television diers
markedly across countries. In the European Union, for example, the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive requires that the “proportion of television advertising spots and teleshopping spots within
a given clock hour shall not exceed 20%” (Article 23 §1.). In contrast, in the United States there are
no such rules, except for children’s programs. Economic theory has identied two countervailing
considerations concerning the welfare eects of limits for the quantity of advertising (Anderson
and Coate, 2005): On the one hand, broadcasters are often competitive bottlenecks and have
market power over advertisers, suggesting that advertising quantity may be too low from a
welfare perspective, for the usual reason why rms with market power restrict quantities below
the ecient level. On the other hand, consumers may have a disutility from advertising, suggesting
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that there may be too much advertising in free TV, since the free TV broadcasters cannot perfectly
internalize the eect of advertising on their viewers.7 Indeed, regulation authorities describe
protecting consumers as the most important function of the quantity restrictions (e.g., OFCOM,
2011).
Today consumers can, however, avoid contact with annoying advertisements by the use of ad
avoidance technologies such as digital video recorders (DVRs). In the EU, about 30 percent of all
households already use such technologies (IP Network, 2013). In the US, 47% of TV households
have at least one digital video recorder (Leichtmann Research Group, 2013), and about 23% have
DVRs on more than one TV set. The average US American watches 25 minutes of DVR playback
a day (Nielsen Media Research, 2013). The traditional argument for quantity restrictions on
advertising may become less compelling under these conditions. Our paper shows that, however,
a cap on advertising makes the non-advertising content of the media more aligned with viewers’
preferences. Therefore, a cap may increase welfare even if no consumer is directly aected by
advertising.
Related literature. Our paper is related to four strands of the literature. First, broadcasting is a
prime example of the private provision of a public good. For this reason, our paper contributes
to the broad literature on public good provision (see Batina and Ihori, 2005, for a review). The
provision of public goods via advertising is studied in (Luski and Wettstein, 1994) and Anderson
and Coate (2005). Our paper goes beyond these papers by studying advertisers’ impact on media
content.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on price versus quantity instruments (Weitzman,
1974), as we compare the welfare implications of a tax on advertising with the eects of a quantity
regulation. Our contribution to this literature is to focus on a specic industry, namely advertising
supported media.
Third, we contribute to the growing work on media bias (see Prat and Strömberg, 2013, for
a survey). The economics’ literature has mainly focused on political media bias. We focus
on advertisers’ inuence and commercial media bias. Our analysis is closely linked to Ellman
and Germano (2009). In their setting, consumers value accurate news, while advertisers value
ad-receptive consumers. They show that a monopoly newspaper will underreport news that
suciently reduces advertiser prots. Interestingly, in a newspaper duopoly, commercial media
bias will be eliminated when advertising demand is suciently high, unless advertisers are able to
commit to withdraw ads from newspapers if they report too critically. Germano and Meier (2013)
study the case of many competing horizontally dierentiated media outlets to investigate how
7Wilbur (2008) estimates that a 10% reduction of advertising quantity in television leads to a 25% increase in audience
size.
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media diversity and ownership concentration aect commercial media bias. Blasco et al. (2016)
and Spiteri (2015) show that commercial media bias is a concern in particular if all advertisers
share the same preferences over media content, as in the tobacco example, where the tobacco
industry had a shared interest in eliminating coverage of the health risks of smoking. Otherwise,
competition in the product market may help overcome commercial media bias. Blasco and Sobbrio
(2012) provide a survey on competition and commercial media bias. However, the quantity of
advertising chosen by free TV broadcasters, its interaction with program quality and commercial
media bias, and the welfare eects of a cap on advertising, have not been formally studied yet.
The present paper attempts to close this gap. We ask how a quantity restriction on advertising
inuences commercial media bias, analyze its welfare properties, and compare the eects of a
quantity restriction with those of a tax on advertising revenues.
Our model also relates to the literature on political media bias and media capture. In some
settings politicians or governments are in fact major advertisers. Politicians that aim to be
(re)elected inform the voters on their manifestos via canvassing television ads; they prefer the
broadcasters not to report on any scandals or former mistakes that could reduce their chances.
Voters, on the other hand, wish to be properly informed about the candidates. Suppressed
information on politicians can prevent them from making an appropriate choice and hence lead
to distorted political outcomes. Empirical evidence on this mechanism is given by Di Tella and
Franceschelli (2011) who show in a study of Argentinian newspapers that government advertising
is associated with a reduced coverage of the government’s corruption scandals. Moreover, as
reported above, news are among the most preferred genres of viewers, but not of advertisers.
News consumption may have positive externalities by improving citizens’ political decisions,
and consumers will not internalize the large social gains associated with an informed electorate.
Therefore, there could be a demand driven media bias of too little informative news even without
any interference from advertisers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). Commercial media bias against
news aggravates this concern.
Fourth, in order to model advertising supported media adequately, we build on the literature on
advertising (see Bagwell, 2007, for a survey) and two-sided markets (see Anderson and Gabszewicz,
2006, for a survey). There are three major views in the economic analysis of advertising. According
to the informative view, advertising provides customers with information about the existence,
price, or qualities of the products. The persuasive view holds that advertising changes consumers’
tastes. The complementary view holds that advertising raises the true utility of the advertised
goods. The literature has ambiguous results on whether there is too much or too little advertising
from a welfare perspective. Moreover, the empirical literature indicates that no single view
captures all the relevant aspects (Bagwell, 2007). In this paper, we aim to show that a cap on
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advertising improves welfare under some conditions. To make our case strong, we take a rather
benign view of advertising and model advertising as informative.8
In the theory of two sided markets, our paper is closely related to the seminal work of Anderson
and Coate (2005), who argue that from a welfare perspective equilibrium advertising quantities in a
two-sided media market may be too high or too low, mainly depending on consumers’ ad aversion.
Their model has been extended to a more detailed analysis of horizontal product dierentiation
by Peitz and Valletti (2008). Our model of entry in two-sided markets TV is related to Choi (2006)
and Crampes et al. (2009). The studies by Ellman and Germano (2009), Germano and Meier (2013),
and Blasco et al. (2016) discussed above pioneered using models of two-sided markets for the
analysis of commercial media bias. As we compare the welfare implications of a tax on advertising
with the eects of quantity regulation, our work is furthermore related to Kind et al. (2008) who
examine taxes in two-sided markets. They study the cases of a monopoly platform, and of perfect
competition, assuming that the platforms’ marginal costs are strictly positive, and show that taxes
can help to accomplish the social optimum if the platform causes overprovision. Our paper, in
contrast, focuses on endogenous program quality, and in particular on commercial media bias, in
television markets, which are typically oligopolistic. Moreover, in television markets marginal
costs are negligible. Thus revenue taxes are taxes on variable prots and aect entry but cannot
be used to ne-tune economic decisions in the short run. Finally, our paper can also be linked to
work on ad avoidance technologies (e.g., Anderson and Gans, 2011).
6.3 Example
In this section, we illustrate the main eects in our model with a simple and highly stylized
example, deferring a more detailed discussion of our assumptions to the next section. In the
example, a monopoly broadcaster chooses its program quality v and its advertising quantity
a. Consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line [0, 1], the broadcaster is located at
0. Consumers have linear travel costs: a viewer who is located at a distance x ∈ [0, 1] from
the broadcaster has utility v − x from watching television. Consumers are ad neutral: their
utility from watching television is independent of the advertising quantity. A consumer watches
television whenever his utility exceeds his outside option of zero. The total number of consumers
is normalized to one, thus the number of viewers is simply equal to the program quality v.
To capture the conict of interest between advertisers and viewers, we assume that advertisers’
willingness to pay for advertising spots decreases in program quality. To be specic, let r denote
8Section 6.4.2 discusses the assumptions underlying our welfare analysis in more detail. In Appendix F.3, we also
explore the case of misleading advertising.
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the per viewer price of an advertising spot, and suppose that the inverse ad demand per viewer is
r = 1− v − a.
The broadcaster is nanced by advertising, has zero variable costs, and xed costs F > 0.
To ensure viability of the market, let F < 1/27. The broadcaster’s revenue is equal to the
number of viewers, times the prices of an ad per viewer, times the number of ads; its prot is
pi = v(1− v − a)a− F.
For a given advertising quantity a > 0, the prot maximizing program quality v is determined
by the rst order condition
1− v − a = v. (6.1)
Equation (6.1) illustrates the fundamental trade-o in our model. The left hand side of (6.1)
describes the marginal gain of the broadcaster from higher quality, on a per advertising spot basis:
higher quality increases the number of viewers, and on each viewer the broadcaster earns the price
of an ad per viewer. The right hand side of (6.1) describes the marginal costs of the broadcaster
from higher quality, per advertising spot: higher quality decreases the price of an ad per viewer,
and the loss of revenue is equal to the number of viewers, which is equal to v in the example.
Solving equation (6.1) for the prot maximizing program quality gives v = v∗(a) := (1− a)/2.
Substituting v∗(a) into the broadcaster’s prot function leads to pi = (1− a)2a/4− F . Without
a cap on advertising quantity, the prot maximizing choices of the broadcaster are a = v = 1/3,
resulting in a prot 1/27− F > 0. If there is a cap a¯ < 1/3, the broadcaster’s prot maximizing
choices are a = a¯ and v = v∗(a¯) as long as the resulting prot is positive; otherwise, the
broadcaster shuts down.
Note that the prot maximizing quality increases when a binding cap is introduced. The reason
is straightforward to see from the rst order condition (6.1): if the advertising quantity is lower
due to a cap, ceteris paribus the price of an ad per viewer is higher, and this gives the broadcaster
an incentive to increase its quality in order to attract additional viewers.
Now consider the welfare eects of a cap on advertising quantity. We measure consumer surplus
by the consumers’ aggregate utility from watching television, CS =
∫ v
0 (v − x)dx. Inserting
v∗(a) shows that CS = (1− a¯2)/8 is decreasing in a¯. Because a cap increases program quality,
consumers are better o, even though they are ad neutral in our example. On the other hand, the
cap decreases producer surplus, as measured by the area under the per-viewer inverse advertising
demand curve multiplied by the number of viewers. To see this, insert a = a¯ and v = v∗(a¯)
into PS = v
∫ a
0 (1− v − x)dx to get PS = a¯(1− a¯)/4, which is increasing in a¯ in the relevant
range a¯ ≤ 1/3. Welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and produces surplus minus xed costs)
is (1− a¯2)/8− F and thus decreasing in a¯ in the relevant range. The benets of the consumers
from a cap outweigh the losses of producers. Of course, if the cap is too tight it will drive the
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broadcaster out of business, to the detriment of both consumer surplus and producer surplus. The
welfare maximizing cap is as tight as possible, subject to the broadcaster breaking even.
6.4 The model
6.4.1 Economic agents
There areN ≥ 2 advertising funded media outlets. Our prime application is to free-to-air television
broadcasters, but the model is also applicable to other advertising funded media, such as radio
broadcasting. Broadcaster i chooses its program quality vi ∈ R and its quantity of advertising
ai ∈ R+.9 We study a model of a circular town in the spirit of Salop (1979), this is perhaps
the best known textbook model that allows for horizontal product dierentiation and a exible
number of rms.10 Broadcasters are evenly spaced on a circle with unit circumference. A mass n
of viewers is uniformly distributed on the circle. Viewers single home: each viewer watches only
one broadcaster.11 The utility of a viewer located at a distance x from broadcaster i is
w + vi − δai − τx. (6.2)
Here, w > 0 is an exogenous parameter suciently big to ensure the market is covered in equilib-
rium; it represents a viewer’s utility from a program located at his ideal point with zero advertising
and program quality. The viewers’ utility increases in program quality vi. The parameter δ ≥ 0
captures ad aversion; consumers are ad averse when the parameter δ is strictly positive, and ad
neutral when δ = 0.12 Transportation costs are linear with a transportation cost parameter τ > 0
which can be regarded as a measure of the broadcasters’ substitutability; the lower τ, the easier it
is to substitute for broadcaster i’s program.
There is a mass m of producers. Each of them produces and advertises one good at constant
marginal costs normalized to zero. We refer to the producers also as the advertisers. Advertising
9We take vi from the real numbers to avoid corner solutions which are less interesting from an economic point of
view.
10In Appendix F, we show that the main results do not hinge on specic features of the Salop circle model. We introduce
a more general model of television viewing behavior that nests the Salop model and several other textbook models
of discrete choice. We nd that the conditions under which a local cap improves welfare are qualitatively similar.
The precise quantitative implications, however, depend on the assumed model of television viewing.
11Note that the assumption of single homing viewers makes the case for advertising restrictions stronger. Single homing
implies that broadcasters have market power on the advertising market and will restrict advertising quantities
in order to drive up the price per ad per viewer. Therefore, as argued by Anderson and Coate (2005), equilibrium
advertising levels may be too low in equilibrium. If we had competition among broadcasters for advertisers, we
would rule out by assumption an important argument why equilibrium advertising quantities may be too low.
12In the main model, we assume all viewers dislike ads to the same degree. In order to investigate the impact of ad
avoidance technologies, an extension where consumers dier in ad aversion is studied in Section 6.6.2.
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is informative: consumers are initially unaware of the existence of a good, but become informed
when watching a channel that is airing an ad for the good. Producers are characterized by the
quality of their goods, denoted by σ˜. We assume that σ˜ is uniformly distributed on [0, σ]. The
parameter σ > 0 corresponds to the highest possible quality of a consumption good.
To model the conict of interest over media content between viewers and advertisers, we assume
that a consumer watching a channel with quality vi is willing to pay up to σ˜ − βvi for a product
of quality σ˜, where β > 0. High quality television program reduces the perceived benets of the
products, and thus the consumers’ willingness to pay for them. Following Anderson and Coate
(2005), we assume that producers capture the willingness to pay of the consumer on the product
market. Therefore, the willingness to pay of an advertiser of type σ˜ for informing a viewer who
watches broadcaster i is σ˜ − βvi, as well. Thus, viewers’ utility increases in vi, while advertisers’
willingness to pay decreases in vi. In this way, our model captures the conict of interests over
media content between viewers and advertisers.13 The model combines elements from the classic
study of welfare in broadcasting markets by Anderson and Coate (2005) with ideas from the
literature on commercial media bias. If program quality is exogenous14, our model is close to
Anderson and Coate (2005).15 We take from Ellman and Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier
(2013) the assumption that program quality decreases the willingness to pay of advertisers.16
Advertisers multi-home. Denote the per-viewer price of an ad on broadcaster i by ri. Assuming
σ > βvi + ri ≥ 0,17. Advertising demand is
ai = mPr(σ˜ − βvi > ri) = m(1− βvi + ri
σ
).
Solving for ri gives inverse ad demand per viewer, which is
ri = σ − βvi − aiσ
m
, (6.3)
13Microfoundations are mentioned in Section 6.4.3 and discussed in detail in Appendix F.2.
14If there is an upper bound v¯ on program quality, one can also think of the standard model as the case where β = 0.
Then broadcasters will choose the program quality as high as possible. In the main part of the paper, we assume
that the upper bound on quality is not binding. We come back to this issue in Section 6.6.1.
15One remaining dierence is that we study a Salop model with a circular town, whereas Anderson and Coate (2005)
consider a linear Hotelling specication.
16In our main model, we assume that a higher program quality reduces the willingness to pay of all advertisers by
the same amount; that is, advertisers have a shared interest in reducing program quality. We study the robustness
of our results in two extensions. In Appendix F.3 we assume that only a subset of advertisers has an interest in
reducing program quality; this also allows to study sector specic regulation. In Appendix F.4, it depends on the
quality σ˜ of the advertised good how much the willingness to pay changes with television quality. We nd that if
one plausibly assumes that the willingness to pay of producers of high quality is less aected by program quality,
the quality enhancing eect of a cap is reinforced.
17The second inequality ensures we can safely ignore corner solutions where every advertiser advertises; this will be
the case in equilibrium if N ≥ βτ (σ +mβδ)
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whenever σ − βvi ≥ aiσ/m; otherwise inverse ad demand is zero. The broadcaster’s revenue per
viewer is riai.
Suppose all broadcasters j 6= i behave symmetrically, and let u := vj − δaj . Moreover, suppose
that there is an indierent viewer located between broadcaster i and its closest competitors.18
Denote the distance between the indierent viewer and broadcaster i by xˆ. Then
vi − δai − τ xˆ = u− τ
(
1
N
− xˆ
)
.
Any viewer with distance less than xˆ watches broadcaster i. Therefore, the fraction of viewers
watching broadcaster i is
2xˆ =
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
.
The prot of broadcaster i is
pii = n(
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
)(σ − βvi − σai
m
)ai − F, (6.4)
where F > 0 are the xed costs of operation. In Sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.3 we consider the case where
the number of broadcasters is exogenous, and assume that the xed costs are suciently small
such that broadcasters make positive prots in equilibrium. Section 6.5.4 shows that our main
results are robust if we study a model with free entry and endogenize the number of broadcasters
with a zero prot condition.
6.4.2 Welfare
In the main part of the paper, our welfare analysis assumes that the willingness to pay of advertisers
correctly captures the social benet of advertisements. As argued by Anderson and Coate (2005),
this is a neutral benchmark case, abstracting away from several countervailing considerations (see
also Bagwell, 2007, for a review of the economics of advertising). On the one hand, consumers
benet from informative advertising, and when these gains cannot fully be appropriated by the
producers, their willingness to pay underestimates the welfare gains of advertising (Shapiro,
1980). On the other hand, if there is competition between producers of products, the advertisers’
18This is the case if u − τ/N < vi − δai < u + τ/N. If vi − δai < u − τ/N , broadcaster i has no viewers. If
vi − δai > u + τ/N , broadcaster i is said to undercut its rivals, which will not happen in equilibrium. Due to
the linear travel costs, the prot of broadcaster i is discontinuous when broadcaster i just undercuts its rivals: if
broadcaster i increases its quality and/or reduces its advertising so much that a viewer whose location is at the
location of broadcaster i+ 1 prefers broadcaster i, then broadcaster i gains all the viewers of broadcaster i+ 1,
including those located between i+ 1 and i+ 2. This is a standard property of the Salop (1979) model with linear
transportation costs. We carefully spell out prots from undercutting in the proofs.
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willingness to pay overestimates the true welfare gains from advertising due to the business
stealing eect (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984).
Moreover, persuasive or misleading advertising may make consumers buy products at a price
higher than their “true” utility gains from them, which is another reason why advertisers’ will-
ingness to pay may overestimate the welfare gains from advertising (Dixit and Norman, 1978).
Incorporating these eects would give additional reasons why a cap on advertising can increase
welfare. The literature on commercial media bias reviewed in Section 6.2 has argued that there
are empirically large and important externalities from advertising due to such eects, for example
when the advertised products involve health risks and the media do not disseminate this informa-
tion. We abstract from these considerations in our main model, but take them into account in an
extension in Appendix F.3, where we show that they make the case for advertising restrictions
stronger.19
Our analysis will focus on symmetric equilibria where all broadcasters choose the same quantity
a and quality v. Then consumer surplus CS is given by
CS = n(w + v − δa)− nτ
4N
. (6.5)
Producer surplus PS is the surplus of the broadcasters and the advertisers; in other words, PS
equals the sum of advertisers’ prots, broadcasters’ prots, and xed costs. In our setting, PS is
equal to the total revenue of the advertisers. PS can be calculated as the area under the per-viewer
inverse demand curve for advertising spots, multiplied by the number of viewers:20
PS = n
∫ a
0
(
σ − βv − σx
m
)
dx. (6.6)
Total revenues of the broadcasters equal n(σ − βv − σa/m)a, that is, the number of viewers,
times the price of an ad per viewer, times the number of ads per broadcaster. The prots of the
19Another interesting benchmark is to be agnostic about the value of advertising, and therefore to give it no positive
or negative weight in the welfare analysis at all (see Peitz and Valletti, 2008, p.16). Then welfare is a function
of program quality alone. A cap on advertising increases welfare according to this standard if it improves the
equilibrium program quality. We show this is the case when the number of broadcasters is exogenous, but need not
be the case with free entry.
20One way to see this is to calculate the revenues of the advertisers. Recall that the mass m of advertisers is
uniformly distributed on [0, σ]. If a is the number of advertising spots, then the marginal advertiser z is given by
(σ − z)m/σ = a, i.e. z = σ − aσ/m. Advertisers with σ˜ > z advertise, those with σ˜ < z do not. The per viewer
revenue of an advertiser of a type σ˜ > z is equal to σ˜ − βv. Thus advertisers’ total revenue is
n
∫ σ
σ− a
m
σ
(σ˜ − βv) m
σ
dσ˜ = n
∫ a
0
(
σ − βv − σx
m
)
dx.
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advertisers are the dierence between their revenues and the payments to the broadcasters,
n
∫ a
0
(
σ − βv − σx
m
)
dx− n
(
σ − βv − σa
m
)
a =
1
2
a2
m
nσ. (6.7)
For a given advertising quantity, advertisers’ total prots (6.7) do not depend on program quality. To
understand why, note that an increase in program quality implies a parallel downward shift of the
inverse ad demand function; for advertising quantity to stay constant, the price of an advertising
spot must decrease by the same amount. Moreover, given advertising quantity, advertisers’ total
prots (6.7) is independent of the number of broadcasters N.
With (6.7), equation (6.6) can also be written as
PS = n
(
σ − βv − σa
m
)
a︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenues of broadcasters
+
1
2
a2
m
nσ.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prots of advertisers
(6.8)
This formulation is helpful in the analysis in Section 6.5.4, where broadcasters’ prots are driven
down to zero by free entry, i.e., the revenue of the broadcasters equals their xed costs NF.
Finally, welfare W is the sum of consumer surplus and total prots of broadcasters and adver-
tisers: W = CS + PS −NF.
6.4.3 Microfoundations
A central assumption of our paper is that the willingness to pay of an advertiser for reaching a
consumer decreases in the quality of the program the viewer watches. Four dierent microfoun-
dations for this assumption can be provided. First, for viewers, high quality television may be
a substitute for consumption, and thus lower their willingness to pay on the product markets.
Second, viewers’ recall of an ad may depend on the program it is embedded in. Third, the televi-
sion program may impact the moods of boundedly rational consumers and thereby, in turn, their
purchase behavior. Fourth, high quality television may contain useful information that counteracts
deceptive advertising and thereby lowers consumer demand on the product market. We discuss
these microfoundations in more detail in Appendix F.2, where we also provide references to the
underlying empirical literature.
These microfoundations are not mutually exclusive. Great television programs may at the same
time be substitutes for consumption goods, generate lower attention to and recall of advertisements,
inuence boundedly rational moods, and inform and counteract deceptive advertising. All these
microfoundations imply that there is a conict of interest between advertisers and viewers
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over television content, and lead to the same positive predictions of the model.21 For normative
questions, our main model builds on the rst two microfoundations, where consumers’ willingness
to pay for a product accurately captures their true benets from the product. If boundedly rational
moods have an impact on purchase behavior, or advertising is deceptive, consumers may have
losses on the product market since their perceived gains from the products are not equal to
their true gains. The magnitude of these losses may depend both on advertising quantity and on
television program quality. In Appendix F.4, we study an extension of our main model that takes
these considerations into account.
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Equilibrium
For a given advertising quantity ai > 0, the prot maximizing quality is determined by the rst
order condition
n
τ
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ri
= βn
(
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
)
. (6.9)
The left hand side of equation (6.9) describes the marginal gain of broadcaster i from increasing its
program quality, on a per advertising spot basis. Higher quality increases the number of viewers
by n/τ , and on each viewer the broadcaster earns the price of an ad per viewer ri. The right hand
side of equation (6.9) describes the broadcaster’s marginal costs from increasing its quality, per
advertising spot. Higher quality decreases the price of an ad per viewer by β, and the loss of
revenue is equal to β times the number of viewers.
The rst order condition for the prot maximizing advertising quantity is
∂pii
∂ai
= −nδ
τ
riai − n
(
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
)
σ
m
ai + n
(
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
)
ri = 0. (6.10)
If broadcaster i shows more ads, he loses viewers because of ad aversion (the rst term), achieves a
lower per-viewer price of ads (the second term), but generates additional revenue on the additional
advertising quantity (the third term). The prot maximizing quantity balances the marginal
benets and costs. Our rst result characterizes the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is no quantity restriction on advertising. There is a symmetric
21While all the microfoundations are consistent with our assumption that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product
of type σ˜ is equal to σ˜ − βv, the willingness to pay may also be a nonlinear function. We further discuss this in
Appendix F.2.
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equilibrium where for i = 1, ..., N :
ai =
mβτ
N (σ +mβδ)
, (6.11)
vi =
σ
β
− τ (2σ +mβδ)
N (σ +mβδ)
. (6.12)
Inverse ad demand per viewer is ri = βτ/N. The equilibrium prot of broadcaster i is
pii =
nmβ2τ2
N3 (σ +mβδ)
− F.
Equations (6.11) and (6.12) can easily be derived from the rst order conditions (6.9) and
(6.10), assuming that all broadcasters behave symmetrically.22 Proving equilibrium existence is,
however, somewhat more challenging for several interrelated reasons (see Appendix F.5). The
prot functions are third order polynomials in advertising quantity and thus not everywhere
concave; global optimality needs to be established. Moreover, in the classic Salop (1979) model,
undercutting the rivals leads to a nonpositive prot. In contrast, in our model undercutting rivals
can lead to a positive prot; we thus need to establish that the prot from undercutting is smaller
than the equilibrium prot.
Proposition 1 implies that, when N increases or τ decreases, there will be fewer ads and higher
program quality. More competition between broadcasters, be it through lower distances between
two adjacent broadcasters or due to better substitutability of their programs, makes viewers better
o.23 This is in line with the results in Ellman and Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2013).
Higher competition has two countervailing eects on the equilibrium per viewer price of
advertising. On the one hand, it lowers advertising quantity and thereby increases the per viewer
price. On the other hand, it increases program quality and thereby decreases the per viewer price.
Equation (6.9) reveals that in any symmetric equilibrium,
nri
τ
≡ n
τ
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
=
nβ
N
.
Recall that the right hand side can be interpreted as broadcaster i’s marginal costs of program
quality, and equals β times the number of viewers of the broadcaster. In any symmetric equilibrium,
22This argument also shows that the equilibrium is unique in the class of all symmetric equilibria whenever F > 0
(see Appendix E).
23In the classic Salop model, more competition leads to lower prices. In a free TV regime, prices are zero anyhow.
However, broadcasters compete in program quality and in advertising time. One can interpret advertising as an
implicit price for the program; the result that there is lower advertising in our model is similar to the result that
prices are lower in the Salop model.
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each broadcaster has 1/N viewers; thus the marginal costs of quality decrease in N. At the prot
maximizing quality, the marginal benet of higher quality, which is proportional to ri, must
therefore also be lower. The model thus predicts that more competition on the media market
leads to a lower price of an advertising spot. This prediction is in line with the empirical results of
Brown and Alexander (2005), who show that a higher concentration on the media market goes
along with higher advertising prices.24
In contrast, in models where program quality is exogenous as in Anderson and Coate (2005) or
Choi (2006), more competition only leads to a lower advertising quantity, and since inverse demand
is falling in quantity, advertising prices increase. As noted, this prediction seems at odds with the
empirical evidence, and it is a puzzle in media economics to explain the discrepancy. Anderson et al.
(1992) and Athey et al. (2013) propose explanations based on multi-homing viewers. Our model
oers a complementary explanation in a model where viewers single home. Broadcasters compete
for viewers not only in advertising quantity, but also in program quality. More competition on
the broadcasting market leads to higher quality, and because of the conict of interest between
viewers and advertisers, higher quality decreases advertising prices.
Proposition 1 also shows that program quality increases in the mass of advertisers m. To
understand this result, note that for any given advertising quantity, the prot maximizing program
quality is determined by the trade-o described in (6.9): a higher program quality attracts more
viewers, but leads to a lower price of advertising spots per viewer. When m increases, ceteris
paribus the price of an advertising spot per viewer becomes higher, therefore, it pays to attract
additional viewers. This ts nicely with the claim of some observers of today’s media markets
that, as earning money through advertising is more dicult, be it because advertisers move online
or simply because of the general economic conditions, advertisers’ interests have a bigger impact
on media content. The model may thus contribute to explaining what is sometimes called the
“crumbling ad-edit wall” (see FCC, 2011, for a discussion).25
To start the welfare analysis, we investigate whether equilibrium program quality and advertis-
ing are too high or too low from a welfare perspective. That is, we consider exogenous changes of
either program quality or advertising quantity, marginally changing one while holding the other
24Brown and Alexander (2005) estimate that a 20% increase in concentration local broadcast television markets would
lead to a 9% increase in the per-viewer price of ads (p. 336).
25The result is related to the paradox noted by Ellman and Germano (2009) in their model of newspaper competition
that increasing the mass of advertisers eventually eliminates commercial media bias. Indeed, it is often argued that
advertising revenues help to have independent media (see, e.g., FCC, 2011). As argued above, this is partly reected
in our model, since a higher number of advertisers m implies a higher equilibrium program quality. Moreover, it
can be shown that in our model a cap makes it easier to bribe the broadcasters to suppress information by bribes
that are independent of the advertising quantity. The risk of such political media capture must be traded o against
the commercial media bias we focus on.
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constant.
Proposition 2. A small exogenous increase of program quality of all broadcasters, holding the
advertising quantities constant, increases consumer surplus and decreases producer surplus. Moreover,
welfare increases if and only if
N > Nˆv :=
mβ2τ
σ +mβδ
.
An increase of program quality means that the program content is more in line with viewers’
preferences, which is the reason why consumer surplus increases. Producer surplus, on the other
hand, decreases. A higher program quality of broadcaster i has a business stealing eect on the
competing broadcasters: it induces viewers to switch from the competitors to broadcaster i. The
prot maximizing quality balances this increase in viewers with the decrease in the prices of
advertising (see the discussion of equation (6.9) above). If the quality of all broadcasters is increased
simultaneously, as envisioned in Proposition 2, however, viewers do not switch; therefore, the
higher quality has only costs but no benets for the broadcasters. Consequently, broadcasters’
prots decrease. In other words, from the point of view of the broadcasters, program quality has a
negative externality due to the business stealing eect, and the equilibrium quality is ineciently
high when compared to the quality that maximizes the joint prots of the broadcasters.
The eect of an increase of program quality on consumer surplus does not depend on N.
In contrast, its eect on producer surplus is ∂PS/∂v = −nβa. Since the equilibrium value
of advertising quantity a is decreasing in the number of broadcasters, the eect on producer
surplus is less important (smaller in absolute value) when there are many competing broadcasters.
This observation explains the result concerning welfare. When there are many independent
broadcasters (and similarly when the program substitutability is high), competition for viewers is
erce. Thus in equilibrium there are relatively few ads, and an increase of program quality does
not reduce producer surplus much. Hence the positive eect on consumer surplus dominates.
Similarly, if consumers are very ad averse, there are few ads in equilibrium and an increase in
quality does not reduce producer surplus much, hence a small exogenous increase of program
quality increases welfare.
Towards an understanding of the eect of a cap on advertising quantity, we now consider the
eect of a small exogenous decrease of advertising quantity.
Proposition 3. A small exogenous decrease of advertising quantity of all broadcasters, holding
program qualities constant, increases consumer surplus and decreases producer surplus. Moreover,
welfare increases if and only if
N > Nˆa :=
βτ
δ
.
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Consumer surplus decreases in advertising quantity since consumers are ad averse. Producer
surplus is increasing in advertising quantity for the usual reason that a monopolist reduces
quantities below the ecient level. Here, since viewers single-home, each broadcaster is in a
monopoly position with respect to the attention of his viewers. When consumers are not very
ad averse (δ suciently small), reducing advertising while keeping program quality v constant
reduces welfare. This is in line with the results by Anderson and Coate (2005): when the quality
of the broadcasters’ content is not at stake, and consumers are not very ad averse, the equilibrium
quantity of advertising is too low. Conversely, if ad aversion is severe, there is too much advertising
in equilibrium.
Again, the eect on consumer surplus is independent ofN, while the eect on producer surplus
is less important when competition is high.26 To understand why, note that the eect of a small
exogenous decrease of advertising quantity on producer surplus is that the marginal advertiser
is crowded out. The corresponding loss of producer surplus equals the willingness to pay of the
marginal advertiser, which in turn equals the equilibrium per-viewer price r of an advertising
spot times the number of viewers n. As discussed above, r is decreasing in N and increasing in τ.
Therefore, the eect on producer surplus is small in absolute value when competition is high.27
6.5.2 Eects of a cap on advertising
While the program quality may be hard to regulate,28 advertising can be restricted. As reported
in Section 6.4.3, many countries impose a cap on the time devoted to ads on free TV. To analyze
the eects of such a cap, we need to take into consideration its eect on program quality chosen
by the broadcasters.29 We now consider the eect of a quantity restriction on advertising a¯ that
constraints all broadcasters to choose ai ≤ a¯. The following lemma studies the eect of a binding
cap.
Lemma 1. Suppose that there is a cap
a¯ ∈
(
0,
mβτ
N (σ +mβδ)
)
26Formally, ∂PS
∂a
= n
(
σ − βv − σa
m
)
. Evaluating the derivative at the equilibrium values of a and v gives ∂PS
∂a
=
nβτ
N
.
27We point out that this result does not hold in models where program quality is exogenous, such as Anderson and
Coate (2005). In these models an increase in N increases the equilibrium price of advertising. Correspondingly, the
loss in producer surplus due to a decrease of advertising quantity is higher when there is erce competition on the
media market.
28Moreover, a direct regulation of program quality may raise issues of free speech and media capture by state authorities.
29We focus on the eects of a cap on a free TV market. Of course, a cap (and similarly advertising taxes analyzed in
Section 6.5.5) will also change the relative protability of free TV and pay TV. See Section 6.6.1 for an analysis of
pay TV.
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on advertising. Then there is an equilibrium where broadcaster i = 1, ..., N chooses ai = a¯ and
vi =
σ
β
− 1
N
τ − 1
m
σ
β
a¯. (6.13)
Prot equals
pii =
na¯βτ
N2
− F.
As in the absence of a cap, equilibrium program quality is high when competition is high.
Moreover, the equilibrium per-viewer price of an ad is decreasing in N and increasing in τ.
Equilibrium quality is decreasing in a¯ : the more stringent the cap (i.e., the lower a¯), the higher
program quality. The main reason is that a cap reduces advertising quantity and thus, since
inverse ad demand is decreasing in ad quantity, ceteris paribus increases the price of an ad per
viewer. Therefore, attracting additional viewers is more protable for the broadcasters, and thus
the equilibrium program content is more in line with viewers’ preferences. To understand the
logic in more detail, consider Figure 6.1, which plots the marginal benets and costs of quality
from equation (6.9) as a function of vi. A cap shifts the inverse ad demand function upward, since
the advertising quantity on broadcaster i decreases; ceteris paribus, the price of an ad increases.
Simultaneously, the competing broadcasters increase their quality, as predicted by (6.13). When
broadcaster i leaves its quality unchanged, i has less viewers than before. Therefore, the marginal
cost curve shifts downwards. These two reasons imply that broadcaster i has an incentive to
increase its program quality. For future reference, note that the eect of the cap a¯ on equilibrium
program quality is independent of N.
Figure 6.1: Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function.
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As noted in the introduction, the supply of news and current aairs during peak hours by the
biggest commercial broadcasters in several European countries is drastically higher than that of
the biggest commercial broadcasters in the USA (Aalberg et al., 2010). This is in line with our
result that a cap increases program quality. Advertising quantity is restricted in the European
countries, but not in the USA. Other things being equal, our model predicts that television content
is more viewer friendly in Europe, and indeed news belong to the viewers’ (but not advertisers’)
most preferred genres (Wilbur, 2008); our model may thus contribute to an explanation of the
cross-country dierences.
We now analyze the welfare eects of a “local” cap that reduces advertising quantity slightly
below the equilibrium level.
Proposition 4. A local cap on advertising increases consumer surplus but decreases producer surplus.
Welfare increases if and only if
N > Nˆcap :=
(2σ +mβδ)mβ2τ
(σ +mβδ)2
. (6.14)
The critical values satisfy Nˆv < Nˆcap < Nˆa.
The cap reduces advertising and increases program quality; both eects increase consumer
surplus and reduce producer surplus. The eect on welfare hinges on the relative importance
of these eects. Note that, when N > Nˆa, reduced advertising quantity increases welfare, and
(since Nˆa > Nˆv) an increased program quality does as well; in this case, a cap will surely increase
welfare. When this sucient condition is not satised, the direct eect of an advertising cap on
welfare is negative; the total eect, however, may nevertheless still be positive.
Proposition 4 implies that, as should be expected, ad aversion makes it more likely that a cap
increases welfare. Moreover, whenever (6.14) holds, the size of the welfare gain through a local
cap is increasing in δ. However, even if consumers are not ad averse, a cap on advertising can
improve welfare.
Figure 6.2 plots the cutos as a function of δ. A decrease in advertising quantity, holding
program quality constant, increases welfare above Nˆa (the dotted line). Clearly, this can only
happen if δ > 0, and the higher δ, the more likely it is. Above Nˆv (the thin line), an increase in v
holding a constant increases welfare. Interestingly, the cutos dier most dramatically when δ is
small. Figure 6.3 plots the cutos as a function of m. Nˆa and Nˆcap dier most when m is small.
In times where advertisers move online and m decreases, the quality enhancing eect of a cap
becomes more relevant.
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Figure 6.2: Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function.
Figure 6.3: Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function.
The most surprising insight from Proposition 4 is that more competition, be it through a higher
number of broadcasters (high N ) or better substitutability (low τ ), makes it more likely that a
local cap improves welfare. Moreover, the quantitative importance of the welfare gains is greater
when there is more competition. This is surprising since, as pointed out above, more competition
increases equilibrium program quality. Therefore, while competition is helpful to increase program
quality, it is not a substitute for regulating the market. Indeed, the marginal welfare gains from
a local cap are increasing in N and decreasing in τ ; in this sense, there is a complementarity
between regulation and competition. Especially in a market with many independent broadcasters,
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a cap on advertising may improve welfare. A policy implication is that successful competition
policy does not automatically make regulation of the advertising quantities dispensable.
To understand the result, recall three observations pointed out above: (i) the eects of a and
v on consumer surplus does not depend on N, (ii) the eects of a and v on producer surplus
gets smaller (in absolute value) when N increases, and (iii) the eect of a cap on equilibrium
program quality is independent of N . These observations imply that the negative impact of a cap
on producer surplus gets less important when N increases, while the positive impact on consumer
surplus is not aected; hence it is more likely that welfare increases.30
6.5.3 The optimal cap
This section studies the problem to maximize welfare by choosing a cap a¯ subject to not changing
the number of broadcasters,
max
a¯
W s.t. pii = na¯βτ/N2 ≥ F.
For a given number of broadcasters, welfare is a convex function of a¯ : consumer surplus is linear
in a¯, while producer surplus is quadratic in a¯ (see (6.8) in combination with (6.13)). Therefore,
it is either optimal to have no cap on advertising, or a cap that brings prots down to zero, i.e.,
a¯ = N2F/ (nβτ) . In particular, inequality (6.14) is a sucient but not a necessary condition for
the optimal cap to be binding.
Figure 6.4 illustrates. Broadcasters’ prots are positive below the zero prot line (in bold); the
area above it is ruled out by the assumption that equilibrium prots (absent a cap) are positive. A
cap that drives broadcasters’ prots to zero is welfare maximizing below the thin line; above it,
laissez-faire is optimal. The two lines intersect only once, at Nˆcap : on the zero prot line a local
cap is a zero prot cap. Figure 6.4 also illustrates that a cap can be optimal even when N < Nˆcap.
30We point out that this result hinges on endogenous program quality and a conict of interest between viewers and
advertisers. In models where program quality is exogenous, such as Anderson and Coate (2005) or Choi (2006),
more competition implies a higher price of advertising, and correspondingly a larger negative impact of a cap on
producer surplus; thus the marginal welfare gains of a local cap are smaller when competition is intense.
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Figure 6.4: Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function.
Proposition 5. There exists a critical value Nˆ ≤ Nˆcap such that the welfare maximizing cap is
a¯ = N2F/(nβτ) if N > Nˆ, and laissez-faire is optimal if N ≤ Nˆ . Moreover, Nˆ increases in F, m,
β, and τ ;Nˆ decreases in n, δ, and σ.
We now compare the results on the optimal cap with our results from Section 6.5.2 on a local
cap. While the welfare gains of a local cap are increasing inN , the same is not everywhere true for
the optimal cap. The reason is that, with higher N, the nonnegativity constraint on prots is more
stringent.31 On the other hand, the conditions under which a cap raises welfare are qualitatively
similar for a local cap and the optimal cap. In particular, a more competitive broadcasting market,
or higher ad aversion, increases the attractiveness of a cap. There are just two dierences: the
impact of the number of viewers n, and the xed costs F . For a local cap, these do not matter. For
the optimal cap, the higher n, and the lower F, the more stringent a cap can be before inducing
exit; therefore, it is more likely that a zero prot cap raises welfare.
The optimal cap is not continuous in the parameters of the model. In Figure 6.4, when we cross
the thin line from the left, the optimal policy jumps from laissez-faire to a cap that drives prots
down to zero. This is somewhat disconcerting since the optimal policy is not robust with respect
to small perturbations. The discontinuity disappears, however, once we consider endogenous
entry.
31To see this, suppose F is below the point where the two lines cross in Figure 6.4. If N is small (to the left of the
thin line), a cap lowers welfare. For intermediate values of N (between the thin and the bold line), a cap increases
welfare. On the bold line, the zero prot cap is equivalent to no cap at all, and the associated welfare gains are zero.
Therefore, the welfare gains from a cap are not monotone in N .
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6.5.4 Endogenous number of broadcasters
This section endogenizes the number N of broadcasters by assuming free entry into the broad-
casting market. We follow the standard approach to model entry in a two stage game. In stage 1, a
large number of potential broadcasters decide whether or not to enter. Upon entry, a broadcaster
has to invest the xed costs F. A broadcaster who stays out has a prot of zero. In stage 2,
broadcasters that have entered choose their advertising quantity and program quality.
The number of broadcasters is then determined by the condition that the broadcasters’ prots
(given in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1) equal zero.32 As shown above, for any xed number of
broadcasters, a cap on advertising lowers the prots of the broadcasters. Therefore, under free
entry, a cap will reduce competition on the broadcasting market.
Consider the welfare eects of a cap in the model with free entry. Since the broadcasters’ prots
equal zero by free entry, total prots equal the prots of the advertisers. A cap reduces advertising
quantity, and by (6.7), advertisers’ prots decreases. Hence a cap decreases total prots, as in
the model with an exogenous number of broadcasters. Concerning consumer surplus, however,
there are additional eects that can reverse our ndings above. A cap induces broadcasters to
exit, and exit has two negative consequences for consumers. First, ceteris paribus, exit leads to a
lower program quality. This counteracts the quality enhancing eect of a cap studied in Section
6.5.2. The net eect of a cap on program quality depends on the relative strength of these eects.
Second, when consumers have fewer broadcasters to choose from, the match between consumers
and programs becomes worse (consumers have higher transportation costs). Indeed, a cap that
is too stringent decreases consumer surplus. Nevertheless, as our next result shows, a local cap
that slightly decreases the advertising quantity below its laissez-faire equilibrium level increases
consumer surplus.
Proposition 6. Consider the model with free entry on the broadcasting market. (i) A local cap
increases consumer surplus. (ii) Suppose that
F < Fˆcapwithexit :=
27n (σ +mβδ)5
512m2σ3β4τ
.
Then a local cap increases welfare, and there is a (uniquely dened) optimal cap a∗,which is decreasing
in δ and n, and increasing in τ and in F. (iii) If F ≥ Fˆcapwithexit, laissez-faire is optimal.
A comparison of Proposition 6 with Proposition 5 shows that our results that better program
32We follow Salop (1979) and assume that, after entry or exit, broadcasters automatically relocate such that they are
equidistant. We ignore the integer constraint on N for convenience. When xed costs are high or the cap on
advertising is very stringent, only a monopolist broadcaster may be active, or even all broadcasters may exit. We
focus on the case where some competition prevails.
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substitutability, higher ad aversion, and a larger viewer market increase the attractiveness of a cap,
are robust to endogenous entry. Moreover, with endogenous entry, the number of broadcasters
depends on the xed costs: the lower F, the more competition on the broadcasting market.
Therefore our result that, with entry, a cap improves welfare if F is suciently small, is similar to
our result in Section 6.5.3 that a cap improves welfare if N is suciently large.
The eects of a cap can be decomposed into the eects for a xed number of broadcasters,
and the eects from the changing number of broadcasters. Holding the number of broadcasters
constant, a cap lowers advertising quantity, which directly aects welfare, and induces an increase
in program quality that aects welfare, too. In addition to that, a cap on advertising leads to
a lower number of broadcasters. A lower N, in turn, aects welfare directly by changing total
transportation costs and total xed costs, and induces a decrease in program quality that aects
welfare, too.
Depending on the parameters, endogenous entry can make it more or less likely that a local
cap increases welfare.33 When δ > 2σ/(3mβ), the exit induced by a cap makes it more likely that
a local cap increases welfare.34 On the other hand, when δ < 2σ/ (3mβ) , the exit makes it less
likely that a local cap raises welfare. Therefore, with an endogenous number of broadcasters, the
case for a cap is stronger when ad aversion is severe, and weaker when viewers are not very ad
averse.35
It is not surprising that endogenous entry can tilt the desirability of a cap in both ways. While
in the classic Salop model, entry is excessive, Choi (2006) has shown that both excessive and
insucient entry are possible in a Salop model of free TV (see also Crampes et al., 2009). Our
results indicate a related ambiguity in the present context. The possibility of excess entry on
media markets should not be dismissed as purely theoretical, however. Berry and Waldfogel (1999)
show empirically that in the U.S. radio market, entry is excessive when evaluated from the point
of view of the radio stations and the advertisers. While they cannot give a complete welfare
analysis (due to lack of data on the listeners’ value of programming), their results indicate that the
business stealing eect of entry, which is one reason why entry may be excessive, is quantitatively
important.
33A related but dierent concern is that content of higher quality may have higher costs. As argued by Anderson
(2007), a cap can for this reason reduce program quality.
34In the laissez-faire equilibrium with free entry, the eect of a cap for given N can be signed as follows. From
Proposition 4, we know that, for given N, a local cap raises welfare if and only if N > Nˆcap. Setting N equal to
the equilibrium number of broadcasters under free entry, and solving the inequality for F , reveals that the eects
of a local cap for a given number of broadcasters increase welfare if and only if F < Fˆcap := n(σ+mβδ)
5
m2β4τ(2σ+mβδ)3
.
Taking entry into consideration, a cap raises welfare if F < Fˆcapwithexit. Straightforward calculations show that,
Fˆcapwithexit > Fˆcap if and only if δ > 2σ/ (3mβ) .
35The additional eects due to endogenous entry also determine howm aects the probability that a cap raises welfare:
Fˆcapwithexit decreases in m if and only if δ < 2σ/ (3mβ) .
140
6.5 Results
6.5.5 The eects of an advertising tax
A tax on advertising seems to be a recurrent policy idea (Rauch, 2013). For example, the states
of Iowa and Florida taxed advertising in the late 1980s, and advertising taxes have recently
been discussed in Minnesota and Ohio.36 While many countries impose a cap on advertising
quantities, however, Austria (with a tax rate of 10%) is currently the only OECD country that taxes
advertising revenues. In this section, we point out that a proportional tax on advertising revenues
has quite dierent implications than a cap in our model.37 We assume that the tax revenue is
redistributed lump sum to the consumers, and call net consumer surplus the consumers’ surplus
before redistribution of tax revenues, given in (6.5). Welfare is the sum of net consumer surplus,
tax revenue, and all prots.
Consider rst the case of an exogenously given number of broadcasters. Since the marginal
costs of broadcasters are equal to zero, a tax on advertising revenue is a tax on variable prots, and
does not change the equilibrium advertising quantity or program quality. Advertisers’ prots and
net consumer surplus are unaected. The broadcasters bear the burden of the tax, since they are
monopolists on the advertising markets: due to single homing of consumers, each broadcaster is
the only one that can sell access to his viewers. The tax just redistributes from the broadcasters to
the government budget, and welfare is constant. In contrast, under the conditions of Proposition
5, a cap raises welfare. Quantity restrictions are a superior instrument to taxes on this market.
With free entry, a tax on advertising revenues leads to exit, and thereby to a higher advertising
quantity and lower program quality. Moreover, consumers have fewer broadcasters to choose from,
and thus higher transportation costs. These eects decrease net consumer surplus.38 Interestingly,
a tax on advertising increases advertisers’ prots (and hence the sum of all prots, too). At rst
sight, this might be a surprising result; it stems from the two-sidedness of the market. The tax on
advertising lowers the number of broadcasters and thus softens the competition for audiences.
Therefore, equilibrium advertising quantities are higher and equilibrium program quality is lower.
By (6.7), advertisers’ prots increase. In contrast, a cap decreases advertising quantities and
36Relatedly, in the discussion on tax reform, U.S. House and Senate Committees introduced proposals to change the
tax deductibility of advertising. See AdvertisingAge (2013).
37An excise tax based on the quantity of advertising, on the other hand, has similar eects as a cap. For given N,
an excise tax leads to a lower advertising quantity, and higher program quality; for any cap a¯, an equivalent tax
rate can be found that leads to the same equilibrium advertising quantities and program qualities. Prots with
the tax are lower by the tax revenue than with the cap (unless tax revenues are redistributed lump sum to the
broadcasters, in which case the eect of the tax is exactly equal to that of the cap). Therefore, an excise tax on
advertising that is, in the short run (for given N), equivalent to a cap, leads in the long run to higher concentration
on the broadcasting market.
38Since the tax revenue is redistributed to consumers, these negative eects have to be balanced against the additional
income from the redistribution of tax revenue. It can be shown that a small tax on advertising increases the sum of
net consumer surplus and tax revenues if and only if F > 27n (σ +mβδ)2 /
(
64m2β4τ
)
.
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therefore advertisers’ prots, as well.
Proposition 7. With free entry on the broadcasting market, a small tax on advertising decreases
net consumer surplus and increases prots. It increases welfare if, and only if,
F > Fˆtaxwithexit :=
729n (σ +mβδ)5
64m2β4τ (4σ + 3mβδ)3
.
Moreover, Fˆtaxwithexit < Fˆcapwithexit if and only if δ > 2σ/ (3mβ) .
While a cap reduces advertising quantity, a tax on ad revenue increases it. Moreover, the cap
increases program quality, while the tax reduces it. This explains why a tax decreases net consumer
surplus and increases prots, while the eects of a cap are just the other way round. Moreover,
the conditions under which these instruments raise welfare are qualitatively quite dierent. In
particular, xed costs F , program substitutability τ , the viewer market n, and ad aversion δ have
the opposite eect on the probability that a tax, or a cap, raise welfare. To understand why,
consider for example xed costs F. As explained in Section 6.5.4 above, an advertising cap raises
welfare if and only if F is suciently low – just as in the model with exogenous N a local cap
raises welfare when N is suciently high. The intuition is that the cap raises v and lowers a, and
both increases welfare when there is a lot of competition on the broadcasting market (compare
Propositions 2 and 3), i.e., when F is low. Proposition 7, in contrast, shows that a tax on advertising
revenue raises welfare if and only if F is suciently high. The tax increases a and lowers v,
which increases welfare when there is not much competition on the broadcasting market, i.e.,
when F is high. The tax and the cap have in common, however, that they reduce the equilibrium
number of broadcasters. As reported above, if δ > 2σ/ (3mβ) , exit makes it more likely that
a cap raises welfare. In this case Fˆtaxwithexit is smaller than Fˆcapwithexit; thus there is a range
of parameters where F is between these critical values, and both a cap and a tax raise welfare.
Conversely, when δ < 2σ/ (3mβ) , exit makes it less likely that welfare increases; then there is a
range of parameters where neither the cap nor the tax raises welfare.
6.6 Extensions
This section explores two extensions of our model: pay TV, and consumers that dier in ad
aversion and use ad avoidance technologies. (Extensions on producers that dier in how far they
are aected by television program quality and sector specic regulation, and deceptive advertising
are provided in Appendix F.) To keep the discussion short, we assume N to be exogenous and
focus on the conditions under which a local cap raises welfare, as in Section 6.5.2 above.
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6.6.1 Pay TV
Our model gives additional support to results by Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti
(2008) that a cap on advertising does not improve welfare in a pay TV market. Indeed, in a pay
TV market, program quality will not be too low from a welfare perspective. To see this, suppose
broadcaster i charges a price pi. A viewer located at distance x from broadcaster i has utility
w + vi − τx− δai − pi from watching the broadcaster. The prot of the broadcaster is39
pii = n
(
1
N
+
vi − δai − pi − u
τ
)(
pi +
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai
)
− F,
when all other broadcasters j 6= i oer the viewers the same gross of transportation costs utility
u = vj − δaj − pj . Consider the prot maximizing choice of vi and pi for given ai. Increasing
both vi and pi by the same amount increases prots if aiβ < 1. It is natural to assume that there
is some upper bound v¯ on program quality above which it cannot be improved. Whenever pi > 0
in equilibrium, the broadcaster will increase its program quality as much as possible. This result
ts the claim by Brown and Cavazos (2005) that the business strategy of the pay TV broadcaster
HBO was to air explicitly darker, advertiser unfriendly material.40
6.6.2 Ad avoidance technologies
As argued in Section 6.2, viewers can today easily avoid contact with advertisements by using ad
avoidance technologies such as ad blockers or digital video recorders. The traditional argument
for a cap on advertising thus may seem less compelling: any viewer who is exposed to ads reveals
by his behavior that he is not very ad averse. The point made in this paper, that a cap may improve
welfare even if viewers do not directly suer from exposure to ads, however, gets reinforced when
there are ad averse viewers who use ad avoidance technologies.
To illustrate this, we consider an extension where there are two types of consumers: a mass
n1 of consumers who are intrinsically ad neutral (δ = 0), and a mass n2 = n − n1 who are
intrinsically ad averse and have a δ > 0. Suppose that ad aversion is independent of the location
of a consumer; both ad averse and ad neutral consumers are distributed uniformly on the circle.
Moreover, suppose that ad avoidance technologies are freely available. Then viewers with δ > 0
use ad avoidance technologies, and thus eectively no consumer is directly negatively aected by
ads.
39As above, this implicitly assumes that the market share of broadcaster i is between zero and one, inverse ad demand
is positive, and broadcaster i does not undercut its rivals.
40Note, however, that the result is driven by the assumption that all viewers have the same marginal rate of substitution
between money and program quality. If viewers dier in these respects, the commercial media bias may reappear
in equilibrium even in a pay TV regime, as in Ellman and Germano (2009).
143
6 Quantity Restrictions on Advertising, Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare
Only those viewers who are intrinsically ad neutral are reached by ads, and only those play
a role in the calculations of the media outlets and the advertisers. The other ones are aected,
however, by the program quality chosen by the broadcasters. We can model this situation as above
by setting δ = 0, replacing n by n1 in the formulas for prots and producer surplus, and adding
a term n2 (w + v)− n2τ/ (4N) to the consumer surplus to account for the consumers who use
ad avoidance technologies. Thus, as compared to a situation where everyone is intrinsically ad
neutral, there is an additional welfare benet from higher program quality: the consumers using
ad avoidance technologies do not gure in the broadcasters’ or advertisers’ decisions, but enjoy a
higher program quality as well. For the welfare comparison in Proposition 4, this implies that
the condition for when a local cap improves welfare (6.14) becomes less strict than when every
consumer is intrinsically ad neutral.41
6.7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that a cap on advertising in free-to-air television (or other advertising
funded media) drives up the per viewer price of advertising spots and thus induces the media to
choose more viewer friendly program content. Due to this eect on non-advertising content an
advertising cap can increase welfare, even when viewers are not directly ad averse or can use
ad avoidance technologies. Competition between broadcasters helps overcoming commercial
media bias. There is, however, a complementarity between competition and regulation: on a
more competitive broadcasting market, the marginal welfare gains from a cap are higher. The
paper also shows that endogenous entry into the broadcasting market can tilt the desirability of
advertising caps in either way, but does not overturn the main insights from the model. Moreover,
the paper compared advertising caps with taxes on advertising revenue, arguing that these two
policy instruments are quite dierent in the present context.
We used the Salop model with linear transportation costs as our model of television viewing
behavior. As we show in Appendix F.4, however, our results concerning an exogenous number of
broadcasters extend to a far more general setting, which comprises other well known discrete
choice models such as the Logit model. In particular, the conditions under which a local cap
raises welfare are qualitatively similar, and the optimal cap has the same qualitative properties, in
these alternative models of television viewing. An interesting question for further research is to
generalize the analysis of entry beyond the Salop model.
Our model assumed that higher program quality reduces the willingness to pay of all advertisers
by the same amount. We discuss two extensions in Appendix F that relax this assumption. First,
41Note that the condition does not depend on n, so replacing n by n1 does not aect it.
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in Appendix F.3, we study an extension where only some advertisers prefer low quality programs,
while others are indierent. If advertising demand from the latter type of advertisers is suciently
high, the market solves the problem of commercial media bias. Otherwise, however, a cap may
raise welfare in a larger set of circumstances, and the welfare gains from a cap may be higher,
than in our main model. The reason is that, in the extension, the higher program quality induced
by the cap does not decrease the prots of those advertisers who are indierent over program
quality, thus the negative eect of a cap on producer surplus is less important. In addition to that,
the extended setting allows to study sector specic regulations such as, for example, a ban on
tobacco advertising, and shows they can be even more benecial.
Second, we discuss an extension where the eect of program quality on advertising demand
depends on the quality of the advertised goods. Plausibly, producers of high quality goods have
less to lose from high program quality. An advertising cap implies that the marginal advertiser
sells a product of higher quality, and thus is less aected by an increase in program quality.
We show in Appendix F.4 that this reinforces the eect of the cap on program quality: with a
cap, inverse advertising demand is less sensitive to program quality, therefore broadcasters will
increase quality further. We also discuss other nonlinearities in consumers’ utility from watching
television, and in the inverse demand for advertising spots.
Our welfare analysis is based on the view that advertising is informative, and on a rational
choice model of consumer behavior. Of course, these assumptions are doubtful when purchase
decisions are boundedly rational, or when advertising is suggestive or deceptive. In Appendix F.3,
we study an extension of our model that takes these issues into account, and show that deceptive
advertising makes the case for an advertising cap stronger.
The size and relative importance of the eects we identify is ultimately an empirical question.
The model has several testable empirical implications, such as the comparative static of equilibrium
advertising quantity and program quality with respect to competition on the television market,
and with respect to the mass of advertisers. A particularly interesting exercise for future research
would be to empirically study the eect of an advertising cap on program content. Moreover,
our model considered a commercial television market. Public service broadcasters may be less
susceptible to commercial media biased insofar as their funding is secured largely independent
from advertising revenues. Since public service broadcasters also compete for viewers’ attention,
their presence may impact the program content of commercial broadcasters as well. Studying
these interdependencies is an interesting topic for future research.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis contributes to the understanding of media markets by studying the determinants
of media outlets’ content choice, by developing novel techniques to assess media bias, and by
analyzing the welfare eects of potential regulations. Chapter 2 demonstrates that advertising
has a causal positive eect on content dierentiation on YouTube, in particular, an exogenous
increase in the technically feasible advertising quantity reduces the YouTubers’ probability to
duplicate mainstream content. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 develop novel techniques and applications
to measure political media bias. Finally, Chapter 6 shows that commercial media bias can be
mitigated by a cap on advertising quantity. The results contribute to the literature on content
dierentiation in (digital) media markets (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Waldfogel, 2017, 2018; Goldfarb and
Tucker, 2019), political media bias (e.g., Groeling, 2013; Gentzkow et al., 2016; Puglisi and Snyder,
2016), commercial media bias (e.g., Ellman and Germano, 2009; Blasco and Sobbrio, 2012; Germano
and Meier, 2013), two-sided (media) markets (e.g., Anderson and Jullien, 2016), media content as a
public good (e.g., Anderson and Coate, 2005; Batina and Ihori, 2005), and user-generated content
(e.g., Luca, 2016b).
Moreover, the thesis points into several directions of future research. First and foremost, media
consumption is moving online. As a consequence, the xed costs of generating media content
decrease, whereby entry in existing online media markets becomes easier; moreover, platforms
with entirely new business models such as search engines, news aggregators, and blogs emerge.
Although Chapters 2, 4, and 5 study phenomena of such newly emerged platforms, more research
on dierent types of online platforms is necessary to draw broader conclusions on their eect on
social and economic outcomes.
In addition to that, user-generated content is becoming more and more important and opens up
novel research opportunities. Today, users can (anonymously) comment on products, news, and
more or less random discussions on the Internet. While Chapters 2, 4, and 5 study contributions to
YouTube, Wikipedia, and Twitter, the thesis does not cover anonymous comments within online
discussion forums such as Reddit or online newspapers’ forums, which would be an interesting
direction for future research.
Relatedly, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 introduce novel techniques to asses political media bias, but the
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recent debate about fake news requires researchers to take one step further and study how to
mitigate the emergence and spreading of fake news.
Finally, online media markets allow for new opportunities on behalf of advertisers. In particular,
targeted advertising could be benecial for consumers and advertisers, since it may reduce the
search cost of consumers and increase the eectiveness of an ad. At the same time, however,
researchers must better understand the role of privacy concerns. In sum, the recent developments
in media markets and their importance for democracy and society, require further research on the
digitization of media markets in general, and on online media platforms, user-generated content,
and advertising in particular.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Robustness checks
This section probes the robustness of my results. In particular, I show that the main results from
Section 2.6.1 are robust to using an alternative observation period, to an alternative selection of
YouTubers, to an alternative classication of the treatment group, and to alternative denitions
of the instrument closei and of the dependent variable Mainstreamvit. In addition to that, I
report the results of placebo regressions that support the plausibility of the exclusion restriction, I
conduct several robustness checks on the results from Section 2.7, and I probe the validity of the
empirical strategy when studying video quality.
A.1.1 Alternative observation period
First, I show that the results from Section 2.6.1 are robust to using an alternative observation
period. As argued in Section 2.4.3, I cannot extend the analysis to earlier or later points in time; I
can, however, select a shorter observation period. Table A.1 shows the results from estimating
equations (2.2) and (2.3) on observations from Jan 2014 to July 2016 only (hence, I exclude twelve
months before, and six months after Oct 2015). While the potentially biased OLS estimates in
columns 1 to 3 are close to their counterparts in Table 2.3, the 2SLS estimates in columns 4 to
6 and the reduced form estimates in columns 7 to 9 are smaller by a third. This is no surprise:
the event study in Section 2.6.2 illustrates that the eect of an increase in the feasible number of
ad breaks on the probability to upload mainstream content becomes stronger over time. Thus,
excluding the last six months from the analysis results in smaller estimates.
A.1.2 Alternative selections of YouTubers
Next, I demonstrate that the results from Section 2.6.1 are robust to alternative selections of
YouTubers. As argued in Section 2.4.3, the nal dataset includes only YouTubers whose median
video duration before Oct 2015 is smaller than 10, because I want to focus on YouTubers who
were ignorant of the ten minutes trick before the launch of the new ad break tool. One could
argue, however, that the selection is too loose. For instance, if a YouTuber’s median video duration
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Table A.1: Alternative observation period
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. F. Red. F. Red. F.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.008 0.005 0.005 -0.131∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046)
closei ∗ postt -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
First stage 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F-test of excluded 147.47 147.48 153.11
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,513 10,513 10,513 10,513 10,513 10,513 10,513 10,513 10,513
Videos 745,219 745,219 745,219 745,219 745,219 745,219 745,219 745,219 745,219
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates
are based on using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, only the periods t ∈ [13, 43] are included into the analysis.
Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
before Oct 2015 is equal to 9, a large share of her videos may already be ten minutes or longer, so
she could have come across the ten minutes trick before the new ad break tool was launched. To
rule out concerns about the selection of YouTubers, I estimate regression equations (2.2) and (2.3)
on two subsamples: rst, a subsample of YouTubers whose median video duration before Oct 2015
is smaller than 7.5, second, a subsample of YouTubers whose 90th percentile of the distribution of
video durations (not the median) is smaller than 10.
Tables A.2 and A.3 show the results. The potentially biased OLS estimates in columns 1 to 3
resemble their counterparts in Table 2.3. Similarly, the 2SLS estimates in columns 4 to 6 are close
to the estimates based on the entire dataset. The rst stage as well as the reduced form estimates
(columns 7 to 9), however, are nearly twice as large as their counterparts in Table 2.3. A potential
explanation is that the average YouTuber whom I consider in this section has more scope to react
to the launch of the new ad break tool than the average YouTuber from the main analysis, which
matches the considerations from Section 2.5.2. In sum, I do not nd evidence of my main results
being sensitive to alternative selections of YouTubers.
A.1.3 Alternative classifications of the treatment group
This section shows that the results from Section 2.6.1 are robust to alternative classications of the
treatment group. In particular, I show that neither the ve percentage point cuto nor considering
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Table A.2: Alternative selection of YouTubers – median video duration < 7.5
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. F. Red. F. Red. F.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.007 0.005 0.005 -0.246∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)
closei ∗ postt -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First stage 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
F-test of excluded 161.21 160.26 166.53
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 9,519 9,519 9,519 9,519 9,519 9,519 9,519 9,519 9,519
Videos 923,189 923,189 923,189 923,189 923,189 923,189 923,189 923,189 923,189
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates
are based on using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, only YouTubers whose median video duration before Oct
2015 is smaller than 7.5 are included into the analysis. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.3: Alternative selection of YouTubers – 90th percentile < 10 min
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. F. Red. F. Red. F.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.009 0.005 0.004 -0.213∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
closei ∗ postt -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
First stage 0.054∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
F-test of excluded 135.13 134.03 134.40
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 6,891 6,891 6,891 6,891 6,891 6,891 6,891 6,891 6,891
Videos 610,496 610,496 610,496 610,496 610,496 610,496 610,496 610,496 610,496
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates
are based on using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, only YouTubers whose 90th percentile of the distribution
of video durations before Oct 2015 is smaller than 10 are included into the analysis. Standard errors are clustered on the
YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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only a YouTuber’s videos between ten and fourteen minutes drive my results.
Table A.4 shows the 2SLS estimates from using two alternative cutos; YouTubers are classied
as treated if their share of videos between ten and fourteen minutes has increased by at least
one (columns 1 to 3) or by at least ten percentage points (columns 4 to 6). While the estimates
in columns 1 to 3 are close to their counterparts in Table 2.3, the estimates in columns 4 to 6 are
larger by a third: the probability to upload mainstream content decreases by around 35 percentage
points for YouTubers in the treatment relative to the control group. The result is plausible: the
average eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks on the probability to upload
mainstream content is stronger for YouTubers who increase their share of videos that are ten
minutes or longer to a higher extent.
Next, I classify a YouTuber as treated if she increased her share of videos that are ten minutes or
longer (instead of ten to fourteen minutes) by at least ve percentage points. Table A.5 shows the
results. The potentially biased OLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 are close to zero and not statistically
signicant. The 2SLS estimates in columns 4 to 6 are negative and statistically signicant at the
1%-level, but smaller in absolute value than their counterparts in Table 2.3. A potential explanation
is that considering all videos that are ten minutes or longer leads to more noise in the estimation,
for instance, because videos that are more than “just” longer than ten minutes are less likely to
indicate that a YouTuber exploits the ten minutes trick. Finally, the reduced form estimates in
columns 7 to 9 are similar to the results from Section 2.6.1.
A.1.4 Alternative definitions of the instrument
Next, I conrm that the results from Section 2.6.1 are robust to alternative denitions of the
instrument closei: While it is equal to a YouTuber’s median video duration before Oct 2015 in the
main analysis, closei corresponds to the 75th and to the 90th percentile of the distribution of her
video durations here. These two alternative denitions of closei may better capture a YouTuber’s
“closeness” to the ten minutes threshold before Oct 2015.
Table A.6 shows the results from a 2SLS estimation of equations (2.2) and (2.3) using a YouTuber’s
75th percentile (columns 1 to 3), and using a YouTuber’s 90th percentile of the distribution of video
durations before Oct 2015 (columns 4 to 6) as an instrument for Di. The estimates in columns
1 to 3 are negative, but smaller in absolute value than their counterparts in Table 2.3; they are
also less statistically signicant. The estimates in columns 4 to 6, in contrast, are larger than their
counterparts in Table 2.3. The rst stage estimates and the rst F -statistics, however, are in both
cases much smaller than in Table 2.3. Hence, the 75th and the 90th percentiles of the distribution
of a YouTuber’s video durations before Oct 2015 have less power to predict a YouTuber’s treatment
status Di than the median.
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Table A.4: Alternative classications of the treatment group – cutos
1% 1% 1% 10% 10% 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di ∗ postt -0.245∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.090) (0.087) (0.084)
First stage 0.024 ∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
F-test of excluded 73.31 73.33 71.54 92.66 92.89 100.79
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped
with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on using the advertising
YouTubers only. All estimates are 2SLS estimates. In columns 1 to 3, YouTubers who have
increased their share of videos between ten and fourteen minutes by at least 1 percentage
point after Oct 2015 are classied as treated. Analogously, in columns 4 to 6, YouTubers
who have increased their share of videos between ten and fourteen minutes by at least 10
percentage point after Oct 2015 are classied as treated. Standard errors are clustered on the
YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Alternative classications of the treatment group – all videos ≥ 10 minutes
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Red. F. Red. F. Red. F.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt 0.005 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.151∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
closei ∗ postt -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
First stage 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
F-test of excluded 207.91 208.62 210.86
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on
using the advertising YouTubers only. Moreover, YouTubers who have increased their share of videos that are ten minutes or
longer by at least ve percentage points are classied as treated. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
A.1.5 Alternative definitions of mainstream content
Here, I show that the results from Section 2.6.1 are robust to alternative denitions of mainstream
content. To this end, I generate four alternative measures. First, I assign a dummy equal to one
to all videos that are given a keyword from the upper half percent, second, I assign a dummy
equal to one to all videos that are given a keyword from the upper two percent of the distribution
of most-viewed keywords (see Section 2.4.2). Third, instead of using a share, I classify a xed
number of keywords per month per category as mainstream – 250 keywords for the categories
“Entertainment”, “People & Blogs”, and “Let’s Play”, where I have the most observations, and 100
keywords for the remaining categories – and assign a dummy equal to one to all videos given
mainstream a keyword such dened. Finally, instead of considering the views, for each month,
for each category, I compute how many Likes a certain keyword has attracted and rank them
in descending order; the upper one percent of this distribution is then classied as mainstream
and all videos given such a keyword are assigned a dummy equal to one. Table A.7 provides an
overview of how these measures are correlated.
Table A.8 shows the results from a 2SLS estimation of equations (2.2) and (2.3) using the four
alternative denitions of Mainstreamvit. In columns 1 to 3, the estimates for β are negative, but
much smaller in absolute value than their counterparts in Table 2.3 and not statistically signicant.
The estimates in columns 4 to 6, in contrast, are larger by a third than the estimates in Table 2.3 and
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Table A.6: Alternative denitions of the instrument
75th perc. 75th perc. 75th perc. 90th perc. 90th perc. 90th perc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di ∗ postt -0.131∗ -0.148∗∗ -0.140∗ -0.377∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.148) (0.161) (0.157)
First stage 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
F-test of excluded 24.71 24.58 24.83 14.68 14.34 14.71
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Mainstreamvit which
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a
mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. The estimates are based on using the advertising YouTubers
only. All estimates are 2SLS estimates. In columns 1 to 3, the instrument closei is dened as the
75th percentile in the distribution of video durations of YouTuber i before Oct 2015. In columns 4
to 6, the instrument closei is dened as the 90th percentile in the distribution of video durations
of YouTuber i before Oct 2015. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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statistically signicant at the 1%-level. When I use a xed number of keywords per category per
month to dene mainstream content (columns 7 to 9), the estimates are negative and statistically
signicant at the 1%-level, but around a fourth smaller than in Table 2.3. Finally, when I consider
the keywords’ number of Likes instead of their views in columns 10 to 12, the estimates are close
to their counterparts in Table 2.3.
Table A.7: Correlation measures mainstream content
1% 0.5% 2% Fixed Likes
1% 1.0000
0.5% 0.8237 1.0000
2% 0.8207 0.6761 1.0000
Fixed 0.8495 0.8479 0.7528 1.0000
Likes 0.8298 0.7688 0.7802 0.7598 1.0000
Notes: Correlation matrix for the dierent measures of main-
stream content.
A.1.6 Placebo regressions
In this section, I conduct a series of placebo regressions to support the plausibility of the exclusion
restriction as discussed in Section 2.5.2. To this end, I augment the reduced form equation (2.4) to
Mainstreamvit = γ
Placeboclosei ∗ fakepostt + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + vvit| t ≤ 33, (A.1)
where in the rst placebo regression, fakepostt is equal to one if t ≥ 3, in the second placebo
regression fakepostt is equal to one if t ≥ 4, and so on; I run 29 placebo regressions in sum. If
closei has no direct eect on Mainstreamvit, all estimates for γPlacebo should be close to zero
and not statistically signicant. The idea is similar to the event study in Section 2.5.2: YouTubers
with dierent values of closei must not have been on dierent trends in terms of Mainstreamvit
before Oct 2015.
Of 29 placebo regressions, the estimate for γPlacebo is in three cases statistically signicant at
the 5%-level; these estimates are, however, positive. Thus, the results provide additional support
for the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
A.1.7 Robustness checks: mechanism
Next, I conduct several robustness checks on the results from Section 2.7. Since I know from Section
2.7.1 that the dependent variables Mainstreamvit and Competitivevit are highly correlated, I
do not repeat all the analyses from above, though. Instead, I focus on the robustness checks on the
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dependent variable as such, i.e., I study alternative denitions of competitive content and I run a
series of placebo regressions to support the plausibility of the exclusion restriction from Section
2.7.2. In addition, I provide robustness checks on the commentator analysis in Section 2.7.4.
Alternative definitions of competitive content
Analogous to Appendix A.1.5, I show that the results from Section 2.7.3 are robust to alternative
denitions of competitive content. Here, I generate three alternative measures. First, I assign a
dummy equal to one to all videos that are given a keyword from the upper half percent, second, I
assign a dummy equal to one to all videos that are given a keyword from the upper two percent
of the distribution of most-used keywords (see Section 2.7.1). Third, instead of using a share,
I classify a xed number of keywords per month per category as competitive – 250 keywords
for the categories “Entertainment”, “People & Blogs”, and “Let’s Play”, where I have the most
observations, and 100 keywords for the remaining categories – and assign a dummy equal to one
to all videos given competitive a keyword such dened. Table A.9 provides an overview of how
these measures are correlated.
Table A.10 shows the results from a 2SLS regression of equations (2.2) and (2.3) using the three
alternative denitions of Competitivevit. All estimates are negative and statistically signicant
at the 1%-level. In columns 1 to 3, the estimates for β are similar to their counterparts in Table 2.3;
the estimates in columns 4 to 9, in contrast, are a fourth to a fth smaller in absolute value.
Table A.9: Correlation measures competitive content
1% 0.5% 2% Fixed
1% 1.0000
0.5% 0.8424 1.0000
2% 0.8415 0.7093 1.0000
Fixed 0.8602 0.8552 0.7819 1.0000
Notes: Correlation matrix for the dierent mea-
sures of competitive content.
Placebo regressions
Analogous to Appendix A.1.6, I conduct a series of placebo regressions to support the plausibility
of the exclusion restriction as discussed in Section 2.7.3. To this end, I augment the reduced form
equation (2.9) to
Competitivevit = γ
Placebo′closei ∗ fakepostt + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + vvit| t ≤ 33, (A.2)
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Table A.10: Alternative denitions of competitive content
0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 2% 2% 2% Fixed Fixed Fixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Di ∗ postt -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.208*** -0.178*** -0.176*** -0.143*** -0.176*** -0.183*** -0.154***
(0.0519) (0.0514) (0.0494) (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0416) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0465)
First stage 0.0286*** 0.0286*** 0.0290*** 0.0286*** 0.0286*** 0.0290*** 0.0286*** 0.0286*** 0.0290***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 144.13 143.85 151.32 144.13 143.85 151.32 144.13 143.85 151.32
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTuber Time Trend X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable Competitivevit is equal to one if video v
of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from the upper half percent of the distribution of most-used keywords. In columns 4
to 6, the dependent variable Competitivevit is equal to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from the
upper two percent of the distribution of most-used keywords. In columns 7 to 9, the dependent variable Competitivevit is equal
to one if video v of YouTuber i in month t is given a keyword from a xed number of the distribution of most-used keywords. All
estimates are based on 2SLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
where in the rst placebo regression, fakepostt is equal to one if t ≥ 3, in the second placebo
regression fakepostt is equal to one if t ≥ 4, and so on; as above, I run 29 placebo regressions in
sum. Of 29 placebo regressions, the estimate for γPlacebo′ is in four cases statistically signicant
at the 5%-level; these estimates are, however, positive. Thus, the results provide additional support
for the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
Alternative cutos in the commentator analysis
Here, I show that the results from Section 2.7.4 are robust to alternative comment cutos. To this
end, I restrict the analysis to all advertising YouTubers who received (i) more than one hundred,
(ii) more than fty, (iii) more than ten, and (iv) at least one comment before and after Oct 2015.
The results in Table A.11 conrm that the measure fluctuationi may lead to unreasonable
results when the total number of comments is small. When I restrict the analysis to YouTubers
with at least one hundred comments (columns 1 to 3) or to YouTubers with at least 50 comments
before and after Oct 2015 columns (4 to 6), the potentially biased OLS estimate is smaller, while the
2SLS and the reduced form estimates are larger than their counterparts in Table 2.14. In contrast
to that, when I restrict the analysis to YouTubers with at least ten comments before and after Oct
2015 (columns 7 to 9), the OLS is estimate larger, and the 2SLS and the reduced form estimates
are smaller than in the main part and not statistically signicant. Finally, when I consider all
YouTubers who have received at least one comment (columns 10 to 12), the 2SLS and the reduced
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form estimate even switch their sign and become positive, but are not statistically signicant.
A.1.8 Validity checks: ality
Finally, I check if the empirical strategy from Section 2.5 is valid when I use LikesLikes+Dislikesvit and
log(V iews)vit as dependent variables.
Exclusion restriction
To conrm the plausibility of the exclusion restriction, I conduct two further event studies. In
particular, I estimate the augmented reduced form regression equations
Likes
Likes+Dislikesvit
=
33∑
t=1
γ′′t closei ∗pret+
49∑
t=35
γ′′t closei ∗postt+θXvit+φi+φt+τti+vvit.
(A.3)
and
log(V iews)vit =
33∑
t=1
γ′′′t closei∗pret+
49∑
t=35
γ′′′t closei∗postt+θXvit+φi+φt+τti+vvit. (A.4)
by OLS. If closei has no impact on the dependent variables, then all estimates for γ′′t and γ′′′t ,
t ∈ [1, 33], should be close to zero without being statistically signicant.
Figures A.1 and A.2 show the results. The estimates for γ′′t and γ′′′t , t ∈ [1, 33] are not statistically
signicant and uctuate around zero, which supports the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.
Yet, the lion’s share of the estimates is not statistically signicant at the 5%-level after Oct 2015,
either.
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Figure A.1: Event study likes/(likes+dislikes) (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots and the
solid line represent the estimates γˆ′′t from equation (A.3). The dashed line depicts a
95%-condence interval.
Figure A.2: Event study log(views) (advertising YouTubers). The dark grey dots and the solid
line represent the estimates γˆ′′′t from equation (A.4). The dashed line depicts a 95%-
condence interval.
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Video duration, likes, and views
Next, I check if video duration as such aects the dependent variables LikesLikes+Dislikesvit and
log(V iews)vit (see Section 2.5.2). To this end, I estimate
Likes
Likes+Dislikesvit
= δ′′durationvit + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + vit | t ≤ 33 (A.5)
and
log(V iews)vit = δ
′′′durationvit + θXvit + φi + φt + τti + vit | t ≤ 33 (A.6)
by OLS.
Table 2.5 shows the results. The size of the estimates for δ′′ (columns 1 to 3), though statistically
signicant at the 1%-level, is negligible: a one second increase in video duration corresponds to a
0.0001 percentage point increase in the fraction of likes. The estimates for δ′′′ in columns 4 to 6,
though, are relatively large and statistically signicant at the 1%-level, too. According to these
estimates, one further second in video duration leads on average to about 1.5 percent more views.
These estimates may reect the algorithmic drift discussed in Section 2.9.2. YouTube wants to
keep its viewers as long as possible on the platform to show as many ads as possible to them. As a
result, longer videos get higher rankings and are watched more often.
A.2 Further discussions
This section revisits a number of topics that could not be covered in the main part of the paper. In
particular, I discuss the consequences of misclassifying advertising and non-advertising YouTubers,
I show that no YouTube platform event beyond the launch of the new ad break tool aects my
results, and I discard a YouTuber learning eect as a potential economic mechanism behind content
dierentiation.
A.2.1 Misclassification of advertising and non-advertising YouTubers
As explained in Section 2.4.1, I cannot retrieve data on the YouTubers’ monetization settings on
the video level. Instead, I pick twenty randomly drawn videos per YouTuber, and classify her as
advertising YouTuber if I detect at least one ad break. In this section, I amplify how measurement
errors during this procedure could aect my results. In addition, I discuss the consequences of
sample migration between advertising and non-advertising YouTubers.
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Potential consequences of measurement error
In this section, I illustrate that a potential measurement error would have only minor consequences.
First, note that I could erroneously classify an advertising YouTuber as non-advertising, but not vice
versa: if a YouTuber never permits for ad breaks, my algorithm cannot classify her as “advertising”
by denition. Second, note that I do not use the classication dummy in a regression framework;
hence, the regression results do not suer from an errors-in-variables bias (e.g., Durbin, 1954).
Yet, I split my sample into advertising and non-advertising YouTubers. Thus, misclassifying some
advertising as non-advertising YouTubers might lead to selection bias in the subsamples.
If I misclassied some advertising as non-advertising YouTubers, the estimates in Table 2.3 may
be too large. YouTubers who fall through the grid of the algorithm seldom permit for ad breaks
and do not follow strict commercial incentives. Thus, they are on average more reluctant to adapt
their content after Oct 2015 than the average YouTuber whom the algorithm detects. On the other
hand, the YouTubers whom I missed might not even increase their share of videos between ten
minutes and fourteen minutes. Thus, they are not aected by the instrument closei and their rst
stage is equal to zero. In this case, the LATE (see Section 2.5.2) was the same whether or not I
classied some advertising as non-advertising YouTubers.
If some advertising YouTubers were included into the subsample of non-advertising YouTubers,
the estimates in Table 2.6 may be too large, too. This would, however, strengthen my results:
Section 2.6.2 demonstrates that there is no eect of an increase in the feasible number of ad breaks
on the non-advertising YouTubers’ content choice; if the estimates were even closer to zero, the
validity check would be even more convincing.
Potential consequences of sample migration
An advertising YouTuber may have been non-advertising in the past and vice versa. Potential
sample migration between advertising and non-advertising YouTubers, however, is unproblematic
for three reasons. First, I do not directly compare advertising to non-advertising YouTubers.
Second, many advertising YouTubers may have started as non-advertising YouTubers in the
beginning of their career. If they became advertising YouTubers as a result of the treatment, they
may have adapted their content with a delay, which may lead to an underestimation of the eect
of advertising on content dierentiation. Finally, if former advertising YouTubers have migrated
to the subsample of non-advertising YouTubers, I might overestimate the main eect , which
would – as argued in the previous subsection – make the validity check more convincing.
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A.2.2 Platform events during the observation period
Next, I provide a systematic review of all platform “events” during my observation period, i.e.,
technical novelties or changes in YouTube’s monetization policy beyond the launch of the new
ad break tool. Note that an event can only aect my results if it is correlated to a YouTuber’s
probability to upload mainstream content and to her value of closei – no such event exists during
the observation period. Since YouTube has no serious competitors, I remain agnostic about events
at competing video sharing platforms.
Data collection
I collect information on all events from the YouTube Creators Blog, which announces YouTube
news, introduces technical features, and gives general advice to YouTubers.1 In a rst step, I
retrieve all blog posts from Jan 2013 to Jan 2017. Next, I manually exclude any post that does not
deal with a platform event, such as YouTube promotion for academies, awards, (real world) events,
and YouTuber portraits. The remaining 42 posts are listed in Table A.12. In a last step, I review
all posts from Table A.12 and indicate if a YouTuber’s monetization options or her probability
to upload mainstream content could be aected. Thirteen events require further investigation; I
discuss them chronologically.
Platform events in 2013
First, in March, YouTubers’ access to their nancial data changed. This event applies to all
YouTubers equivalently, has no eect on their content choice, and is therefore unproblematic.
In May, selected YouTubers from the U.S., and in October, selected YouTubers worldwide were
given the option to raise a subscription fee of 0.99$ per month. The pilot was, however, extremely
limited: not even 100 YouTubers worldwide participated.2 Thus, my results are unlikely to be
aected by these events.
Next, YouTube launched its “Fan Finder”: a YouTuber could let the platform turn one of her
videos into an “ad” and show it to viewers of a dierent channel in place of a conventional ad;
this was supposed to enlarge a YouTuber’s fan base. Since YouTubers were asked to produce
special videos that advertise their channel, the event may have aected their content choice. Yet,
all YouTubers with at least 1, 000 subscribers could participate and there were no restrictions
1See youtube-creators.googleblog.com/ (May 2019).
2E.g., www.fastcompany.com/3020553/the-most-popular-youtube-channels-might-
start-charging-you-to-watch, www.bbc.com/news/business-22474715, or
searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/2267170/youtube-launches-paid-channels-
subscription-fees-start-at-usd099-per-month (May 2019).
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Table A.12: YouTube platform events
Date Summary of Moneti- Content
the event zation choice
1 2013 Jan The channel view count only includes views from publicly available videos from
now.
2 2013 Feb It is now technically feasible to update several video updates at the same time.
3 2013 Mar YouTube changes the interaction with AdSense: a YouTuber’s nancial overview is
now available at YouTube Analytics
X
4 2013 Mar The new channel design “YouTube One” is available for all YouTubers.
5 2013 Apr Users see more videos in their homepage feed.
6 2013 May YouTubers receive an e-mail once a video upload has nished.
7 2013 May The new channel design “YouTube One” is mandatory for all YouTubers.
8 2013 May Selected YouTubers from the US may raise a subscription fee of 0.99$ per month. X X
9 2013 June Mobile users (Android and iOS) may follow links embedded into videos from now.
10 2013 July YouTubers may now connect multiple channels via a Google+ page.
11 2013 Aug Improved mobile features for users.
12 2013 Sept Launch of the YouTube Audio Library (150 royalty-free tracks).
13 2013 Sept Improved tools for moderating comments.
14 2013 Sept New tools to identify and interact with one’s top viewers.
15 2013 Sept YouTubers may now feature playlists from other channels.
16 2013 Oct Selected YouTubers from outside the US may also raise a subscription fee of 0.99$
per month.
X X
17 2013 Nov A YouTuber may let the platform turn her video into an ad that is then shown to
viewers from dierent channels.
X
18 2013 Dec Live streams are now technically feasible. X
19 2014 Feb YouTube validates a video’s view count repeatedly from now on.
20 2014 Feb Users can create their own playlists.
21 2014 Apr Enhanced playlist tools in YouTube Analytics are launched.
22 2014 June New messaging and commenting features for YouTubers.
23 2014 June YouTube removes blocked users from a channel’s subscriber count.
24 2014 Nov New YouTube homepage for music videos.
25 2015 Mar 360 degree videos are now technically feasible. X
26 2015 May 60fps for live streams is now technically feasible.
27 2015 June New data tool Music Insights is available: shows the cities where an artist is most
popular, top tracks by artist, and views from both artists’ ocial music videos and
fan uploads claimed using Content ID.
28 2015 July A new design for YouTube mobile app is launched.
29 2015 Oct YouTube Red is launched in the US. X X
30 2015 Nov New language and translation tools are available.
31 2015 Nov New virtual reality tools are available. X
32 2016 Jan Users can donate to the YouTuber after watching a video. X X
33 2016 Feb A new blurring tool (to blur faces etc.) is available.
34 2016 Apr YouTube withholds any ad revenue generated during content ID disputes from now. X
35 2016 June Mobile live streams are now technically feasible. X
36 2016 Sept YouTube Analytics becomes easier to understand for YouTubers.
37 2016 Sept New tools for YouTubers to engage with their community.
38 2016 Oct An optional feature for paid promotion disclosure is available. X X
39 2016 Oct Special video end screens are available. X
40 2016 Nov New comment features are available for users.
41 2016 Dec Launch of a new URL system that is independent from Google+.
42 2017 Jan User messages in a chat stream may be highlighted.
Notes: Summary of YouTube platform events.
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on the advertising video’s duration. Hence, the event is not correlated to closei and thereby
unproblematic.
Finally, live streams became technically feasible in December and may have inuenced YouTu-
ber’s content choice. The feature is open to all YouTubers, though. Hence, the event is not
correlated to closei and cannot aect my results.
Platform events in 2015
In March, 360 degree videos became technically feasible. Similar to the live streams, the event
may have inuenced YouTubers’ content choice, but since it is open to all YouTubers, there is no
correlation to closei.
YouTube Red, a paid subscription service that provides advertising-free streaming of all videos
and exclusive original content was launched in October. The availability of YouTube Red is,
however, limited to the US. Since my dataset includes only German YouTube channels, the event
cannot aect my results.
In November, several virtual reality tools became available. Again, YouTubers’ content choice
may have been aected, but since the features are open to all YouTubers, there is no correlation to
closei.
Platform events in 2016
In January, YouTube launched a “Donate Button”: users who click on the button can donate to a
YouTuber after watching her video. As with the technical novelties from above, this may have
inuenced YouTubers’ content choice. In addition, their monetization options were aected. Still,
the feature is open to all YouTubers and thereby not correlated to closei.
Next, in April, YouTube announced that it would withhold (not block) all ad revenue generated
during copyright disputes. This event applies to all YouTubers equivalently, has no eect on their
content choice, and is therefore unproblematic.
Mobile live streams became technically feasible in June, i.e., YouTubers could stream from their
mobile devices. Similar to the “stationary” live streams from 2013, the event is not correlated to
closei and cannot aect my results.
In October, YouTube launched an optional feature for paid promotion disclosure: by checking
the “video contains paid promotion” box in their settings, YouTubers can inform their audience
about paid product placement and endorsements by third parties. This may inuence their videos’
content, but is unrelated to closei.
Finally, in October, video end screens, that allow YouTubers to promote up to four dierent
videos or playlists, became technically available. Although the event may have aected the
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YouTubers’ content choice, the feature is open to all YouTubers, thereby not correlated to closei,
and hence unproblematic.
A.2.3 YouTuber learning eect
Here, I discuss a YouTuber learning eect as an alternative explanation for the results from Section
2.6: YouTubers copy the most mainstream content in the beginning of their career, but deviate
from the mainstream when they become more experienced and start to develop a personal style. If
such a learning eect was positively correlated with closei, it could be the driving force behind the
decrease in the probability to upload mainstream content after Oct 2015 rather than an increase
in the feasible number of ad breaks per video.
Three arguments, however, speak against a YouTuber learning eect. First, there exists no
plausible reason why YouTubers with a high value of closei would experience a stronger learning
eect than YouTubers whose value of closei is low. See Section 2.5.2 for a detailed discussion on
the independence of closei.
Second, ti controls for a YouTuber’s average change in the probability to upload mainstream
(or competitive) content over time. Columns 1 and 4 in Table A.13 replicate the 2SLS results from
Tables 2.3 and 2.11 and illustrate that a linear YouTuber learning eect is of minor importance.
On the one hand, the estimates for β and β′ are nearly unaected when I control for ti. On the
other hand, the estimates for ti, though negative, are extremely small. A YouTuber’s probability
to upload mainstream content decreases by 0.00008 percentage points for each additional video;
similarly, her probability to upload competitive content decreases by 0.0003 percentage points for
each additional video.
Third, allowing for a more exible YouTuber specic time trend by adding t2i and t3i does
not aect the estimates for β and β′, either (columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 of Table A.13). It becomes,
however, obvious that the YouTuber specic time trend is not linear. For instance, columns 2 and
5 illustrate that a YouTuber’s probability to upload mainstream or competitive content increases
in the beginning, but decreases from around her 160th video, which is consistent with the story
from above. Note that the average number of videos per YouTuber is 99.3 and the median number
of videos is 64. Thus, many YouTubers in my sample do not reach the turning point of 160. In
sum, even though I nd some evidence for a YouTuber learning eect, it is not the driving force
behind the main results from Section 2.6.
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Table A.13: Learning
Mainstream Mainstream Mainstream Competitive Competitive Competitive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di ∗ postt -0.192*** -0.201*** -0.196*** -0.179*** -0.188*** -0.185***
(0.0480) (0.0485) (0.0482) (0.0456) (0.0460) (0.0458)
ti -0.00008 0.0004*** 0.0007*** -0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0005***
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
t2i -1.13e-06*** -3.62e-06*** -1.24e-06*** -3.36e-06***
(2.54e-07) (8.93e-07) (2.52e-07) (9.02e-07)
t3i 4.50e-09*** 3.82e-09**
(1.69e-09) (1.71e-09)
First stage 0.0290*** 0.0288*** 0.0289*** 0.0290*** 0.0288*** 0.0289***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
F-test of excluded 151.32 148.55 150.05 151.32 148.55 150.05
instruments
Time FE X X X X X X
YouTuber FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
YouTubers 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599
Videos 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542 1,067,542
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is Mainstreamvit
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a
mainstream keyword, and 0 otherwise. In columns 4 to 6, the dependent variable is Competitivevit which
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if video v of YouTuber i uploaded in month t is equipped with a competitive
keyword, and 0 otherwise. All estimates are obtained by 2SLS and based on using the advertising YouTubers
only. Standard errors are clustered on the YouTuber level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In the following we provide translations of the letter that favors the challenger (top) and that gives
a negative perspective on the challenger (bottom). The letters on the chancellor are analogous,
with the only dierence that “Schulz” is replaced by “Merkel.”
Dear Sir or Madam,
I herewith refer to your news coverage of the local Bundestag election campaign and of Sunday’s TV debate.
Let me be forthcoming in saying that I think Schulz is denitely the better candidate for our country and for the region
where we live. For precisely this reason I would urgently ask you to stop pretending between the lines as if the election
result had already been determined. What if your editorials were to demobilize important voters!
The region where we live is facing immense challenges: an ailing infrastructure, a lack of day-care centers, the
integration of refugees. Under a Schulz administration, I as a young mother could be more condent of the future for
my children and my home. Hence: Fairplay in news coverage for a high voter turnout!
Yours sincerely,
Annamarie Richter
PS: As we are on vacation from Friday on, I would kindly ask you to inform me via e-mail whether and when you
publish the letter to the editor (it is rather dicult to reach me via mobile phone). Thank you!
Dear Sir or Madam,
I herewith refer to your news coverage of the local Bundestag election campaign and of Sunday’s TV debate.
Let me be forthcoming in saying that I think Schulz is denitely the worse candidate for our country and for the region
where we live. For precisely this reason I would urgently ask you to stop pretending between the lines as if the election
result had already been determined. What if your editorials were to demobilize important voters!
The region where we live is facing immense challenges: an ailing infrastructure, a lack of day-care centers, the
integration of refugees. Under a Schulz administration, I as a young mother would have look with great worry into the
future of my children and my home. Hence: Fairplay in news coverage for a high voter turnout!
Yours sincerely,
Annamarie Richter
PS: As we are on vacation from Friday on, I would kindly ask you to inform me via e-mail whether and when you
publish the letter to the editor (it is rather dicult to reach me via mobile phone). Thank you!
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Classroom survey
To support our argument that voters perceive an extensive Wikipedia biography as a positive
signal, we conducted a classroom survey among sixty undergraduate students of economics.1
The goal was to study if students rate unknown MPs with a longer Wikipedia biography better
in terms of their valence characteristics, i.e., qualities of a politician on which all voters agree
(Stokes, 1963). We used nine valence characteristics that are frequently discussed in the political
science literature (e.g., Kinder et al., 1980; Funk, 1999; Stone and Simas, 2010).
We randomized the students into two groups. Students in group 1 received the instruction:
“Consider a politician from your preferred party. The Wikipedia biography of this politician
(politician A) is three pages long. Consider another politician from the same party. The Wikipedia
biography of this politician is one page long. Please answer the following questions.” Students in
group 2 received the same instructions, only that the biography of politician A was one, and of
politician B was three pages long. Next, we asked which politician would probably score better
with respect to each of the nine valence characteristics. The students could either reply “Politician
A”, “Politician B”, or “Don’t know.” We considered the students’ replies if they answered all nine
questions.
Table C.1 shows the results. Column 1 displays the valence characteristics that we consider.
Columns 2 to 4 show the shares of students who opted for the politician with the three-page
biography (s3), the politician with the one-page biography (s1), and “Don’t know”, respectively.
Column 5 displays the dierence between s3 and s1, which is positive for all valence characteristics
except for intelligence and honesty. We test the statistical signicance of this dierence against
the null hypothesis that s3 = s1 and nd that the dierence between s3 and s1 is statistically
signicant for knowledge, strength as a public servant, and inspiring (p < 0.01).
1The survey was carried out via classEx, a free software for interactive classroom experiments (Giamattei and
Lambsdor, 2019).
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Table C.1: Survey
Three-page One-page Don’t Dierence
biography biography know (1)-(2)
Knowledge 0.417 0.1 0.483 0.316∗∗∗
(0.0833)
Intelligence 0.117 0.183 0.7 -0.07
(0.070)
Provides strong 0.283 0.2 0.517 0.083
leadership (0.089)
Sets a good 0.217 0.167 0.617 0.05
moral example (0.080)
Strength as 0.367 0.133 0.5 0.233∗∗∗
public servant (0.086)
Empathy 0.25 0.117 0.633 0.133∗
(0.076)
Inspiring 0.4 0.117 0.483 0.283∗∗∗
(0.085)
Decency 0.167 0.15 0.683 0.017
(0.072)
Honesty 0.083 0.183 0.73 -0.1
(0.065)
Notes: This table summarizes the results of our survey. Column (1) shows
the nine valence characteristics under consideration. Column (2) shows
the share of participants that opted for the politician with the three-page
biography. Column (3) shows the share of participants that opted for the
politician with the one-page biography. Column (4) shows the share of
participants that opted for “Don’t know.” Column (5) gives the dierence
between columns (2) and (3) along with its standard error. We test against
the null hypothesis that (2) = (3). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.2 Robustness checks
In our main analysis, we excluded 35 MPs in distinguished positions (ministers and party heads)
and nine further MPs who had already left the Bundestag. Table C.2 shows that including these
observations does not aect our results. Moreover, the estimates that were added – dummies
for early resignations and distinguished oces – are very large and statistically signicant,
legitimizing the presumption that they are not comparable to other MPs in the sample.
In addition to that, we prove the robustness of the results in Table 4.3 by taking into account that
English texts are about a fourth to a fth shorter than German texts.2 To this end, we scale the MPs’
German biography length in equation (2.2) with the factors 0.6, 0.75, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively.
Moreover, we use the dierence in logs of the biography lengths as a dependent variable. Table
C.2 shows that our results are qualitatively unaected.
C.3 Party ailiation and English biography length
In Section 4.4, we argue that it is plausible to assume that there are no eects of party aliation
on the English biography length, because partisan contributors have no incentive to contribute
to the English Wikipedia. In this section, we perform four additional plausibility checks. First,
only thirteen of 598 MPs in our dataset provide more than a short CV in English on their personal
homepage, suggesting that they do not consider an English web presence as important. Second,
only eight of 138 English biographies (5.8%) were edited from the Bundestag building; with one
exception, only small changes were undertaken. Third, the lion’s share of the English biographies
is not translated from their German counterparts. Translated articles have to be marked by
a translation template on the article’s talk page and by a link to the source article; only ten
out of 138 English biographies are marked like this, and no biography is translated from a
foreign language into German. In addition, Wikipedia advises against one-to-one translation.3
Finally, while the assumption of no party eects may fail for foreign languages that are spoken in
countries adjacent to Germany or by large minorities, Germany has no direct border with any
English speaking country, and a low number of immigrants whose native language is English
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).
2See, e.g., www.orbis-uebersetzungen.de (Feb 2016).
3See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Translation (Dec 2018).
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Table C.2: Robustness checks I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Length Length Length Length
CDU/CSU 1106.7∗∗ 1903.7∗∗ 1047.9∗∗∗ 2167.2∗∗∗
(529.0) (850.0) (381.4) (780.8)
Left 2554.5∗∗∗ 2171.8∗∗∗
(758.7) (662.4)
Greens 1933.0∗ 1599.9∗
(1000.1) (911.8)
Female -694.2 330.5 -421.7 135.5
(501.3) (866.7) (408.1) (740.5)
Former periods in BT 679.5∗∗∗ 411.5∗ 905.5∗∗∗ 747.0∗∗∗
(173.4) (217.6) (159.4) (197.5)
PhD 2085.3∗∗∗ 1562.8 1917.1∗∗∗ 778.6
(691.5) (1021.7) (613.3) (883.1)
Party head 13689.0∗∗∗ 7010.2
(4381.3) (4710.3)
Minister during 18th BT 9316.7∗∗ 11781.8∗∗∗
(3732.3) (4530.0)
Former periods as minister 10701.3∗∗∗ 11764.1∗∗∗
(2517.3) (2765.1)
Early resign 7629.5∗∗ 13072.9∗∗∗
(3397.5) (4265.3)
Population density 0.732∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.201)
Fraction pop. 18 - 35 305.4 92.70
(190.5) (156.3)
Fraction pop. with Abitur -36.26 5.823
(55.49) (47.63)
Constant 3805.8∗∗∗ -1841.2 3402.3∗∗∗ -433.3
(594.6) (3575.3) (372.1) (3410.8)
N 633 289 607 275
R2 0.437 0.542 0.173 0.344
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable lengthGi measures
Wikipedia coverage of MP i in terms of her biography length in characters. CDU/CSUi,
Lefti, andGreensi are dummy variables equal to 1 if MP i is aliated to that party; SPD
is the omitted category. Femalei is equal to 1 if MP i is a woman. FormerperiodsinBTi
counts the election terms that MP i has been in parliament. Ancillary incomei is the
mean ancillary income of MP i during the 18th election term in 1,000 Euros based on
the estimation of abgeordnetenwatch.de. PhDi is equal to 1 if MP i has a PhD.
Population densityi, Fraction pop. 18− 35i, and Fraction pop. with Abituri refer
to i’s constituency demography. Party headi is equal to 1 if MP i is chairman of her
party or its parliamentary group. Minister during 18th BTi is equal to 1 if i was a
minister in the 18th election term. Former periods as ministeri counts the election
terms during which MP i was minister before the 18th election term. Early resigni is
equal to 1 if MP i left the Bundestag early. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.176
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Table C.3: Robustness checks II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD
CDU/CSU 3836.8∗∗∗ 4767.6∗∗∗ 5032.0∗∗∗ 5533.5∗∗∗ 0.314
(1212.8) (1405.9) (1466.2) (1590.2) (0.233)
Left 8622.4∗∗∗ 9979.4∗∗∗ 10373.3∗∗∗ 11128.3∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗
(1714.2) (1944.0) (2023.7) (2189.9) (0.345)
Greens 4359.3∗∗ 5818.2∗∗∗ 6255.7∗∗∗ 7111.0∗∗∗ 0.00663
(1745.9) (1993.2) (2076.7) (2249.0) (0.347)
Female -1570.5 -1506.5 -1499.7 -1483.2 -0.232
(999.5) (1148.4) (1200.0) (1306.8) (0.142)
Former periods in BT 987.7∗∗∗ 1348.2∗∗∗ 1458.8∗∗∗ 1678.5∗∗∗ 0.0645
(265.4) (303.4) (316.2) (342.9) (0.0737)
PhD 2565.7∗∗ 3007.0∗∗ 3167.8∗∗ 3501.7∗∗ 0.138
(1123.5) (1293.2) (1351.8) (1473.3) (0.193)
Ancillary Income 0.802 0.832 0.938 1.180 - 0.0000
(5.490) (6.145) (6.392) (6.916) (0.0009)
Constant -13683.6∗∗∗ -15861.5∗∗∗ -16490.7∗∗∗ -17738.0∗∗∗ -0.0713
(1909.9) (2043.0) (2096.4) (2220.4) (0.952)
Mills 6793.5∗∗∗ 8244.2∗∗∗ 8699.7∗∗∗ 9621.6∗∗∗ 0.284
Lambda (812.0) (807.0) (820.1) (854.2) ( 0.510)
N 596 596 596 596 596
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results are based on an ML estimation of the DiD
selection model. The dependent variable is lengthGi − lengthEi , which measures the dierences
in Wikipedia coverage of MP i in terms of her biography length in characters. In columns (1) to
(4) the German length lengthGi was scaled with the factors 0.6, 0.75, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively,
before taking the dierence. CDU/CSUi, Lefti, and Greensi are dummy variables equal to 1
if MP i is aliated to that party; SPD is the omitted category. Femalei is equal to 1 if MP i is
a woman. Former periods in BTi counts the election terms that MP i has been in parliament.
Ancillary incomei is the mean ancillary income of MP i during the 18th election term in 1,000
Euros based on the estimation of abgeordnetenwatch.de. PhDi is equal to 1 if MP i has a
PhD. Population densityi, Fraction pop. 18− 35i, and Fraction pop. with Abituri refer to i’s
constituency demography. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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D Appendix to Chapter 5
D.1 Tweet examples (translated from German into English)
D.1.1 Examples of non-criticizing tweets
Grüne tweeted:
12.000 plastic particles in one (!) litre of arctic ice. We do not only poison the sh in the sea, but
everything will end up in our bodies. Time to act. Stop #plasticpollution #plastictax.
SPD tweeted:
Civil insurance: Well explained on Spiegel Online.
LINKE tweeted:
It is good that @Simone_Lange opposes #Hartz4 so clearly. Otherwise very sad. @dieLinke is the
social alternative and will continue to exert pressure for a fundamentally dierent policy.
D.1.2 Examples of criticizing tweets
LINKE tweeted:
I also accuse the SPD of playing a waiting game! But it is not correct that the LINKE supports the
proposal by the FDP in its current form! #219a must be deleted. Induced abortion has no place in
the penal code.
AfD tweeted:
While @PoggenburgAndre is politically “classied”, @DLF of course abstains from doing so for the
former secret police collaborator #Kahane. And you really wonder why fewer and fewer citizens
trust your reporting?
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E.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Here we show that, for any F > 0, if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it is given by (6.11) and
(6.12). In Section F.5, we establish that (6.11) and (6.12) indeed constitute an equilibrium.
Suppose that F > 0. In any symmetric equilibrium, ai > 0 for otherwise broadcasters make
losses−F . Therefore, the rst order conditions (6.9) and (6.10) have to hold. By symmetry (ai = aj
and vi = vj) these conditions simplify to
1
τ
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
− β
N
= 0,
− δ
τ
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai − 1
N
σ
m
ai +
1
N
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
= 0.
It is easily veried that the unique solution to these equations is given by equations (6.11) and
(6.12).
E.2 Proof of Proposition 2
From (6.5),
∂CS
∂v
= n > 0. (E.1)
Moreover, from (6.6),
∂PS
∂v
= −nβa (E.2)
which is strictly smaller than zero since a > 0 in equilibrium.
Finally, consider the marginal eect of v on welfare W,
∂W
∂v
=
∂CS
∂v
+
∂PS
∂v
= n− nβa.
Inserting the equilibrium value of a gives
∂W
∂v
= n− nmβ
2τ
N (σ +mβδ)
,
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which is strictly positive i N > Nˆv.
E.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From (6.5),
∂CS
∂a
= −δn < 0. (E.3)
Moreover, from (6.6),
∂PS
∂a
= n
(
σ − βv − σa
m
)
> 0, (E.4)
which is strictly positive in equilibrium. The marginal eect of a on welfare is
∂W
∂a
=
∂CS
∂a
+
∂PS
∂a
= −δn+ n
(
σ − βv − σa
m
)
.
Inserting the equilibrium values from (6.11) and (6.12) gives
∂W
∂a
= −δn+ 1
N
nβτ,
which is strictly negative i N > Nˆa.
E.4 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, and hence omitted.
E.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The marginal eect of a¯ on CS is given by
dCS
da¯
=
∂CS
∂a
+
∂CS
∂v
dv
da¯
.
From Lemma 1 it follows that
dv
da¯
= − 1
m
σ
β
, (E.5)
so from (E.3), (E.1) and (E.5),
dCS
da¯
= −δn− σn
mβ
< 0.
The marginal eect of a¯ on the producer surplus PS is given by
dPS
da¯
=
∂PS
∂a
+
∂PS
∂v
dv
da¯
.
182
E.6 Proof of Proposition 5
From (E.2), (E.4), and (E.5) it follows that
dPS
da¯
= n (σ − βv) ,
which is strictly positive since in equilibrium both inverse ad demand and advertising quantity
are strictly positive, i.e., σ − βv > σa/m > 0.
Finally, consider the eect of a¯ on welfare W,
dW
da¯
=
dCS
da¯
+
dPS
da¯
= −δn− σn
mβ
+ n (σ − βv) .
From inserting the equilibrium value of v from Proposition 1 it follows that the total eect of a¯ on
W is
dW
da¯
= −δn− σn
mβ
+ nβ
τ (2σ +mβδ)
N (σ +mβδ)
which is strictly negative if and only if N > Nˆcap.
E.6 Proof of Proposition 5
By inserting the equilibrium value of a and v into the welfare function, it follows that the laissez-
faire welfare WLF , that is achieved when there is no cap, equals
WLF = n
(
w +
σ
β
− τ (2σ +mβδ)
N (σ +mβδ)
− δ mβτ
N (σ +mβδ)
)
− nτ
4N
+ n
∫ mβτ
N(σ+mβδ)
0
(
σ − β
(
σ
β
− τ (2σ +mβδ)
N (σ +mβδ)
)
− σx
m
)
dx−NF.
With a cap a¯ = N2F/ (nβτ), welfare equals
W cap = n
(
w +
σ
β
− 1
N
τ − 1
m
σ
β
N2F
nβτ
− δN
2F
nβτ
)
− nτ
4N
+ n
∫ N2F
nβτ
0
(
σ − β
(
σ
β
− 1
N
τ − 1
m
σ
β
N2F
nβτ
)
− σx
m
)
dx−NF.
The dierence is
W cap −WLF
=
(
FN3 (σ +mβδ)−mnβ2τ2) (mnβ2τ2 (3σ + 2mβδ) +N (σ +mβδ) (FN2σ − 2nτ (σ +mβδ)))
2N2mnβ2τ2 (σ +mβδ)2
.
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Since by assumption laissez–faire equilibrium prots (given in Proposition 1) are positive,
FN3 (σ +mβδ) < mnβ2τ2.
Therefore, W cap > WLF if and only if
mnβ2τ2 (3σ + 2mβδ) +N (σ +mβδ)
(
FN2σ − 2nτ (σ +mβδ)) < 0
or, equivalently,
F < Fˆ (N) :=
2Nnτ (σ +mβδ)2 −mnβ2τ2 (3σ + 2mβδ)
N3σ (σ +mβδ)
.
For any N > Nˆcap, Proposition 4 has already established that a local cap raises welfare and
thus clearly W cap > WLF . For the rest of the proof, consider the case where N ≤ Nˆcap.
By dierentiating Fˆ (N) with respect to N, it can be shown that for all N ≤ Nˆcap, Fˆ (N)
is strictly increasing in N. Therefore, for all N ≤ Nˆcap, one can invert Fˆ (N) to nd a strictly
increasing function Nˆ (F ) such that F < Fˆ (N) if and only if N > Nˆ (F ) . The remaining
properties of Nˆ (F ) can be shown by the implicit function rule, taking into account that, in the
relevant range, Nˆ (0) ≤ N ≤ Nˆcap.
E.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Without a cap on advertising, the number of rms and quantities of advertising are, in equilibrium,
N = NLF :=
(
nmβ2τ2
F (σ +mβδ)
) 1
3
,
a = aLF :=
mβτ(
nmβ2τ2
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
(σ +mβδ)
=
(
βτFm2
n (σ +mβδ)2
) 1
3
.
With a binding cap a¯, the number of rms equals N =
√
(na¯βτ) /F .
Substituting v from Lemma 1 in equation (6.5), and inserting the equilibrium number of rms
N =
√
(na¯βτ) /F , shows that consumer surplus is
CS (a¯) = n
(
w +
σ
β
− σ
mβ
a¯− δa¯
)
− 5
4
√
nτF√
a¯β
.
As noted in the main text, in contrast to the case with a constant number of broadcasters, with
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free entry a cap on advertising does not necessarily increase CS. Indeed,
CS′ (a¯) = − nσ
mβ
− nδ + 5
8
1
a¯
3
2
√
Fnτ
β
(E.6)
is positive when a¯ is suciently small; thus when a very stringent cap is relaxed, viewers become
better o.
To prove part (i) of Proposition 6, evaluate (E.6) at the laissez-faire equilibrium value of adver-
tising. After straightforward calculations,
CS
′ (
aLF
)
= − nσ
mβ
− nδ + 5
8
n (σ +mβδ)
mβ
= −3n (σ +mβδ)
8mβ
< 0.
Therefore, a local cap improves consumer surplus.
It remains prove parts (ii) and (iii). Summing prots and consumer surplus shows that, given a
binding cap a¯, welfare equals
W (a¯) = n
(
w +
σ
β
− σ
mβ
a¯− δa¯
)
− 5
4
√
nτF√
a¯β
+
1
2
a¯2
m
nσ. (E.7)
A welfare maximizing planner maximizes W (a¯) by choosing a cap a¯ ≤ aLF .1 Here, choosing
a¯ = aLF is equivalent to laissez-faire, i.e., imposing no cap at all.
Dierentiating (E.7),
W ′ (a¯) = − nσ
mβ
− nδ + 5
8
1
a¯
3
2
√
Fnτ
β
+
a¯
m
nσ.
Evaluating W ′ (a¯) at a¯ = aLF and rearranging gives
W ′
(
aLF
)
= − nσ
mβ
− nδ + 5
8
n (σ +mβδ)
mβ
+ F
1
3
(βτ)
1
3 n
2
3σ
(σ +mβδ)
2
3 m
1
3
,
which is strictly negative if and only if
F <

(
nσ
mβ + nδ − 58 n(σ+mβδ)mβ
)
(σ +mβδ)
2
3 m
1
3
(βτ)
1
3 n
2
3σ
3 = Fˆcapwithexit.
This shows that a local cap improves welfare if and only if F < Fˆcapwithexit.
NoteW fullls the Inada condition lima¯→0W ′ (a¯) =∞, henceW ′ (a¯) > 0 for suciently small
1Equation (E.7) presupposes that N ≥ 2. Of course, a cap that is too stringent will eliminate competition on the
broadcasting market. As stated above, we focus on the case where some competition prevails.
185
E Appendix to Chapter 6
a¯. If a binding cap a¯ < aLF is optimal, it must fulll the rst order conditionW ′ (a¯) = 0.Although
W is not necessarily concave on
(
0, aLF
]
, nevertheless a sucient second order condition (called
pseudo-concavity) holds:
Lemma 2. Suppose thatW ′ (a0) = 0 for some a0 ∈
(
0, aLF
)
. Then (i)W ′′ (a0) < 0. Moreover,
(ii)W ′ (a) > 0 for all a < a0 andW ′ (a) < 0 whenever a0 < a < aLF .
Proof. Dierentiating W ′ (a) ,
W ′′ (a) = − 15
16a
5
2
√
F
n
β
τ +
nσ
m
.
Suppose that W ′ (a0) = 0 and 0 < a0 < aLF . Then W ′′ (a0) has the same sign as g (a0) , where
g (a) := aW ′′ (a)−W ′ (a) = − 25
16a
3
2
√
Fnτ
β
+
nσ
mβ
+ nδ.
Note that g′ (a) > 0 and
g
(
aLF
)
= − 25
16
 mβτ(
nmβ2τ2
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
(σ+mβδ)
 32
√
Fnτ
β
+
nσ
mβ
+ nδ = − 9
16m
n
β
(σ +mβδ) < 0.
It follows that g (a0) < 0 and hence W ′′ (a0) < 0. This establishes (i). Part (ii) is obvious from
(i).
To complete the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 6, suppose that F < Fˆcapwithexit. By the
intermediate value theorem, since W ′ (a¯) > 0 for suciently small a¯ and W ′
(
aLF
)
< 0, there
exists some a∗ ∈ (0, aLF ) such that W ′ (a∗) = 0. By Lemma 2, W has a strict global maximum
at a∗. For the comparative statics of the optimal cap, recall that W ′ (a∗) = 0 and W ′′ (a∗) < 0.
By the implicit function rule, the sign of da∗dδ is equal to the sign of
∂W ′(a∗)
∂δ = −n < 0. Similarly,
∂
∂τW
′ (a¯) > 0 and ∂∂FW
′ (a¯) > 0, thus a∗ is increasing in τ and in F. Moreover,
∂
∂n
W ′ (a¯) =
∂
∂n
(
n
(
− σ
mβ
− δ + 5
8
1
a¯
3
2
√
Fτ
βn
+
a¯
m
σ
))
=
(
− σ
mβ
− δ + 5
8
1
a¯
3
2
√
Fτ
βn
+
a¯
m
σ
)
− 5
16
1
a¯
3
2
√
Fτ
βn
.
Note the bracket is W ′ (a¯) /n and thus zero when evaluated at a∗. It follows that ∂∂nW
′ (a∗) <
0 and a∗ is decreasing in n.
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To prove part (iii) of Proposition 6, suppose that F ≥ Fˆcapwithexit. ThenW ′ (aLF ) ≥ 0. Lemma
2 implies that W ′ (a¯) > 0 for all a¯ < aLF . Thus the optimal policy is laissez-faire.
E.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose there is a tax t on advertising revenue. The prot of broadcaster i equals
pii = n
(
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
)(
σ − βvi − σ
m
ai
)
ai (1− t)− F.
For givenN, the equilibrium advertising quantity a, program quality v, are as given in Proposition
1 above. Inverse ad demand per viewer equals r = βτ/N, and net of taxes (1− t)βτ/N. The
equilibrium prot of a broadcaster is is
pii =
nmβ2τ2
N3 (σ +mβδ)
(1− t)− F.
With endogenous entry, the equilibrium number of broadcasters is
N =
(
nmβ2τ2 (1− t)
F (σ +mβδ)
) 1
3
.
Therefore, in equilibrium
a =
mβτ(
nmβ2τ2(1−t)
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
(σ +mβδ)
, v =
σ
β
− τ (2σ +mβδ)(
nmβ2τ2(1−t)
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
(σ +mβδ)
.
Moreover, net consumer surplus (i.e., before redistribution of tax revenues) is
CSnet = n (w + v − δa)− nτ
4N
= nw +
nσ
β
− 2τn(
nmβ2τ2(1−t)
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
− nτ
4
(
nmβ2τ2(1−t)
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
. (E.8)
Thus, CSnet is decreasing in t. Advertiser prots equals a2nσ/ (2m) (see equation (6.8)). Inserting
the equilibrium value of a gives
1
2
a2
m
nσ =
1
2
nσ
m
 mβτ(
nmβ2τ2(1−t)
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
(σ +mβδ)

2
. (E.9)
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Thus, advertiser prots are increasing in t. Tax revenue T is given by T = nrat. In equilibrium,
T =
nm (βτ)2 t(
nmβ2τ2(1−t)
F (σ+mβδ)
) 2
3
(σ +mβδ)
. (E.10)
Welfare is W = CSnet + PS − NF + T. Note that, because of free entry, PS − NF equals
advertisers’ prots (E.9).
Inserting (E.8), (E.9), and (E.10), into W, dierentiating with respect to t, and evaluating at
t = 0, shows that
∂W
∂t
|t=0 =
F
(
mnβ2τ2
F (σ+mβδ)
) 1
3
12mβ2τ (σ +mβδ)
(
4mβ2τ (4σ + 3mβδ)−
(
mnβ2τ2
F (σ +mβδ)
) 1
3
9 (σ +mβδ)2
)
.
Therefore, W is increasing in t if and only if F > Fˆtaxwithexit.
To complete the proof, straightforward calculation of Fˆcapwithexit − Fˆtaxwithexit shows that
Fˆtaxwithexit < Fˆcapwithexit if and only if δ > 2σ/ (3mβ).
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This chapter was originally published as Online-Appendix to “Quantity Restrictions on Advertising,
Commercial Media Bias, and Welfare.” Available at URL:https://ars.els-cdn.com/
content/image/1-s2.0-S0047272715001528-mmc1.pdf
F.1 Additional background material
Media reports impact firm profits. We start by pointing to evidence that media reports
impact rm protability. For example, when the New York Times reported about a potential
breakthrough in cancer research in its Sunday edition, it induced a permanent rise in share prices
of EntreMed, a biotechnology company with licensing rights to the breakthrough - even though
the information had already been published in Nature and various newspapers several month
earlier (Huberman and Regev, 2001). Similarly, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) show that media
reporting has a causal eect on investor behavior, and Liu et al. (2014) show that media coverage
of IPOs has long-run eects on the stock’s value. Media reporting may also bring public scrutiny
to sensitive issues and lead to regulatory threats to rms. For example, Ere and McMillan (1990)
show that during the 1979 oil crisis, television reports on the oil crises inuenced home heating
oil price ratios, but not residual fuel oil price ratios, and argue that the dierent reactions are
explained by the threat of government intervention.
Moreover, several studies have shown that critical media reports impact consumer behavior.
Niederdeppe and Frosch (2009) provide evidence that news coverage on trans fat reduced sales
of trans-fat-products. Schlenker and Villas-Boas (2009) nd a signicant decrease in beef sales
following reports on mad cow disease. Wakeeld et al. (2003) show that antismoking messages
can lower youth smoking rates. Laugesen and Meads (1991) nd that doubling the coverage of
smoking issues in newspapers lowers cigarette consumption as much as a 10% price increase.
Advertisers influence editors. Several recent papers have shown econometrically that adver-
tisers systematically inuence media content. The papers listed in Table F.1 compare advertiser
spending with media coverage or slant. An empirical challenge is to identify whether there is
a causal eect of advertising on media content. The recent literature has used state-of-the-art
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instrumental variable techniques and natural experiments to overcome this challenge (e.g., Gurun
and Butler, 2012).
Interviews and surveys of key players in the market also conrm that advertisers inuence
media content. An early survey by Soley and Craig (1992) on newspaper editors found that almost
9 out of 10 of their correspondents claim that advertisers have attempted to take inuence on
editorial decisions. In a survey of journalists by Center (2000), a third of the journalists stated
an “intrusion of commercial interests” into editorial decisions (p. 3). Similarly, the survey by An
and Bergen (2007) on 219 advertising directors at US daily newspapers reports frequent conicts
between the journalism side and the business side of newspapers. Further evidence of advertisers’
inuence comes from a content analysis of ostensibly noncommercial newscasts (Upshaw et al.,
2007): 90% of the stations studied contained at least one instance per newscast of commercial
messages outside regular commercial blocks.
Table F.1: Evidence on advertisers’ inuence on media content
Study Media Advertiser Country Main result
Warner et al. (1992) Magazines Tobacco US “strong statistical evidence that
cigarette advertising (...) diminished
the coverage of the hazards of
smoking” (p. 305)
Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) Finance publications mutual funds US “mutual fund recommendations are
correlated with past advertising”
(p.197)
Reuter (2009) Wine publications Wineries US “Wine Spectator appears largely to
insulate reviewers from the inuence
of advertisers” (p. 125)
Rinallo and Basuroy (2009) Newspapers, magazines Fashion I, F, G, UK, US “there is evidence of a strong positive
inuence of advertising on coverage
(...) exist in both Europe and the US” (p.
33)
Gambaro and Puglisi (2015) Newspapers All I “coverage of a given company is
positively related with the amount of
ads purchased on that newspaper by
that company” (p. 1)
Di Tella and Franceschelli (2011) Newspapers Government Ar “One standard deviation increase in
monthly government advertising is
associated with a reduction in the
coverage of the government’s
corruption scandals of (...) 18% of a
standard deviation in coverage.” (p.
119)
De Smet and Vanormelingen (2012) Newspapers Big advertisers B “advertisers in Belgian Dutch-language
newspapers receive a signicantly
higher coverage” (p. 1)
Gurun and Butler (2012) Local newspapers Local companies US “positive slant about local companies is
strongly positively related to the local
advertising budget of these companies”
(p. 563)
Dewenter and Heimesho (2014) Car magazines Car producers G “evidence for media bias in test scores”
(p. 17)
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Conflict of interest between viewers and advertisers. At the center of our model is a
conict of interest between viewers and advertisers over media content. Here we provide additional
empirical evidence that motivates this assumption, and in particular deepen the issue that viewers
but not advertisers may favor accurate reporting of defects, risks, or negative externalities of
products.
As we mention in the paper, two important cases of commercial media bias concern the health
risks of tobacco and anthropogenic climate change. Reporting about the health risks of smoking
is an important and well-documented case of commercial media bias. The tobacco industry is a
major advertiser. According to the WHO (2013, p.22), “the tobacco industry spends tens of billions
of US dollars worldwide each year on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS). In
the United States alone, the tobacco industry spends more than US$ 10 billion annually on TAPS
activities.” The tobacco industry has suppressed reports on health risks of smoking, and induced
media platforms to merely reprint statements claiming that there was no proven evidence for
smoking inicting health (Ben, 2004). For example, when the magazine Mother Jones published
an article on smoking and health, the tobacco companies withdrew their ads and “made clear
that Mother Jones would never get cigarette advertising again” (Whelan et al., 1981, p.34). Warner
and Goldenhar (1989) and Warner et al. (1992) provide strong statistical evidence that cigarette
advertising in magazines relates to less coverage of the health risks of smoking.
News coverage of anthropogenic climate change is an issue of global importance. Global
warming imperatively requires an accurately informed public. The broad scientic consensus
is that human activities aect the climate (Oreskes, 2004). The discourse in the news media,
however, has signicantly diverged from the scientic consensus, particularly in the US. Boyko
and Boyko (2004) study the US press coverage of global warming between 1988 and 2002.1 They
nd that 53% of the investigated articles gives equal weight to the scientic consensus opinion
and the view that human activities are a negligible factor in overall changes in the climate. The
dierence between US television news coverage and the scientic consensus is even more severe:
from 1996 to 2004, 70% of the television broadcasts on climate change provided a balanced view on
its causes (Boyko, 2008, p.6). As pointed out by Ellman and Germano (2009), one potential reason
behind this biased media coverage is the inuence of big advertisers such as car manufacturers or
airlines.2
Critical media reporting also has an important role to counteract misleading advertising.3
1Their empirical evidence stems from randomly selected articles from four major US newspapers: New York Times,
Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal.
2See also Blasco and Sobbrio (2012) and Germano and Meier (2013).
3Sharp evidence on deceptive advertising is provided by Zinman and Zitzewitz (2016), who show that ski resorts
report 23% more fresh snow during weekends, when potential skiers are more exible to react on snow conditions.
Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) survey the available evidence. Nagler (1993) and Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) explore
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Again, tobacco is a case in point: cigarette advertising has often downplayed the associated
health risks (see Glaeser and Ujhelyi, 2010). Arguably, deceptive advertising, combined with
tobacco advertisers’ inuence on media content, explains why public awareness of the health risks
lagged decades behind their scientic discovery. For example, in Gallup polls from 1980 every
second woman did not know that smoking during pregnancy increases the risk of stillbirth and
miscarriage (Myers et al., 1981). Similarly, the WHO (2011) report on the global tobacco epidemic
points out that many smokers do not fully understand the health risks of smoking. The WHO
(2011) also mentions that the news media are a key source of health information, and emphasizes
the importance of media reporting on tobacco control.
Another well documented example is advertising for medical drugs. For example, Faerber and
Kreling (2014) classify more than one half of all major claims in prescription and non-prescription
drug ads on US television during 2008-2010 as potentially misleading. Furthermore, Faerber
and Kreling (2014) report that consumers may see up to 30 hours of television drug advertising
each year; in contrast, they spend 15 to 20 minutes at an average visit with their primary care
physician. Misleading advertising may thus seriously impair consumers’ ability to take well
informed decisions (Brody and Light, 2011).
F.2 Microfoundations
A central assumption of our paper is that the willingness to pay of an advertiser for reaching a
consumer decreases in the quality v of the program the viewer watches. This section discusses the
microfoundations mentioned in Section 6.4.3 of our paper.
One possible interpretation of the variable v is that it corresponds to a genre preferred by
viewers. The empirical results by Wilbur (2008) and Brown and Cavazos (2005) indicate that
advertisers’ preferences over genres dier from viewers’ preferences: advertisers prefer lighter
content. Similarly, experimental evidence from Goldberg and Gorn (1987) shows that happier
program types put viewers in a more advertising receptive mood.
The implications for consumer welfare depend on the mechanism how program content impacts
on advertising eectiveness. One potential reason is that television genres preferred by consumers
are substitutes for consumption goods; therefore, the better the quality of the television program,
the lower the willingness to pay for goods. In other words, viewing advertiser friendly genres is a
complement for consumption, i.e., it raises the utility of the viewer from consuming goods. We
call this the complementary microfoundation.4 Consumers have stable preferences dened over
theoretical implications of misleading advertising, and study optimal policy responses. We show in an extension of
our model in Appendix F.3 that misleading advertising strengthens the case for a cap on advertising.
4This microfoundation is similar to the complementary view of advertising (Stigler and Becker, 1977; Becker and
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consumption and advertising. Television program quality enters their utility function directly,
and it moreover aects the utility they gain from consumption goods. In particular, we assume
that the gross utility gain of a consumer from buying a product of quality σ˜ is equal to σ˜ − βv.
If in addition producers capture all the gains on the product market, the willingness to pay of a
producer of type σ˜ for an advertising slot is also σ˜ − βv. In this microfoundation, consumers are
rational, and the willingness to pay of consumers for goods indicates their true welfare gains from
consumption.
Another reason why television content may have an impact on advertising eectiveness is that
consumers’ recall of an ad depends on the program it is embedded in. Mathur and Chattopadhyay
(1991) show in an experiment that viewers recall an ad better if it is shown in the context of a
program that puts the viewers in a happy mood. This nding inspires our a second microfoundation,
the recall microfoundation.
Suppose that some consumers recall an ad after seeing it, while others forget it. The probability
that a consumer forgets an ad for a product of type σ˜ placed in a program of quality v is p (v, σ˜) .
Plausibly, p is increasing in v, and decreasing in σ˜ : the better the television program, and the
lower the product’s quality, the more likely the consumer is to forget the product. Moreover,
recall of better products ( i.e., those with a high σ˜) might be less aected by television genre. A
functional form consistent with these properties is p (v, σ˜) = βv/σ˜. A consumer who saw an
ad for a product, but doesn’t recall it, does not buy the product; just as consumers who do not
know the product exists. Consumers make rational decisions given their information.5 As in
the complementary microfoundation, the willingness to pay of an informed consumer captures
the true welfare gains from consumption. The willingness to pay of an advertiser of type σ˜ for
showing an ad to a consumer is (1− p (v, σ˜)) σ˜. Note this is decreasing in program quality v.
Moreover, if p (v, σ˜) = βv/σ˜, the willingness to pay of the advertiser is σ˜ − βv, as in our model.
Television genre may also impact advertising eectiveness since it inuences the moods of
boundedly rational consumers. For an example, recall the case of Coca-Cola refusing to advertise
during news broadcasts out of a concern that “bad” news might counteract its positioning of Coke
as an “up-beat, fun product.” There is good empirical evidence that consumers’ moods impact their
economic decisions. Harlé and Sanfey (2007) experimentally induce dierent moods by showing
short movie clips to their subjects prior to an ultimatum game experiment. Incidental sad moods
result in lower acceptance rates of unfair oers. Harlé et al. (2012) conrm this nding and study
Murphy, 1993; Bagwell, 2007). While this view claims that advertising is a complement for the advertised consump-
tion good, we claim here that television content may be both a complement and a substitute to consumption goods.
We point out that our model of advertising itself is also consistent with the complementary view of advertising.
5Moreover, if producers capture all the rents on the product market as in our model, consumers have no incentive to
remember the ads; forgetting is a form of rational ignorance.
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the underlying neural mechanisms in an fMRI study. Consumers have also been found in eld
data to be more likely to engage in impulse buying when they are in a positive mood (Beatty and
Ferrell, 1998; Flight et al., 2012; Faber and Vohs, 2011). Television induced moods may thus aect
advertising eectiveness and purchase behavior, even when the “true” utility from consumption
is not aected by television genre.6 We call this the moods microfoundation. In such a situation,
consumers’ willingness to pay cannot simply be equated with their true utility gains from the
products. If some genres put consumers in a spending happy mood such that they overestimate
the true utility gains of the products, the welfare analysis has to take this into account; we do this
in Section F.3.1 of this chapter.
A second possible interpretation of the variable v is that a high quality corresponds to more
accurate and critical reporting over products, for example over any risks involved in the consump-
tion. A program of higher quality can then be interpreted as containing more information that
helps consumers making well-informed decisions. Good television programs may also contain
information about the advertiser or producer, and any externalities that the products may have. An
example is the case of government advertising and reporting of corruption scandals investigated
by Di Tella and Franceschelli (2011).
Following Nagler (1993) and Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), this interpretation can be used to
develop another microfoundation, the deceptive advertising microfoundation. They argue that
advertising sometimes is misleading and makes consumers underestimate costs involved in the
consumption of their products. Key cases are advertising for medicines, cigarettes, and fast food;
see also the discussion in Section F.3.1 of this chapter. Following Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010),
suppose that consumption of a product has health costs c, so the true gain of consumers from
consuming a product of type σ˜ is σ˜− c. Consumers’ perception of these costs may dier from the
true costs. We assume that the perceived costs depend on how accurate reporting on television is;
the better the program quality, the higher the perceived costs.7 Suppose that perceived costs are
equal βvi, and that, in the relevant range, consumers underestimate the costs, i.e., c > βvi. Thus,
the better the program, the smaller consumers’ errors.
Under these assumptions, a consumer is willing to pay up to σ˜− βvi for a product of quality σ˜.
As above, we assume that the producer can completely capture these perceived benets. Therefore,
the willingness to pay of the producer for informing the consumer is equal to σ˜ − βvi, as well.
6See also DellaVigna (2009) and Lerner et al. (2015) who survey the growing literature on the role of emotions in
economic decisions.
7Another dierence between our setup and Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) is that, in our model, all consumers watching the
same broadcaster are identical and have single unit demand. Therefore, even though each producer is a monopolist,
consumption is ecient if and only if consumers perceive the health cost correctly, and there is no eciency
enhancing role for misinformation.
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Consumers are aware that a better program quality helps them making better decisions, and thus
perceive a benet vi from watching the program. They are not aware that the products involve
any health costs beyond βvi. Therefore, their perceived benet from watching the broadcaster is
w + vi − δai − τx (F.1)
as in the paper. In the welfare analysis, however, we need to take into account that consumers do
not correctly perceive the costs involved in the consumption decisions on the product market.
As discussed in the paper, the microfoundations described above are not mutually exclusive,
and they all lead to the same positive predictions of the model. For normative questions, the main
model in the paper builds on the complementarity microfoundation or the recall microfoundation,
where consumers’ willingness to pay for a product accurately captures their true benets from the
product. The moods microfoundation and the deceptive advertising microfoundation, on the other
hand, show that consumers may have losses on the product market since their perceived gains
from the products are not equal to their true gains. The magnitude of these losses may depend
both on advertising quantity and on television program quality. Section F.3.1 of this chapter
studies an extension of our main model that takes these considerations into account.
F.3 Extensions
F.3.1 Deceptive Advertising
In the paper we assume that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product accurately captures
the consumer’s benets from the product. As argued above, this assumption is doubtful when
purchase decisions are boundedly rational, or when advertising is suggestive or deceptive. Then,
consumers may take suboptimal decisions (for themselves) on the product markets. Moreover, the
corresponding losses of the consumers will depend on television program quality. This section
investigates how taking these considerations into account modies our main results.
As in the paper, we assume that a television program with quality v reduces the willingness
to pay for a product of type σ˜ to σ˜ − βv. However, here we assume that one part, γβv, of the
reduction comes from consumers making smaller errors, and the remaining part (1− γ)βv comes
from good television being a substitute for consumption, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Following Glaeser
and Ujhelyi (2010), suppose that consumption of a product has a health costs γc, so the true gain
of consumers from buying a product of type σ˜ is σ˜ − (1− γ)βv − γc. The consumer perceives
the costs to be γβv; we assume that in the relevant range, consumers underestimate the costs,
i.e., c > βv. We scale both the true costs and the perceived costs with the same parameter γ in
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order to have one single parameter that captures the importance of deceptive advertising. The
case where γ = 0 corresponds to our main model. The case γ = 1 corresponds to the deceptive
advertising microfoundation discussed in Section 6.4.3. When 0 < γ < 1, higher television quality
both reduces the true utility of consumption, and informs consumers so that they have a more
accurate estimate of the costs.
As in the paper, we assume that the producers can capture all the perceived benets from the
products by charging the price σ˜− βv. The net utility gain of a consumer from consuming a good
of type σ˜ is then σ˜− (1− γ)βv−γc− (σ˜ − βv) = γ (βv − c) . The consumer is informed about,
and consumes, in total a such products, thus the consumer’s loss on the product market equals
aγ (c− βv) . Consumers are aware that a better program quality helps to make better decisions,
and perceive a benet v from watching the program. They are not aware that the products
advertised on television involve any health costs beyond γβv. Thus the consumers’ perceived
benet from watching a broadcaster is given by (6.2), and hence as in the paper. Consumer surplus,
however, also has to take into account consumers’ losses on the product market:
CS = n (w + v − δa)− nτ
4N
− naγ (c− βv) . (F.2)
Producer surplus is, as in the paper, given by
PS = n
∫ a
0
(
σ − βv − σx
m
)
dx. (F.3)
Note that consumption of a product of type σ˜ raises welfare if and only if σ˜ > γc. Thus consump-
tion of high-quality goods is welfare enhancing in our setting.
For the positive analysis, this model generates the same predictions as the model in the paper.
A cap on advertising, however, now has additional benets for the consumers: it improves their
decisions on the product market, both by reducing the number of ads and by improving the
program quality. Thus, the welfare gains due to a cap are higher than in the paper. To see this
formally, note that the eects of lower advertising quantity, and higher program quality, on
consumer surplus are
−∂CS
∂a
= δn+ nγ (c− βv) ,
∂CS
∂v
= n+ naγβ.
Therefore, both the direct (less advertising) and the indirect (higher program quality) eect of
a cap on consumer surplus are more important when γ > 0. It is therefore more likely that the
cap’s positive eects on consumer surplus outweigh the negative eects on producer surplus.
Deceptive advertising thus makes the case for a cap stronger. It modies, however, our result
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on the complementarity between competition and regulation. When there are many independent
broadcasters, consumers’ errors are small since program quality is high and advertising quantities
are low; thereby consumers’ gains from a cap are smaller. This works against the complementarity
between competition and regulation. Indeed, if γ is close to 1, competition and regulation are no
longer local complements.
We now show, however, that the local complementarity between competition and regulation
holds whenever γ < (2σ +mβδ) / (3σ +mβδ) ; a sucient condition is γ < 2/3. Competition
and regulation are local complements if the marginal welfare gains from a cap,−dWda¯ , are increasing
in N. Here, W = CS + PS −NF, where CS is given in (F.2), and PS in (F.3). Substituting v
from Lemma 1 of the paper into these expressions, and dierentiating, one obtains
∂
∂N
(
−dW
da¯
)
= nβτ
2σ − 3σγ +mβδ −mβγδ
N2 (σ +mβδ)
,
which is strictly positive if and only if γ < (2σ +mβδ) / (3σ +mβδ) .
F.3.2 Sector Specific Regulation
In the paper we assumed that advertisers have a shared interest in low program quality. This may
be appropriate for specic industries where the qualities of the products sold are highly correlated.
For example, all producers in the tobacco industry may suer from an increased awareness of
the health risks of smoking. In other industries, however, broadcasters may be less hostile to
accurate reporting. As argued by Ellman and Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2013), and
modelled in detail by Blasco et al. (2016) and Spiteri (2015), competition on the product market
can ameliorate commercial media bias when advertisers have opposing interests.
In this section, we study an extension where advertisers are interested in low program quality
in some industries, but not in others. This allows us to probe the robustness of our results, and
to shed light on the rationale of sector specic bans on television advertising. For example, in
the United States, broadcasters are not allowed to send commercials on tobacco by the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970 (Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, 2012). The rules in the
European Union are similar. The Audiovisual Media Services Direction (European Union, 2012)
bans commercials on cigarettes and other tobacco products, medicinal products and medicinal
treatment available only on prescription. The advertisements for alcoholic beverages shall not
be aimed specically at minors and shall not encourage immoderate consumption (Article 9).
The restrictions can be more stringent in the member states. In Germany, gambling must not be
advertised and commercials for alcohol must not appeal to children or teenagers (Seufert and
Gundlach, 2012).
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We give a new rationale for sector specic regulations based on their impact on non-advertising
media content below. To keep the discussion short, we focus on the case where δ = 0. Suppose
there is a mass m1 of type 1 advertisers characterized by β = 0. These advertisers are not
interested in dumbing down media content. Moreover, there is a mass m2 = m−m1 of type 2
advertisers with β > 0; these advertisers prefer lower program quality. Suppose that the quality
σ˜ of the product of any advertiser is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, σ] ; thus type
1 and type 2 advertisers do not dier in this respect. (In Section F.4.2 we explore an extension
where advertisers’ preferences for media content depend on their product’s quality). Advertising
demand of broadcaster i is then
ai = m1 Pr (σ˜ > ri) +m2 Pr (σ˜ − βvi > ri)
=
{
m1
(
1− riσ
)
+m2
(
1− ri+βviσ
)
, if 0 ≤ ri < σ−βvi,
m1
(
1− riσ
)
, if σ−βvi ≤ ri < σ.
(F.4)
Inverse ad demand per viewer is
ri =
{
σ − σ aim1 , if ai <
m1βvi
σ ,
σ − m2βm vi − σaim , if m1βviσ ≤ ai < 1σ (mσ − βm2vi) .
If m1 is suciently big, then only the type 1 advertisers are advertising in equilibrium, since
the willingness to pay of type-2 advertisers is lower. In this case the market solves the problem of
commercial media bias. If m1 is suciently small, however, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
where both type-1 and type-2 advertisers are served.8 In this case, the prot of broadcaster i is
pii = n
(
1
N
+
vi − δai − u
τ
)(
σ − β2vi − σai
m
)
ai
where β2 := m2β/m < β. The equilibrium values of program quality and advertising quantity
can be found by replacing β by β2 in the formulas in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 in the paper.9
Consumer surplus can be calculated as in the paper (see equation (6.5) there). To calculate
8If the maximum quality v¯ is suciently high, there also exist an equilibrium where all broadcasters choose very
high quality and sell advertising spots only to type-1 producers. Any broadcaster trying to sell to type-2 producers
would have to lower its quality so much that it would not have any viewers.
9The proof is similar to the proofs of these results, with one additional consideration: one has to take into consideration
deviations to a high quality, whereby the deviating broadcaster captures all viewers, and serves only type-1
advertisers. The prots from this deviation are proportional to m1; the deviation does not pay of m1 is suciently
small.
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producer surplus, we need to take the two dierent types of advertisers into account:
PS = n
∫ m1βv
σ
0
(
σ − σ x
m1
)
dx+ n
∫ a
m1βv
σ
(
σ − m2β
m
v − σx
m
)
dx.
We now consider the eect of a general cap that applies to the quantity of all advertising by type
1 and type 2 producers.
Proposition 8. Consider the extension where there is a massm1 of advertisers with β = 0 and a
massm2 = m−m1 of advertisers with β > 0. Let δ = 0. If both types of advertisers are served in
equilibrium, a local cap on advertising increases welfare if and only if
N > Nˆcap2 :=
2β2τm2
σ (β (m−m2) + 1) .
Proof. Since by assumption δ = 0,
W = nw + nv + n
∫ m1βv
σ
0
(
σ − σ x
m1
)
dx+ n
∫ a
m1βv
σ
(
σ − m2β
m
v − σx
m
)
dx− nτ
4N
.
The eect of a cap on welfare is
dW
da¯
=
∂W
∂a
+
dv
da¯
∂W
∂v
,
where
∂W
∂a
= n
(
σ − m2β
m
v − σa
m
)
,
∂W
∂v
= n− nm2β
m
(
a− m1βv
σ
)
.
Moreover, from Lemma 1, replacing β by β2, we have
dv
da¯
= − 1
m
σ
β2
= − σ
βm2
.
Thus
dW
da¯
= n
(
σ − m2β
m
v − σa
m
)
− σ
βm2
(
n− nm2β
m
(
a− m1βv
σ
))
. (F.5)
The equilibrium values of a and v can be taken from Proposition 1 in the paper, replacing β by β2
and setting δ = 0 :
a =
mβ2τ
Nσ
=
βτm2
Nσ
,
v =
σ
β2
− 2τ
N
=
mσ
m2β
− 2τ
N
.
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Inserting these into equation (F.5) shows that the eect of a local cap is
dW
da¯
=
nβτm2
Nm
− σ
βm2
(
n− nm2β
m
(
βτm2
Nσ
− m1β
σ
(
mσ
m2β
− 2τ
N
)))
=
nβτm2
Nm
− σ
m2β
(
n+ nβ
(
m1 − βτ m
2
2 + 2m1m2
Nmσ
))
. (F.6)
This is strictly negative if and only if
βτm2
Nm
<
σ
m2β
(
1 + β
(
m1 − βτ m
2
2 + 2m1m2
Nmσ
))
.
or, equivalently (since m = m1 +m2), N > Nˆcap2.
To compare this with our main model, rst note that whenm2 → m,we get the same condition
as in Proposition 1 in the paper for the case δ = 0. Moreover, Nˆcap2 is increasing in m2. Thus the
lower m2, the more likely it is that a cap improves welfare. Therefore, in the extension considered
in Proposition 8, it is more likely than in our main model that a cap improves welfare. The intuition
is that, since only some broadcasters suer from higher program quality, the loss of producer
surplus due to a cap is not as important as in the main model in the paper.
As reported above, many countries impose bans on advertising for specic sectors or products,
for example tobacco or alcohol. To see the implications in our model, consider a sector specic
advertising ban that excludes all type 2 advertisers. Then for the broadcasters there is no drawback
from choosing high program quality; thus in equilibrium program quality will be equal to its highest
possible level v¯. If v¯ is suciently high, a sector specic advertising ban leads to a higher welfare
than laissez-faire, or a local cap on all advertising. While most rationales for regulating the content
of advertising are built on bounded consumer rationality, this argument identies conditions such
that regulating advertising content is justiable for the reason it decreases commercial media bias,
even when consumers are perfectly rational.
F.4 Robustness
The following section contains robustness checks with respect concerning television viewing
behavior and advertising demand.
F.4.1 Television viewing behavior
This section probes the robustness of our results with respect to the model of television viewing
behavior, focusing on the case where the number of broadcasters is exogenous. One limitation of
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our results comes from the assumption that everyone watches television. If the number of viewers
is endogenous, and viewers are ad averse, a cap on advertising will ceteris paribus increase the
total number of viewers. This means that increasing v has higher costs for a broadcaster, because
he loses βa on every viewer he has, countervailing the quality improving eects of a cap.10
Our results do not hinge, however, on specic features of the Salop circle model. To show this,
we introduce a more general model of television viewing behavior that nests the Salop model and
several other textbook models of discrete choice. Suppose that, if all broadcasters j 6= i behave
symmetrically, the fraction of viewers who watch broadcaster i depends only on the dierence
between the utility vi − δai oered by broadcaster i, and the utility oered by the competitors,
scaled by a factor 1/τ . The share is given by s
(
vi−δai−u
τ
)
, where u := vj − δaj , and s is a
strictly increasing function with s (0) = 1/N. In general, the function s will depend on N ; we
assume it to be independent of the other exogenous parameters of the model. We assume that
the function s is suciently well behaved such that a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
exists and can be characterized by the relevant rst order conditions. This model nests the Salop
model with linear transportation costs studied in the paper (given undercutting is not an issue),
the Salop model with any convex (e.g. quadratic) transportation costs, the Logit model (see, e.g.,
Anderson et al., 1992), and the covered Spokes model introduced by Chen and Riordan (2007) and
used in a study of commercial media bias by Germano and Meier (2013).
Sections F.4.3 to F.4.3 below substantiate these claims, and Section F.4.3 characterizes the
symmetric equilibrium with and without a cap. Here we summarize the main results. A cap
increases program quality, and indeed dv/ (da¯) = −σ/βm exactly as in the paper, see equation
(6.13) there. The comparative static of the equilibrium depends on the behavior of Ns′ (0) . The
advertising quantity a is decreasing in N, and quality v is increasing in N, if and only if Ns′ (0)
is increasing in N. Similarly, the price of an advertising spot per viewer r is decreasing in N if
and only if Ns′ (0) is increasing in N. As discussed in the paper, this seems to be the empirically
plausible case. The Salop model with linear or strictly convex transportation costs, and the Logit
model share this property that Ns′ (0) is increasing in N. The Spokes model is a limit case where
Ns′ (0) is independent of N .
For the welfare analysis, we assume that, for a given number of broadcasters N, welfare is
given by
W = n (w + v − δa) + n
∫ a
0
(
σ − βv − σ
m
x
)
dx−NF + C (N) ,
whereC (N) is independent of a and v. This is the case in all the discrete choice models mentioned
10Indeed, if ad aversion is strong, a cap may decrease equilibrium program quality. The simplest way to see this is to
reconsider the example from Section 6.3 of the paper, and to introduce ad aversion δ > 0. Then a cap will increase
program quality whenever δ < 1, but it will decrease quality when δ > 1.
201
F Online-Appendix to Chapter 6
above (e.g. in the Salop model, C (N) equals aggregate transportation costs). As in the paper, a
cap increases consumer surplus, and decreases producer surplus. Moreover, the welfare analysis
of a local cap is quite similar to our main model. A local cap improves welfare if and only if
Ns′ (0) > Nˆcap. This is, in addition, a sucient but not necessary condition for the optimal cap
subject to the constraint that prots are nonnegative to be binding. The optimal policy is either to
choose a cap that drives prots down to zero, i.e., a¯ = FN2s′ (0) / (nβτ) , or laissez-faire.
As seen above, many standard discrete choice models imply that Ns′ (0) is increasing in N.
Moreover, if Ns′ (0) is increasing in N, then the comparative statics of equilibrium advertising
quantity, program quality, and price per ad per viewer go in empirically plausible directions. It
is exactly this property that also gives rise to the complementarity between competition and
regulation: If Ns′ (0) is increasing in N, then an increase in N makes it more likely that a local
cap raises welfare.
Since s (·) is independent of the remaining parameters of the model, their impact is exactly as
in the linear Salop model considered in the paper.11 Table F.2 lists the market share, the condition
under which a local cap improves welfare, and the optimal cap (if binding) for several discrete
choice models nested in our general model. It shows that the conditions under which a local cap
improves welfare are qualitatively similar. Moreover, the optimal cap has the same qualitative
properties under these models. Table F.2 also shows, however, that the precise quantitative
implications depend on the assumed model of television viewing. The condition under which
a local cap improves welfare is the most restrictive in the Logit model, followed in decreasing
strength by the Spokes model, the Salop model with linear transportation costs and the Salop
model with quadratic transportation costs.
Table F.2: Dierent assumptions on television viewing behavior.
Model s
(
ui−u
τ
)
Ns′ (0) local cap improves W i zero-prot cap
Salop linear 1N+
ui−u
τ N N > Nˆ cap
FN2
nβτ
Salop quadratic 1N+
N(ui−u)
τ N
2 N2> Nˆ cap
FN3
nβτ
Spokes 1N+
ui−u
Nτ 1 1 > Nˆ cap
FN
nβτ
Logit e
ui/τ
eui/τ+(N−1)eu/τ
N−1
N
N−1
N > Nˆ cap
F (N−1)
nβτ
Notes: Salop linear (quadratic) refers to the Salop model with linear (quadratic) transportation costs.
11Note that even in the Spokes model a lower τ, i.e., a more competitive broadcasting market since programs are better
substitutes, makes a cap more likely to be welfare enhancing.
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F.4.2 Advertising demand
In our paper we assume that a higher program quality reduces the willingness to pay of all
advertisers by the same amount. In a diagram with advertising quantity on the horizontal axis, and
the price of an ad per viewer on the vertical axis, the inverse demand curve for advertising spots
is linear, and a higher program quality leads to a parallel downward shift of the inverse demand
curve; see the left hand side of Figure F.1. The reduction of the willingness to pay, however, may
depend on the quality of the good. It seems plausible to assume that the willingness to pay of
producers of high (rather than low) quality goods is less aected by program quality. Moreover,
there might be nonlinearities in the inverse advertising demand curve. For example, advertisers
may have increasing marginal costs from program quality, or similarly, viewers’ marginal utility
from program quality may be decreasing.
Figure F.1: Left hand side: Parallel downwards shift of the inverse ad demand function. Right
hand side: Turn of the inverse ad demand function.
To study potential implications, suppose that the inverse demand for advertising is given by a
function r (a, v) ,which is decreasing in a and in v.12 While a complete analysis is beyond the scope
of this Appendix, we show that the plausible assumption that producers of high quality goods have
little to lose from program quality strengthens the mechanism by which a cap increases program
quality. Formally, the assumption means that the cross-partial derivative rva := ∂2r/ (∂v∂a) is
negative. In terms of the right hand side of Figure F.1, an increase in quality makes the inverse ad
demand curve steeper.
12Note this can also capture decreasing marginal utility of the viewers. Suppose a viewer’s utility is given by
w+f (vi)−δai−τx, where f ′ (v) > 0 > f ′′ (v), instead of equation (6.2), and ri is as given by ri = σ−βvi− aiσm .
Then we can equivalently think of the broadcaster choosing v˜i := f (vi) ; then viewers utility from watching is
w + v˜i − δai − τx as in (6.2), but ri = σ − βf−1 (v˜i)− σai/m, thus the advertisers have increasing marginal
costs from program quality.
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Consider the prot maximization problem of broadcaster i, given a binding cap a¯ :
max
vi
ns
(
vi − δa¯− u
τ
)
r (a¯, vi) a¯− F
where u = vj − δa¯ for all j 6= i. Setting up the rst order condition for the prot maximizing
program quality, and then using symmetry, one obtains
s′ (0)
τ
r (a¯, v) +
1
N
rv (a¯, v) = 0
where rv is the partial derivative ∂r/∂v. Consider how the equilibrium value of v changes when
the cap a¯ changes. From the implicit function rule,
dv
da¯
= −
s′(0)
τ ra +
1
N rva
s′(0)
τ rv +
1
N rvv
, (F.7)
where as above subscripts indicate partial derivatives. The denominator is negative by the second
order condition, and ra < 0 < s′ (0) by assumption. Therefore, if rva = 0, then dv/da < 0, and a
cap improves program quality as in the paper; the sign of the second order partial derivatives rvv
and raa does not matter for this result.13 As can be seen from (F.7), rva < 0 reinforces the quality
enhancing eect of the cap.
The economics behind this is as follows. A tighter cap implies that the marginal advertiser has
a better product. When rva < 0, it follows that the willingness to pay of the marginal advertiser
decreases less in program quality. Therefore, broadcasters have an additional reason to increase
their program quality. Similarly, any reason why the marginal advertiser has a lower stake in
program quality works in the same direction. On the other hand, when the marginal advertiser
has a higher stake in program quality (perhaps because of the advertisers’ cost structure), this
works against the quality enhancing eect of a cap.
13While the curvature of r in v does not matter for the sign of dv/da, it inuences its absolute value. This can change
the results on the desirability of a cap and on the local complementarity between competition and regulation. To
see this, consider the case where there is some upper bound v¯ on quality. Such an upper bound might endogenously
arise as the result of viewers’ utility being increasing in v only up to v¯, or from advertisers’ willingness to pay
dropping rapidly when quality exceeds v¯. Then, enough competition on the media market can be sucient to
ensure that equilibrium program quality is v¯, and thus as high as it possibly can be. If, in addition, ad aversion is
small, a cap on advertising will be detrimental to welfare.
204
F.4 Robustness
F.4.3 Technical Details
Salop model with convex transportation costs
Suppose that the transportation costs of a viewer located at a distance x from the broadcaster equals
τ l (x) , where l is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and satises l (0) = 0. Let ui = vi − δai,
and u = vj − δaj for all j 6= i. Assuming that there is an indierent viewer between broadcaster
i and its closest competitors, the distance x between this viewers and broadcaster i solves
ui − τ l (x) = u− τ l
(
1
N
− x
)
,
or equivalently
ui − u
τ
= l (x)− l
(
1
N
− x
)
.
Let λ (x,N) = l (x)− l ( 1N − x) . Since λ is strictly increasing in x, holding N xed, an inverse
function λ−1 (·, N) exists, and
λ−1
(
ui − u
τ
,N
)
= x.
Therefore, the market share of i is
s
(
ui − u
τ
)
= 2x = 2λ−1
(
ui − u
τ
,N
)
.
Thus
s′
(
ui − u
τ
)
=
2
λ′
(
λ−1
(
ui−u
τ , N
)) = 2
l′ (x) + l′
(
1
N − x
) .
When ui − u = 0, x = 1/ (2N) . Thus
Ns′ (0) =
N
l′
(
1
2N
) .
Therefore
d
dN
(
Ns′ (0)
)
=
l′
(
1
2N
)
+ l′′
(
1
2N
)
1
2N
l′
(
1
2N
)2 > 0.
Thus Ns′ (0) is increasing in N.
It remains to establish that the rst order conditions are sucient for a maximum. Given the
convex transportation costs, undercutting is not an issue. To show that any critical point is a
global maximum, we now show that the variable prot, pii + F, is log-concave in (ai, vi) .
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We begin by establishing that ln s
(
ui−u
τ
)
is strictly concave in ui.
∂2
∂u2i
(
ln s
(
ui − u
τ
))
=
1
τ2
(
s
(
ui−u
τ
))2
(
s
(
ui − u
τ
)
s′′
(
ui − u
τ
)
−
(
s′
(
ui − u
τ
))2)
is strictly smaller zero if, and only if,
s
(
ui − u
τ
)
s′′
(
ui − u
τ
)
<
(
s′
(
ui − u
τ
))2
.
Here, this inequality is equivalent to
1 + λ−1
(
ui − u
τ
,N
)
λ′′
(
λ−1
(
ui−u
τ , N
))
λ′
(
λ−1
(
ui−u
τ , N
)) > 0
which is true since λ−1 > 0, λ′ > 0 and λ′′ > 0.
It follows that
ln (pii + F ) = ln s
(
ui − u
τ
)
+ ln
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
+ ln ai
is the sum of three functions, each of them being weakly concave in (ai, vi). Moreover, the rst
of these functions is strictly concave in (ai, vi) except along the line where vi − δai is constant;
the second is strictly concave except along the line where βvi + σaim is constant. It follows that
ln (pii + F ) is strictly concave in (ai, vi).
Logit
In the logit model, the market share of broadcaster i is
s
(
ui − u
τ
)
=
eui/τ
eui/τ + (N − 1) eu/τ
(see, e.g., Anderson et al., 1992). It is straightforward to calculate that
Ns′ (0) =
N − 1
N
.
Moreover, it can be shown that the variable prot (pii + F ) is log-concave in (ai, vi). Therefore,
the rst order conditions are sucient for a maximum.
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Spokes
In the covered Spokes model introduced by Chen and Riordan (2007) and used in Germano and
Meier (2013),
si
(
ui − u
τ
)
=
1
N
+
1
N
ui − u
τ
.
Then Ns′ (0) = 1 is independent of N. Again, the variable prot is log-concave in (ai, vi) and
therefore the rst order conditions are sucient for a maximum.
Equilibrium characterization and welfare eects of a cap
The prot of broadcaster i is
pii = ns
(
vi − δai − u
τ
)(
σ − βvi − σ
m
ai
)
ai − F.
The rst order condition
∂pii
∂vi
= s′
(
vi − δai − u
τ
)
1
τ
n
(
σ − βvi − σ
m
ai
)
ai − βns
(
vi − δai − u
τ
)
ai = 0
simplies to, assuming symmetry,
r ≡ σ − βv − σ
m
a =
βτ
Ns′ (0)
.
Consider the case without a cap. The rst order condition
∂
∂ai
pii = ns
′
(
vi − δai − u
τ
)(
− δ
τ
)(
σ − βvi − σ
m
ai
)
ai + ns
(
vi − δai − u
τ
)(
− σ
m
)
ai
+ ns
(
vi − δai − u
τ
)(
σ − βvi − σ
m
ai
)
= 0
simplies, in any symmetric equilibrium, to
− δ
τ
s′ (0) ra− 1
N
σ
m
a+
r
N
= 0.
Inserting r = βτ/ (Ns′ (0)) and solving for a gives
a =
β
Ns′ (0)
mτ
σ +mβδ
.
Moreover,
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v =
σ
β
− τ
Ns′ (0)
2σ +mβδ
σ +mβδ
.
If there is a binding cap a¯, then in any symmetric equilibrium
v =
σ
β
− σ
βm
a¯− τ
Ns′ (0)
.
Inserting the equilibrium value of v into the welfare function, we get
W (a¯) = n
(
w +
σ
β
− σ
βm
a¯− τ
Ns′ (0)
− δa¯
)
+n
∫ a¯
0
(
β
(
σ
βm
a¯+
τ
Ns′ (0)
)
− σ
m
x
)
dx−NF+C
= n
(
− σ
βm
a¯− δa¯
)
+
nσ
2m
a¯2 +
nβa¯τ
Ns′ (0)
+ terms independent of a¯.
Consider the problem to maximize W (a¯) by choosing a, subject to the constraint that prots are
nonnegative:
pii =
n
N
βτ
Ns′ (0)
a¯− F ≥ 0.
Since W (a¯) is convex in a¯, either the optimal cap is driving prots to zero, or it is not binding.
Moreover,
dW
da¯
= n
(
− σ
βm
− δ
)
+ n
a¯
m
σ +
nβτ
Ns′ (0)
.
Evaluating this at the equilibrium level of a (absent a cap) gives
dW
da¯
= n
(
− σ
βm
− δ
)
+
n βNs′(0)
mτ
σ+mβδ
m
σ +
nβτ
Ns′ (0)
= n
(
− σ
βm
− δ
)
+
nβτ
Ns′ (0)
2σ +mβδ
σ +mβδ
.
Rearranging shows that this is strictly negative if and only if
Ns′ (0) >
(2σ +mβδ)mβ2τ
(σ +mβδ)2
= Nˆcap.
Thus a local cap raises welfare if and only if Ns′ (0) > Nˆcap.
F.5 Omied Steps of Proof of Proposition 1
In Appendix E, we have shown that if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it is as described in
Proposition 1 in the paper. Here we prove existence of the equilibrium. We suppose all broadcasters
j 6= i behave as indicated in the Proposition and show that broadcaster i has no incentive to
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deviate. Since the proof is somewhat lengthy, we break it down into steps, for which we rst
briey sketch the intuition. Step 1 assumes that broadcaster i does not undercut and shows that,
under this assumption, broadcaster i has no incentive to deviate. The remaining steps consider
deviations that involve undercutting. Step 2 prepares the ground by describing the range of ai and
vi leading to undercutting. From here, it is straightforward to show that undercutting more than
two rivals is not protable: it leads to zero inverse ad demand and hence to a prot of zero (Step
3). The remaining steps consider undercutting two rivals. Step 4 considers the case of N = 3.
Here, by undercutting two rivals, broadcaster i captures all the market. It will choose vi such that
it just undercuts its two rivals since this is sucient to make all viewers watch broadcaster i.
We show that the resulting prot is smaller than the equilibrium prot. Steps 5 and 6 consider
undercutting two rivals in case of N > 3. Here, by undercutting two rivals, broadcaster i does
not capture all viewers. Step 5 shows that broadcaster i will not increase its program quality more
than necessary to just undercut two rivals. The intuition is that at the equilibrium broadcaster i is
already indierent whether or not to increase its program quality a bit, thereby winning viewers
but gaining a lower price for ads. At the considered deviation, broadcaster i already has more
viewers than in equilibrium, and thus prefers not to increase its program quality any more. Step 6
shows that the deviation prot from just undercutting two rivals is smaller than the equilibrium
prot.
Step 1: Find the prot maximizing decisions of broadcaster i assuming that broadcaster i does not
undercut any rival.
Suppose all broadcasters j 6= i behave as indicated. Then
u = vj − δaj = σ
β
− 2τ
N
.
The prot of broadcaster i is
pii = n
 1
N
+
vi − δai −
(
σ
β − 2τN
)
τ
(σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai
whenever (
1− ai
m
) σ
β
> vi > δai +
(
σ
β
− 2τ
N
)
− τ
N
.
Otherwise, prot is zero: if the rst inequality does not hold, inverse ad demand is zero, if the
second inequality does not hold, broadcaster i has no viewers. Therefore, broadcaster iwill choose
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an ai > 0 such that
3τ
N
(
σ
βm + δ
) > ai > 0. (F.8)
We rst consider the prot maximizing vi for a given ai satisfying (F.8). Note that pii is strictly
concave in vi. Solving the rst order condition
∂pii
∂vi
=
n
τ
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai − βn
 1
N
+
vi − δai −
(
σ
β − 2τN
)
τ
 ai = 0
for vi shows that the prot maximizing program quality is
v∗i (ai) =
1
2
((
1− ai
m
) σ
β
+ δai +
(
σ
β
− 2τ
N
)
− τ
N
)
.
Substituting v∗i (ai) into the prot of broadcaster i gives
pii (ai, v
∗
i (ai)) =
nβ
4τ
(
3τ
N
− ai
(
σ
βm
+ δ
))2
ai.
The rst order condition
d
dai
pii (ai, v
∗
i (ai)) = 0
has the solutions
ai1 =
3τ
N
(
σ
βm + δ
)
corresponding to the upper bound on ai in (F.8), and
ai2 =
ai1
3
=
mβτ
N (σ +mβδ)
which is equation (6.11) in the paper. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that pii (ai, v∗i (ai))
as a function of ai is: zero at ai = 0, strictly concave when ai < 2ai1/3, strictly convex when
2ai/3 < ai < ai1, and zero at ai = ai1. It follows that ai2 maximizes prot. Noting that v∗i (ai2)
is the value of vi given in the Proposition completes step 1.
Step 2: Describe the range of ai and vi leading to undercutting.
Suppose broadcaster j is a distance k/N away from broadcaster i. A consumer with ideal point
at the location of broadcaster j is indierent between the products of broadcasters i and j if
vi − δai − kτ
N
= vj − δaj .
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Consider a unilateral deviation of broadcaster i, while all broadcasters except i stick to the
equilibrium strategies, i.e., vj − δaj = σβ − 2τN . Thus, the consumer is indierent if
vi − δai = σ
β
− 2τ
N
+
kτ
N
.
For k = 1, 2, ..., the values of (ai, vi) satisfying this equation are the points of discontinuity
of the demand of broadcaster i. Note that the discontinuity at k = 1, 2, ... corresponds to just
undercutting 2k rivals. For simplicity and w.l.o.g., we break all ties in favor of broadcaster i,
i.e., we assume that if a broadcaster deviates then any consumer that is indierent between the
deviating and another broadcaster watches the deviating broadcaster.
To summarize, broadcaster i undercuts no rival if
vi − δai < σ
β
− 2τ
N
+
τ
N
.
Broadcaster i undercuts exactly 2k rivals, k = 1, 2, ... , if
σ
β
− 2τ
N
+
kτ
N
≤ vi − δai < σ
β
− 2τ
N
+
(k + 1) τ
N
.
Step 3: Broadcaster i cannot make a positive prot by undercutting more than 2 broadcasters.
By the symmetry of the behavior of broadcasters j 6= i, if broadcaster i undercuts more than
2 broadcasters, it undercuts 4 or more broadcasters. To undercut 4 or more broadcasters, the
program quality of broadcaster i needs to be vi ≥ σ/β+δai.However, then σ−βvi−σai/m < 0,
thus inverse ad demand is zero.
Step 4: Undercutting two rivals: the case N = 3.
Suppose that broadcaster i undercuts exactly 2 rivals. That is,
σ
β
− τ
N
≤ vi − δai < σ
β
.
If N = 3, this means broadcaster i has a market share of 1. The prot of broadcaster i is then
n
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai. (F.9)
Note this is strictly decreasing in vi, therefore, the optimal undercutting of two rivals satises
σ
β
− τ
3
= vi − δai.
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Solving for vi gives
vi = vˆi (ai) :=
σ
β
− τ
3
+ δai,
substituting in (F.9) shows that the prot is
pidevi (ai, vˆi (ai)) = n
(
σ − β
(
σ
β
− τ
3
+ δai
)
− σai
m
)
ai.
Note pidevi (ai, vˆi (ai)) is strictly concave in ai. The rst order condition
d
dai
pidevi (ai, vˆi (ai)) = 0
has the unique solution
adevi =
mβτ
6 (σ +mβδ)
.
Moreover,
vˆi
(
adevi
)
=
σ
β
− τ
3
+ δ
mβτ
6 (σ +mβδ)
.
The prot from the deviation is
pidevi
(
adevi , vˆi
(
adevi
))
=
3
4
nmβ2τ2
27 (σ +mβδ)
,
which is 3/4 of the equilibrium prot given in the Proposition.
It follows that in case N = 3, broadcaster i has no incentive to undercut two rivals.
Step 5: In case N > 3, from all strategies involving undercutting two rivals, the best strategy is at
a point of discontinuity of demand.
Suppose broadcaster i undercuts exactly 2 rivals:
σ
β
− τ
N
≤ vi − δai < σ
β
.
If N > 3, broadcaster i has a market share of
3
N
+
vi − δai −
(
σ
β − τN
)
τ
.
Prot is
piDevi (ai, vi) = n
 3
N
+
vi − δai −
(
σ
β − τN
)
τ
(σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai.
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We will show that this prot is maximal whenever i just undercuts two rivals, i.e., when
σ
β
− τ
N
= vi − δai. (F.10)
To see this, suppose that broadcaster i undercuts 2 rivals, and
σ
β
− τ
N
< vi − δai < σ
β
.
For a xed ai,
∂
∂vi
piDevi =
1
τ
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
− β
 3
N
+
vi − δai −
(
σ
β − τN
)
τ
nai.
Note that piDevi is strictly concave in vi. Moreover, at vi = σβ − τN + δai, we have
∂
∂vi
piDevi
∣∣∣∣vi=(σβ− τN +δai) =
(
1
τ
(
βτ
N
− βδai − σai
m
)
− β 3
N
)
nai
= −
(
1
τ
(
βδai +
σai
m
)
+ β
2
N
)
nai < 0.
Therefore, in the relevant range piDevi is strictly decreasing in vi for xed ai. It follows that the
best strategy involving undercutting two rivals must satisfy equation (F.10).
Step 6: In case N > 3, broadcaster i has no incentive to just undercut 2 rivals.
Suppose broadcaster i just undercuts 2 rivals, i.e., equation (F.10) holds. Then
piDevi = n
3
N
(
σ − βvi − σai
m
)
ai.
Solve equation (F.10) for vi = σβ − τN + δai and substitute into piDevi to get
piDevi = n
3
N
(
σ − β
(
σ
β
− τ
N
+ δai
)
− σai
m
)
ai.
Note that this is a strictly concave function of ai. The rst order condition
∂
∂ai
piDevi = 0
has the unique solution
ai =
1
2N
mβ
τ
σ +mβδ
.
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Inserting this into piDevi gives
pidevi =
3
4
nmβ2τ2
N3 (σ +mβδ)
which is 3/4 of equilibrium prot. It follows that broadcaster i has no incentive to just undercut
two rivals.
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